Keynote Report

# MIGRATION IN EUROPE : TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVES

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## Introduction

1. Although Europe is considered today more as an area of immigration and of acceptance of refugees, it also contributed in the past to migration flows, notably during the 19th century and up to the end of the 1960s. Recent trends show the ageing of European populations, which has rekindled the debate on migration as a way of increasing the working population at the beginning of the 21st century. Several recent studies have shown, however, that immigration alone will not be sufficient to modify the demographic structures of those European countries most affected by population decline.

2. Current debates are also considering the possibility of increasing labour immigration in order to compensate for the deficit in pension and social security systems as well as manpower shortages. At the same time, the social cost of immigration is growing, with the prolongation of the duration of stays of migrants and increases in family reunion inflows and the arrival of refugees and asylum seekers. In addition, in certain European countries, unemployment among foreigners is at a much higher level in relation to their proportion of the working population. Furthermore, second generation immigrants encounter difficulties with insertion in the labour market. The European immigration model has changed over time and the challenges faced by European societies require structural policies which go far beyond the role migration can play in the short and medium term to alleviate the consequences of population ageing.

3. This paper provides an overview of the main migration periods in postwar Europe to the present (Part I). The second part reviews recent trends in Europe. These are defined in part by the increase in labour-related migration responding to specific occupation shortages and the continued inequalities between nationals and some foreigners in participation rates, sectoral distribution, unemployment rates and working conditions.

4. Part III examines the migration challenges in an enlarged Europe with the accession of ten candidate countries later this year (1 May 2004), which will occur within a complex labour market framework. These new member states will also play an important role in the implementation of one of the most significant events within the European Union in terms of migration: the agreement under the Treaty of Amsterdam (1 May 1999) to create a common immigration and asylum policy. Part IV focuses specifically on the continued efforts and challenges facing the European Union in the development of this policy. Although the legal framework for the harmonised policy has been developed at a cautious speed, the European Union has succeeded particularly in the area of asylum affairs and joint external border control.

[1] This paper draws on a document prepared by Jean-Pierre Garson (OECD) and Anaïs Loizillon (Consultant, OECD) and presented at a conference jointly organized by the European Commission and the OECD "The Economic and Social Aspects of Migration," Brussels 21- 22 January 2003.

## I. POST-WAR MIGRATION IN EUROPE: AN OVERVIEW

5. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, European countries have experienced four main migration periods.

### A. The First Period: Employment-related migration and the reconstruction of Europe (1945- 1973)

6. Immediate post-war migration was characterised by the return of ethnic citizens and other displaced persons to their country of origin. Despite these mass migration flows across all of Europe, the reconstruction of post-war Europe generated large labour shortages. In response, government authorities of those concerned countries, firms and private agencies actively recruited migrant workers. These major migration movements within Europe and from developing countries contributed to the economic development and unparalleled growth which took place in Europe between 1945 and 1975, often referred to as the "Trente Glorieuses."

7. During the "Trente Glorieuses," European countries experienced strong economic growth supported by the development of heavy industry, manufacturing, building and public works sectors. Means of production were modernised and trade flows increased. The wave of migrants from Ireland and Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Italy) - all countries which faced stagnating economies and high unemployment rates - at first met the labour market needs of Western Europe. The same can be said for migrants from North Africa, Turkey, the former Yugoslavia and, in the particular case of the United Kingdom, the former Commonwealth. The Treaty of Rome, which led to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, was based on several principles, one of which allowed the free movement of persons between its six founding states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). As of the late 1960s, a significant increase in intra-Community migration occurred, mostly due to the large wave of Italian workers moving to the other five member countries. Yet, even after the institutional implementation of the free movement and settlement of persons in 1968, intra-Community employment-related migration remained relatively small compared to the larger migration waves originating mostly from third countries. (See G. Tapinos, *Regional Economic Integration and its Effects on Employment and Migration* in Migration and Development: New Partnerships for Cooperation, OECD 1994).

8. During this period, numerous bilateral agreements were signed, for example, between Germany and the following countries: Italy (1955), Greece and Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Switzerland also signed agreements with most of these countries. The name « *Gastarbeiter* » given in Germany to immigrant "guest" workers became somewhat of a paradigm. As such, the host country could continue to maintain its rate of economic growth and its firms could obtain cheap labour. Immigrant workers had greater employment opportunities than in their home country and were able to send remittances home to their families. After a period of work abroad, there was an expectation that migrant workers would return home with newly acquired skills. Workers usually were afforded temporary work permits and work contracts, generally renewed on an annual basis.

9. Between the early 1960s and the early 1970s (see P. Stalker, *The Work of Strangers*, 1994), more than 30 million foreign workers entered the European Economic Community. These figures include temporary workers and multiple entries. By the early 1980s, the resident foreign population in Western Europe had effectively tripled since 1950, reaching 15 million. In 2000, more than 20 million foreigners lived in the European Economic Area (EEA), accounting for 5.4% of the total population, with small variations among countries (see Chart 1).

