Summary: Spring labor offensive of 2002 sees dramatic changes
The Shunto, or spring labor offensive, began in 1952. It has been making its mark in history for over half a century.
However, this year’s shunto will be long remembered and talked about as extremely unique and epoch-making.
The employment situation this year was dismal: a lingering business recession and fears of entering a deflationary spiral, a first for Japan, along with conspicuous hollowing-out of the manufacturing sector and record unemployment rates. These were compounded by uncertainties about whether the current Administration can really carry out administrative and financial reforms and stimulate an economic recovery at the same time. As a result, anxiety was also spreading rapidly among the public.
Until now, employees have taken periodic pay increases completely for granted. For the first time, however, regular pay increases were a focus of attention this year, and whether or not to continue this practice loomed large in labor-management negotiations. This was truly an epoch-making turnaround.
Negotiations started off grudgingly, with one top manager after another insisting that there would be no wage hikes or across-the-board pay increases, and that they would revamp the periodic, mandatory pay hike system.
All eyes were focused on the reply made on March 13 by Toyota, which had posted record-high profits. Their reply, however, was that, although they decided to pay bonuses exactly as labor demanded, there would be no increases in base wage rates. These results, which were a great surprise to many, seemed to symbolize what this year’s shunto was all about. Toyota’s reply constituted a new message: that theirs was “a decision prioritizing the revival of Japan’s international competitive strengths,” and that “as long as there are mandatory pay hikes, no across-the-board wage increases are necessary. If a company did good business, it could reward the employees with bonuses.”
Of course, some unions did succeed in obtaining an across-the-board raise in employee wages. Still, the mass media immediately used such sensational headlines to describe this year’s spring labor offensive as “the dawn of shunto without increases in basic pay,” “a wage-reduction shunto,” or “the end of the wage-raise shunto.”
Immediately after settling their labor-management negotiations by guaranteeing periodic/mandatory pay raises, several major electric manufacturers, including Hitachi and NEC, announced their proposal to cut wages or freeze periodic/mandatory wage hikes for a limited period. The announcements were made separately from their shunto announcements, and created a major stir.
Another focus of this year’s shunto was employment protection. The National Federation of Iron and Steel Workers’ Unions originally pressed employers to conclude an Employment Protection Agreement, but agreed instead to exchange Confirmation Forms as documents corresponding to an “agreement” showing the management’s intention to make efforts to protect employment.
We could see some management executives who criticized these movements, saying that pledging to “protect employment” after cutting the workforce by tens of thousands made no sense at all.
Only a handful of unions brought up the concept of work sharing. Similarly, pay hikes for part-time employees failed to make any substantial progress.
As a result of the 2002 spring labor offensive, unions are now under pressure to make heroic efforts to prevent a precedent from being created and to develop new strategies for future shunto.
(Shunto: see JLF Vol.8, Vol.11, Vol.12, Vol.13)
However, this year’s shunto will be long remembered and talked about as extremely unique and epoch-making.
The employment situation this year was dismal: a lingering business recession and fears of entering a deflationary spiral, a first for Japan, along with conspicuous hollowing-out of the manufacturing sector and record unemployment rates. These were compounded by uncertainties about whether the current Administration can really carry out administrative and financial reforms and stimulate an economic recovery at the same time. As a result, anxiety was also spreading rapidly among the public.
Until now, employees have taken periodic pay increases completely for granted. For the first time, however, regular pay increases were a focus of attention this year, and whether or not to continue this practice loomed large in labor-management negotiations. This was truly an epoch-making turnaround.
Negotiations started off grudgingly, with one top manager after another insisting that there would be no wage hikes or across-the-board pay increases, and that they would revamp the periodic, mandatory pay hike system.
All eyes were focused on the reply made on March 13 by Toyota, which had posted record-high profits. Their reply, however, was that, although they decided to pay bonuses exactly as labor demanded, there would be no increases in base wage rates. These results, which were a great surprise to many, seemed to symbolize what this year’s shunto was all about. Toyota’s reply constituted a new message: that theirs was “a decision prioritizing the revival of Japan’s international competitive strengths,” and that “as long as there are mandatory pay hikes, no across-the-board wage increases are necessary. If a company did good business, it could reward the employees with bonuses.”
Of course, some unions did succeed in obtaining an across-the-board raise in employee wages. Still, the mass media immediately used such sensational headlines to describe this year’s spring labor offensive as “the dawn of shunto without increases in basic pay,” “a wage-reduction shunto,” or “the end of the wage-raise shunto.”
Immediately after settling their labor-management negotiations by guaranteeing periodic/mandatory pay raises, several major electric manufacturers, including Hitachi and NEC, announced their proposal to cut wages or freeze periodic/mandatory wage hikes for a limited period. The announcements were made separately from their shunto announcements, and created a major stir.
Another focus of this year’s shunto was employment protection. The National Federation of Iron and Steel Workers’ Unions originally pressed employers to conclude an Employment Protection Agreement, but agreed instead to exchange Confirmation Forms as documents corresponding to an “agreement” showing the management’s intention to make efforts to protect employment.
We could see some management executives who criticized these movements, saying that pledging to “protect employment” after cutting the workforce by tens of thousands made no sense at all.
Only a handful of unions brought up the concept of work sharing. Similarly, pay hikes for part-time employees failed to make any substantial progress.
As a result of the 2002 spring labor offensive, unions are now under pressure to make heroic efforts to prevent a precedent from being created and to develop new strategies for future shunto.
(Shunto: see JLF Vol.8, Vol.11, Vol.12, Vol.13)