## B. The Second Period: Economic crisis and new migration adjustments (1973-1989)

10. The beginning of the second period of migration was marked by the economic crisis of the mid-1970s due to the oil price increase in 1973. Several European countries reduced or tried to reduce immigration. Although employment-related migration fell dramatically until the late 1980s, other categories of migration entries increased significantly, especially family reunification flows.

11. The 1973 oil price increase brought the end of employment-related migration. Growing unemployment and increasing social tensions prompted governments to stop active recruitment policies. In some countries, the recruitment of new workers was made more difficult for employers by increasing the costs of recruitment, limiting the categories of workers and introducing annual quotas. Governments also implemented policies with the aim of encouraging migrant workers to return to their home countries.

12. In reality, the economic downturn did not lead to a massive return of immigrants to their home country. Many immigrants decided to remain in the host country to benefit from their social rights, which were similar to native workers. The economic situation in their home countries was markedly worse and, finally, many feared not being able to re-enter the host country. According to some United Nations estimates, only 10% of immigrant workers returned to their country of origin in the two years that followed the 1973 crisis. As a result, European Community countries observed that migration was part of a process not only reflecting the needs of the labour market, but also including a strong family component and a social cost linked to the presence of second generations. In Germany, for example, despite the formal end of immigration in November 1973, the foreign population increased from 4 million in 1973 to 4.5 million in 1980 (see H. Werner, *From Guests to Permanent Visitors: From the German "Guestworker" Programmes of the Sixties to the Current "Green Card" Initiative for IT Specialists*, 1999). Moreover, intra-Community migration stagnated due to the economic crisis and the convergence of salaries among member countries of the European Community (which grew in 1974 with the adherence of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark).

## C. The Third Period: Diversification of host and sending countries and the increase in the flows of asylum seekers, refugees and ethnic minorities (1990-2000)

13. The third migration period, which began in the late 1980s, is characterised by the diversification of host and sending countries. The traditional emigration countries in Europe, such as Spain, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Portugal, gradually became countries of immigration. Moreover, immigrants were no longer only coming from former colonies, as was the case for the United Kingdom and France, but from a more diverse group of countries, notably from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Migrants' motivations changed, as did their migration entry channels. A net increase in asylum seekers and refugees was observed, partially amplified by the effects of the political changes occurring in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union. Regional conflicts, such as those in the former Yugoslavia and Kurdistan, led to large flows of asylum seekers and refugees from those areas.

14. The increase in asylum applications was particularly strong in the early 1990s and reached a new peak in 1997, mostly due to the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. In 1983, Western Europe registered about 70 000 asylum seekers. This number was ten times higher in 1992 (largely the result of an increase in applications in Germany that year before the Constitutional reform was implemented in 1993). Applications then fell until 1996 (at 245 000) and registered a small increase in 1997 (260 000). In 2002, European Union countries recorded more than 382 000 asylum applications of a total 581 700 applications in nearly all OECD countries (see Table 1). The top five European countries, based on the absolute value of flows, are the United Kingdom, followed by Germany, France, Austria and Canada.

15. In addition to regional conflicts, the increase in asylum applications stemmed from the fact that numerous migrants had recourse to this entry channel, which remained their only possibility due to increased restrictions in migration policies. Delays in responding to applications led some applicants to settle definitely in the host country even though the rates of accepted applications and of refugee status granted were low.

16. This third period is also characterised by the predominance of family reunification flows in several European countries of the OECD and by a renewed interest in employment-related migration, notably for skilled and highly skilled labour in the late 1990s (see *Employment Outlook*, OECD 2001).

17. After the collapse of the former USSR and the opening of frontiers, East-West migration and particularly movement of ethnic minorities increased. These flows were significant during the late 1980s and the early 1990s and were directed to a limited number of European Union countries, mainly Germany. In 1989 and 1990, Germany welcomed more than 620 000 people of German ethnic descent (*Ausslieder*) originating from Poland, Romania and the former Soviet Union (see Table 2). Provisions in the German Constitution relating to ethnic German minorities encouraged these large flows. To a lesser extent, other countries such as Greece and Finland also recorded the return of ethnic minorities originating from the former Soviet Union and in the case of Finland, from the Baltic States. Moreover, the flow of the Roma people, mostly from Romania, Bulgaria, the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic, increased the ranks of other ethnic minorities in certain countries of Western Europe.

## D. The Fourth Period: Return of employment–related migration with a "preference" for skilled workers and temporary migration

18. The increase in permanent migration and especially temporary employment-related migration during this fourth period is the result of several factors. On the one hand, the intensity of the late 1990s expansion phase and, on the other, the development of information and communication technology, health and education, sectors which require skilled and highly-skilled labour in shortage in some countries contribute to this growth. The increase in employment-related migration also includes unskilled foreign labour, especially in agriculture, building and public works, and domestic services; this is notably the case in Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The ageing population phenomenon explains some of this renewed interest in labour-related migration.

19. All temporary labour migration categories are on the rise since 1998, especially in Germany, Australia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. Recent policies implemented to facilitate the recruitment of foreign labour have the tendency to favour solutions with temporary foreign workers. Foreign students also can contribute to help reduce labour shortages in host countries. The number of foreign students is quite important in the United States, but also in several countries of the European Union (United Kingdom, Germany, France and Spain) and Switzerland (see Table 3). Many OECD Member countries recently have brought about important changes concerning the possibilities of status changes and access to the labour market upon completion of training (see *International Mobility of the Highly Skilled*, OECD, 2002).

20. The 1990s have shown an increasing proportion of women among immigrants. This trend is particularly visible in France, Greece, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Italy. This feminisation concerns all components of migration flows. Women have formed an increasing proportion of employment-related migration and refugee flows, while earlier female migration to OECD countries was limited mostly to family reunification channels.

21. This rapid overview of the main periods marking European migration since the mid-1950s is not intended to be exhaustive. It is important to complete it, however, by highlighting two events which in our minds are related to the general framework of the economic and social aspects of migration. The first involves the persistence during this entire period of irregular migration and the employment of undocumented workers. In this context, some OECD countries have carried out amnesty programs (see Table 4). The second concerns naturalisations, which in many European Union countries have led to an increasing number of foreigners who join the ranks of nationals (see Chart 2 and Table 5). These processes reinforce the permanent and settlement nature of immigration (as is the case in Australia, Canada, the United States and New Zealand) and give migrants the possibility of obtaining full citizenship.

## II. MIGRATION AND THE LABOUR MARKET: RECENT TRENDS

22. Despite the recent improvement in the employment situation in the majority of OECD countries, there are still significant differences between nationals and immigrants in terms of labour market integration. Foreigners or immigrants generally have lower participation rates than nationals; such differences also exist between men and women (see Table 6) and among nationalities.

23. In a number of OECD countries, foreign or immigrant men have higher participation rates than nationals. This is true in particular in host countries where employment-related migration predominates, as in the countries of southern Europe (Italy, Greece) and Hungary. On the contrary, in the Netherlands and northern European countries (notably Sweden and Denmark), which traditionally receive many refugees, foreigners have appreciably lower participation rates than natives.

24. Chart 3 compares the trend in foreign employment and total employment since the start of the economic upturn (first half of the 1990s). In the older European immigration countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom), employment growth initially benefited mainly nationals. After four to six years, however, foreign employment increased sharply despite the strains appearing on the labour market and accelerating growth. In the new immigration countries such as Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, the trend is very different in the sense that foreign employment has been on an upward slope since the beginning of the economic upturn.

25. Table 7 provides an overview of the sectoral breakdown of foreign labour in the OECD countries in 2001-2002. It is noticeable, in particular, that foreigners are over-represented in certain sectors, meaning that they account for a larger proportion of employment in those sectors than they do in the total labour force. In the majority of OECD countries, over-representation occurs in secondary sector activities. In Germany and Japan, for example, more than a quarter of foreign employment is concentrated in mining and manufacturing. Foreigners are also over-represented in the construction sector in 11 of the 19 countries examined.

26. There is, however, an increasing similarity between the distributions of foreign workers compared to those of nationals implies that foreigners' labour market integration has been increasing. For example, second-generation young people arriving on the labour market usually have higher levels of education and training than their parents. Thus, young foreign workers are increasingly working in jobs with a "national profile" as opposed to those typically held by first-generation immigrants. In the specific case of the illegal employment of foreign workers, information obtained in the course of regularisation programmes indicates that they are on average younger than the remainder of the labour force and are widely distributed across the economy.

27. Generally, foreigners are more vulnerable to unemployment than nationals for a variety of reasons (see *Employment Outlook*, OECD 2003). In most European OECD countries, the share of foreign

or immigrant workers in the total number of unemployed is greater than their share in the active labour force.

28. The disparities in the unemployment rates of foreigners and nationals (see Table 6) and the fact that foreigners are affected differently by unemployment depending on their nationality are particularly attributable to economic trends and the nature of jobs held by foreigners. These differences also depend on the demographic structure of the foreign population and when the different waves of migration arrived in the various host countries. Migrants' profiles also determine their employability. Variables such as age, gender, nationality, category at entry (refugee, family member or worker), skill level, professional experience and the length of stay in the country play an important role in explaining the degree of vulnerability to unemployment. Knowledge of the language of the host country also contributes significantly to integration in the labour market and in society as a whole.

29. To assess the scale of the effort needed to offset the specific problems faced by foreigners or immigrants in OECD labour markets, one can calculate the number of new jobs theoretically needed to bring the foreign unemployment rate into line with that of nationals, assuming no change in the latter. This would have the effect of balancing the share of foreign or immigrant workers in the total number of unemployed to their share in the active labour force. Results for 2002 are shown in Table 8. What emerges is that, even in countries where foreigners are hard hit by unemployment, such as in Belgium, Finland, Sweden and France, the theoretical number of jobs that should be created, in fact, remains relatively small in proportion to the total labour force. Nevertheless, achieving this objective in the medium term means thinking about strengthening active measures in favour of employment, developing specific measures and stepping up the campaign against discrimination.

## III. MIGRATION CHALLENGES IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE

### A. A highly contrasted European "migration landscape"

30. European Union countries share a certain number of common concerns in the field of international migration. They want to improve the control of migration flows, grant refugee status to migrants who truly meet the Geneva Convention criteria, and, finally, cooperate actively with each other and sending countries to reach these objectives. This convergence of concerns and objectives, however, should not obscure the reality: the "migration landscape" in the European Union is extremely contrasted and the imminent adhesion of the 10 candidate countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia) will only accentuate that difference.

31. Older immigration countries, such as France, Belgium and the Netherlands registered important migration waves of foreign workers, sometimes accompanied by their family members, in the 1950s, 1960s until the mid-1970s. Along with Germany and the United Kingdom, these countries are currently managing second generations of immigrants and are quite concerned with the integration of foreigners and their children in the labour market and society in general.

32. In the early 1950s, the Scandinavian countries created the Nordic market allowing the free movement of people, merchandise and capital in the geographic area created by its member countries. These countries have not turned to a recruitment policy of foreign workers, but have given priority in their annual inflows to refugees and other migrants accepted under humanitarian conditions. This priority explains the fact that migration flows to this region during the past 20 years have mostly been composed of migrants from countries with civil wars or armed conflicts. The integration of these populations in the labour market and in Scandinavian society requires appropriate policies to respond to the need of displaced or uprooted persons.

33. From the 1850s to the 1950s, the Southern European countries and Ireland were categorised among the great countries of transatlantic emigration and later as the major purveyors of migrants to Europe. They have now become countries of immigration, facing for the most part (except Ireland) a large flow of undocumented workers. The imminent adhesion of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the European Union, for example, will help increase the contrast between the old and new countries of immigration. It is in this extremely contrasted landscape (including the diversification of sending countries of new arrivals and settled migrants, see Table 9) that migration, employment of foreigners and a common migration policy will have to be determined in the European Union.

## B. Beyond a one-dimension view of migration

34. The mobilisation of certain EU member countries around the issue of asylum seekers and the importance taken by this category during the past decade have made it such that migration as a whole has been assimilated to economic and political refugee movements in certain OECD Member countries and in numerous debates. This mobilisation recently was translated into the creation of a European Fund aimed at helping countries faced with a large number of asylum seekers and at risk of seeing this channel strongly reactivated. As countries share the cost burden of asylum seekers, one also wonders whether this policy risks prompting the reduction of current efforts to curb the flows of fake asylum seekers. Moreover, resources allocated to this Fund could rise considerably with an increase in asylum applications in countries hitherto less concerned, such as Italy, Spain and Greece, as well as three of the new candidate countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic).

35. Conversely, the varying degree of fear felt by each country that they will face a labour shortage now or in the near future has led some of them to "reduce" the migrant to his/her labour force dimension, even though past experience shows the complex character of different migration processes, from the arrival of the worker, to that of his/her family, to naturalisation. Beyond the questions related to the integration of immigrants in the host country society, migrants also retain more or less strong ties with their country of origin and this dimension should not be separated from the migration phenomenon.

36. Simplistic approaches to the migration phenomenon, sometimes communicated in messages to the public, have reinforced the perception of "Fortress Europe," during a period when immigration flows have increased throughout the 1990s (see Chart 4). Today, public opinion is not clear on whether one should continue to fight against irregular immigration and the employment of undocumented workers or if "Fortress Europe should transform itself into a more welcoming Europe."

37. In this context, various lobby groups (very powerful, but rarely representing immigrants), unresponsive sending countries and partisans of an increase in multiculturalism have led certain countries to adopt migration policies incoherent with other policies (e.g., policies favouring certain ethnic minorities or teaching the original language and culture, to the detriment of the acquisition of host country's language, a prerequisite for obtaining, keeping or regaining a job).

38. In their recent work, the OECD and the European Union already contributed to alleviate fears raised by the effects of EU enlargement on migration flows (see *Migration Policies and EU Enlargement*, OECD 2001). This research deserves to be extended and oriented toward the labour market aspects and the status of immigrants or foreigners in candidate countries. Moreover, it is hopeful that the EU/OECD Conference—the framework for this document—can bring about an in-depth study on the social and economic aspects of migration, similar to the one recently published by the British authorities (see *Migration: An Economic and Social Analysis*, Home Office 2001), who were concerned in delivering to the public a global message on migration linked with economic growth and the dynamic character of

British society. Going beyond the economic and social aspects of migration, the challenge here is first of all human and political.

## C. The employment of foreigners at the heart of future concerns

39. Theoretically, countries resorting to employment-related migration seek flexibility, especially adaptability to the current labour needs. In reality, we notice that countries with selective migration policies reconsider their strategy by seeking migrants with characteristics better adapted to the medium term needs of the labour market. This vision contrasts sharply with past approaches that focused on the temporary nature of employment-related migration. How can one reconcile employment-related migration policies with the changes occurring in the labour market?

40. In terms of migrants, the right to work mandates equal treatment as well as clear and non-discriminatory statutes reflecting equal pay and social protection. The conditions set by migrants are now systematically taken into consideration for skilled and highly skilled workers, while in the past this was not true for unskilled labour. The recent temporary programmes, however, are not sufficiently clear in terms of the status accorded to migrants. Future bilateral and multilateral agreements related to the labour force could be modified to provide better benefits to its various partners (the state, employers, and migrants). The OECD Secretariat recently evaluated such agreements and other forms of labour recruitment during a seminar in Montreux hosted by the Swiss authorities in June 2003 (OECD publication forthcoming).

41. Immigrants are expected to play a role in alleviating the impact of population ageing and certain countries even hope to increase immigration as a way to reduce or balance the pension systems deficit. Before even considering their degree of realism, such perspectives presume the implementation of a permanent migration policy, which few European countries have supported officially. In this respect, it would be beneficial to give serious thought to examples of such policies that have been in use for a long time in some non-European OECD countries (e.g., Canada, Australia).

42. In terms of labour shortage fears, which seem poorly identified for now (see special chapter on the role of migration in addressing future labour market needs in *Trends in International Migration,* OECD 2002), reliance on increased immigration is competing with and/or complementing goals to increase the participation rate of residents (including settled migrants), the possibility of increasing "labour saving" investments, relocations, etc. These challenges are tied to the future equilibrium of the labour market and deserve more in-depth analysis. Whatever the case, selective employment-related migration has several limits. In addition, the existence of old migration waves, the persistence of conflict in regions beyond the EU, close or far away, and the inequalities of development will continue to weigh on the volume of migration flows not "selected" by the host countries.

43. The fight against illegal inflows and the irregularity of entries and residence of foreigners will remain the core of migration policies in OECD Member countries. The effectiveness of these policies is a serious challenge because from these policies emanate the implementation of more active regular immigration policies. European Union countries are aware of these needs and the Council of the European Union has recently adopted several recommendations related to the crackdown on the employment of undocumented workers. Similarly, the Commission of the European Union wrote a report on illegal employment. This report identifies four categories of undeclared workers: those engaged in various jobs, those who are "non-active" economically, the unemployed and third country residents living illegally in the European Union. In other OECD Member countries, such as the United States, Canada and Mexico, international cooperation activities, when they exist, are mostly bilateral and often very specific.

## IV. DEVELOPING A COMMON EU IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICY[2]

44. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1 May 1999, the European Community gained limited jurisdiction on immigration issues. The treaty put forth a common immigration and asylum policy, which rapidly became one of the key development areas within the freedom, security and justice affairs of the European Union in preparation for the accession of new Member States (*i.e.*, by 1 May 2004). In October 1999, the Tampere European Council defined four objectives regarding immigration and asylum: partnership with sending countries, fair treatment of third country nationals, and management of migration flows and the development of a common European asylum system.

45. Starting from the premise that zero immigration policies were no longer appropriate, the European Commission defended that the new policy framework should balance economic and demographic developments within the EU with the situation in sending countries. The policy is comprised of two parts: a harmonized legislative framework and the co-ordination of EU Member State actions regarding combating illegal immigration and the management of legal migration flows.

### A. The adoption of a harmonised legal framework

46. The Commission's legislative programme considers four proposed directives, based on the purpose of stay: family reunification; labour immigration; entry of students, occupational trainees and volunteers; and the status of long-term residents. In addition, a specific proposal covers victims of trafficking in human beings.

47. The first text on legal immigration, adopted on 22 September 2003, concerned the right to family reunification with an increased flexibility regarding both the definition of family members and the conditions required to qualify for family reunification. A number of waivers were granted to certain EU Member States with respect to specific criteria on reunification for children.

48. The second text agreed to by Council of Ministers (on 6 June 2003) is a proposed directive on the status of third country nationals who are long-term residents. This proposal falls within the Tampere goal of reaching an integration policy that grants long-term residents rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens. These rights include the right to reside, receive education and work as an employee or self-employed person and the principle of non-discrimination vis-à-vis the citizens of the state of residence. Moreover, long-time residents should have the opportunity to obtain the nationality of the EU member state where they reside.

49. Negotiations on the proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals for the purpose of employment have ceased to move forward since spring 2002. This proposal established common definitions, procedures and criteria for the admission of employees and the self-employed and, in particular, proposed that residence and work permits be combined into a single document. The admission mechanism is expected to be based on the labour market testing of each application. That is, employers must demonstrate that the domestic labour market could not fill the vacancy, advertised through the intermediary of employment service agencies in EU Member States or the European Employment Service (EURES). Waivers would allow EU Member States to use other systems to meet labour shortages (*e.g.*, a national green card programme) or, conversely, limit permit delivery for economic reasons.

[2] Parts of this section draw on *Trends in International Migration*, OECD 2003 (Part I.C.4).

50. In addition, this directive planned to solidify the status of individuals legally working in the labour market for three years. In these cases, it stipulated that residence permit renewals should no longer depend on labour market requirements and, after five years of uninterrupted legal residence, should transfer to long-term resident status. Rather than advocating temporary or permanent immigration, the Commission is defending a progressive viewpoint based on the idea that migrants' rights should increase with their length of stay.

51. During the second half of 2003, the Italian Presidency placed the emphasis on issuing a directive to support a short-term residence permit to victims of illegal immigration or of trafficking in human beings who co-operate with the competent authorities. In addition, work will begin in 2003 on a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals for the purpose of studies, professional training or voluntary service.

52. At the initiative of EU Member States, several texts have been adopted relating to illegal immigration: the criminal responsibility of carriers transporting foreign nationals; the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals; the definition of facilitating unauthorised entry, transit and residence; and combating trafficking of human beings.

## B. Co-operation between EU Member States in combating illegal immigration

53. For a genuine common policy, the action taken by EU Member States with regard to immigration needs to be co-ordinated at the European level. The Council approved three action plans during the course of 2002, summarised below.

54. First, the Santiago Plan to combat illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings in the European Union consists in creating a global approach of both internal and external activities, using a thorough set of measures grouped under seven action areas: visa policy; information exchange and analysis; pre-frontier measures; border management; readmission and return policy (the last two which were later the subject of a special plan); police co-operation via the strengthening of the role of Europol and, lastly, penalties for various offences linked to illegal immigration.

55. The second plan consists in managing the external borders of the European Union. It was designed in line with the Schengen common area: one member state's surveillance of its own borders is carried out on behalf of all member states because of the abolition of checks at internal borders. The enlargement of the European Union means that some new member states will be responsible for checks on eastern borders once they are fully integrated into the Schengen area. While the Commission's proposal to create a European border guard was not included in the management plan, it has not been ruled out.

56. The last action plan is the development of a Community return policy for illegal residents. It is devoted to the strengthening of operational co-operation between EU Member States, creating minimum common standards or guidelines for return procedures, programmes specific to some third countries and the strengthening of co-operation with third countries. Operational co-operation between EU Member States and with third countries (*e.g.*, organising common return operations) is given priority over the development of common standards. Co-operation with third countries, which mainly relies on the signing of readmission agreements designed to facilitate the expulsion of the persons concerned, is proving more difficult than anticipated.

## C. Co-ordination in the management of legal migration flows

57. In contrast with their increased co-operation in combating illegal immigration, EU Member States are making less progress in co-ordinating the management of legal migration flows which has been inspired by the co-ordinated employment strategy. Some progress has been made, however, in the creation of a European Migration Network, comprised of national contact points designated by voluntarily participating EU Member States. The network will be responsible for analysing every aspect of the phenomenon of migration as well as for the improvement of data collection on migration and the exchange of best practices regarding the integration of third country nationals.

## D. A common European asylum system

58. In Tampere, heads of state and government agreed that a set of standards and measures for a common asylum policy should be adopted by May 2004 and fully inclusive of the 1951 Geneva Convention related to the status of refugees. The objectives included sharing the financial and physical burden and responsibility of a common asylum system among EU Member States so as to better manage asylum and the protection of displaced persons. A common asylum system includes the adoption of common minimum standards on procedures for granting refugee status, on increasing the speediness of decisions and on reception conditions.

59. The European Commission and Council have moved along rapidly on some issues related to implementing a common asylum policy. A significant achievement was the development of an agreed common list of safe countries, adopted by the Council on 28 November 2002. The Council declared that members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) were designated as safe countries and that EU candidate countries would be considered safe upon signature of the accession treaties. The candidate countries are an area of concern due to increasing numbers of asylum applications. The rise in asylum seekers observed in the early 1990s and, more recently, in 2000 and 2001 due to the increasing number of regional conflicts inflated the number of asylum seekers in many OECD countries. Central and Eastern European countries were particularly affected, as asylum applications increased by about 76% between 2000 and 2001, even though absolute numbers remained small.

60. Other steps to a common asylum policy are currently being developed and implemented. For example, since January 2003, EURODAC has been operational to reduce the number of second asylum applications lodged by asylum seekers rejected in another Member States, also known as the phenomenon of “asylum shopping.” This system, which helps to reinforce the Dublin Convention, collects and compares fingerprints of asylum seekers and persons who have crossed an external border in an irregular fashion and can identify if a previous asylum claim has been submitted.

## E. Integration of immigration policy and foreign relations

61. The Tampere European Council concluded that the European Union and its Member States needed to improve coherence between their internal and external policies, reflecting the need for integrating immigration and foreign policies. To that end, an integrated, comprehensive and balanced approach to tackling the root causes of illegal immigration would remain the European Union’s constant long-term objective. Closer economic cooperation, trade expansion, development assistance and conflict prevention is critical to promoting economic prosperity in sending countries and thereby reducing the underlying causes of migration. The Council expects full co-operation from third countries in dealing with illegal flows and agreed to implement punitive foreign policy measures that nonetheless would not jeopardise economic development. In 2002, nine third countries received priority action status in terms of

assistance to mange migration flows: Albania, China, Libya, Morocco, Russia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and Yugoslavia.

62. Moreover, readmission by third countries of persons illegally present in the European Union is a key component of EU foreign policy regarding immigration and the Commission has successfully negotiated agreements in three cases (Hong Kong, Macao and Sri Lanka). The Commission also proposed a programme for technical and financial assistance with a budget of €250 million over five years (2004-2008) to support those third countries with serious intentions of signing readmission agreements with the European Community in their efforts to ensure better management of every dimension of migration and asylum flows. The European Commission will also be conducting a study (to be completed by spring 2004) on the advisability of establishing legal immigration quotas at the European level with the object of facilitating co-operation with third countries.

## F. Challenges to harmonisation

63. A quick glance at the migration history of the European Union countries clearly shows that the stages of development of migration waves are different by country or groups of countries considered. For example, political changes in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s had a greater effect for geopolitical and historical reasons on migration flows in the 1990s in Germany and Austria (as well as in the United States and Canada) compared to France or the United Kingdom. This is also similar to what has happened after the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia and the civil war in that region: large refugees flows fled from Bosnia, Kosovo and, more recently, Albania to Germany, Sweden, Austria, Italy and Greece.

64. Germany has welcomed a large number of ethnic German migrants since 1989; Greece has received Greek minorities from Pontis in the former USSR and Albanians of Greek origin; Spain has been the target for some nationals from its former colonies in Central and Latin American; and Portugal can hardly ignore its similar connections with African countries with Portuguese as the official language or with Brazil. In the future, the same experiences will be felt in Poland with its ethnic minorities in Ukraine or in Hungary with Romania, just as France, Belgium, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands experienced in their time with their former colonies.

65. Tomorrow, with the EU enlargement, these geopolitical constraints will continue their impact on migration movements and policies. The precedent already has been set with the enlargement of the European Community in 1981 with Greece and in 1986 with Portugal and Spain. These experiences certainly provide us with useful lessons on how to manage the transition period which runs between adhesion and the entry into force of free movement, on one hand, and the free settlement of communitarian nationals in each of the member countries. The upcoming enlargement contains two new factors: first, several candidate countries are having difficulty in managing their migration flows originating from the former Soviet Union and certain Asian countries and to a lesser extent Africa. Second, numerous ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe continue to have a precarious political status and could feed into future migration flows to the European Union.

66. This group of factors clearly show that the European Union countries are facing very different situations with regards to migration: different migration histories, differing levels of economic dependency on immigration and varying concerns among countries about the flow of the past decade (composed mostly of asylum seekers, refugees and ethnic minorities). The Treaty of Amsterdam underscores the importance of creating a common migration policy for all member states. This remains an ambitious goal considering the varied landscape described above and the heterogeneity of the immigrant population that is already settled in the European Union area. Thus, one of the first challenges for migration in Europe will be to find

a common thread on the issue of migration management and the harmonisation of migration policies among European Union countries.

**Conclusion**

67. In this document, we first presented the main migration periods since the 1950s in Europe, followed by the brief description of the role of immigrants in the labour market. The last section focuses mostly on the complexity of the migration phenomenon and the situation which prevails in European Union member countries in order to identify the main challenges as well as the steps and limits of the harmonisation of general migration policies and employment-related migration policies in particular. This last section, while underscoring several migration challenges for the enlarged European Union, aims to spark the debate. It also hopes to reinforce the cooperation between the OECD and the European Union on subjects such as migration and the labour market, the integration of immigrants and the international cooperation between host and sending countries for management of migration flows and economic development.

68. Beyond the challenges raised in this document, several questions related to migration policies remain to be discussed. What will be the nature of future migration policies that the European Union will advocate for and at what level will they be applied (by region, country, groups of countries, all of Europe)? Will active employment-related migration policies be more selective, consist of more quotas, and, if so, for what category of workers or countries supplying the labour force? Are the policy goals the same for old and new countries of immigration, for old and new EU members? Up to what degree can migration policies be harmonised? Can they be defined without taking into consideration the migration policies of other large non-European immigration countries in the OECD zone?

# TABLES AND CHARTS

Table 1. **Inflows of asylum seekers in 2002**

Thousands and percentages

| | Thousands | average 1990-2001 | 2001-2002 % change |
|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 110.7 | 57.3 | 20.3 |
| United States | 81.1 | 91.7 | 28.3 |
| Germany | 71.1 | 170.5 | -19.5 |
| France | 51.1 | 31.9 | 8.0 |
| Austria | 37.1 | 14.8 | 23.0 |
| Canada | 33.4 | 29.6 | -19.6 |
| Sweden | 33.0 | 23.8 | 40.4 |
| Switzerland | 26.2 | 26.7 | 27.1 |
| Belgium | 18.8 | 20.6 | -23.4 |
| Netherlands | 18.7 | 33.5 | -42.7 |
| Norway | 17.5 | 6.7 | 18.2 |
| Ireland | 11.6 | 3.3 | 12.7 |
| Slovak Republic | 9.7 | 1.3 | 19.5 |
| Czech Republic | 8.5 | 4.3 | -53.1 |
| Italy | 7.3 | 10.7 | -45.7 |
| Denmark | 6.7 | 10.6 | -35.5 |
| Hungary | 6.4 | 4.1 | -32.9 |
| Spain | 6.2 | 8.4 | -34.9 |
| Australia | 6.0 | 9.6 | -54.2 |
| Greece | 5.7 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| Poland | 5.2 | 2.5 | 14.2 |
| Turkey | 3.8 | 5.5 | -26.7 |
| Finland | 3.4 | 1.9 | 108.5 |
| Bulgaria | 2.9 | 1.0 | 18.6 |
| Romania | 1.1 | 1.4 | -54.4 |
| Luxembourg | 1.0 | 0.6 | 51.4 |
| New Zealand | 1.0 | 1.2 | -36.1 |
| Japan | 0.3 | 0.2 | -28.6 |
| Portugal | 0.2 | 0.4 | 26.9 |
| **EU** | **382.6** | **390.3** | **-1.9** |
| **Central and Eastern Europe**[1] | **33.8** | **12.4** | **-25.2** |
| **North America** | **114.6** | **121.3** | **9.3** |
| **OECD**[1] | **581.7** | **567.5** | **-1.5** |

1. Above countries only.

*Sources* : Refer to the Statistical Annex of *Trends in International Migration* (OECD 2003 edition); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Labour Force Statistics 1982-2002* (OECD 2003 edition).

Table 2. **Inflows of ethnic Germans by country of origin to Germany, 1950-1998**

Thousands

| | Total | *of which:* Former USSR | Romania | Poland | Former CSFR | Others |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1950 - 1965 | 551.6 | 18.9 | 15.4 | 356.7 | 31.1 | 129.6 |
| 1966 - 1980 | 516.0 | 66.8 | 91.5 | 275.5 | 59.5 | 22.7 |
| 1981 - 1989 | 932.0 | 169.6 | 135.4 | 606.2 | 11.0 | 9.9 |
| 1990 - 1995 | 1 509.0 | 1 120.8 | 178.4 | 201.3 | 3.4 | 5.1 |
| 1996 | 177.8 | 172.2 | 4.3 | 1.2 | - | 0.1 |
| 1997 | 134.4 | 131.9 | 1.8 | 0.7 | - | 0.1 |
| 1998 | 103.1 | 101.6 | 1.0 | 0.5 | - | - |
| Cumulated total | 3 924.0 | 1 781.7 | 427.8 | 1 442.0 | 105.0 | 167.4 |

*Source:* Ministry of the Interior.

Table 3. **Stock of foreign students in selected OECD countries, 2001**
Thousands and percentages

| | Thousands | *Of which:* from an OECD country (%) |
|---|---|---|
| United States | 475.2 | 36.6 |
| United Kingdom | 225.7 | 58.9 |
| Germany | 199.1 | 52.0 |
| France | 147.4 | 28.1 |
| Australia | 121.0 | 22.4 |
| Japan | 63.6 | 33.4 |
| Spain | 39.9 | 64.6 |
| Belgium | 38.2 | 59.8 |
| Austria | 31.7 | 69.4 |
| Italy | 29.2 | 44.2 |
| Switzerland | 27.8 | 72.1 |
| Sweden | 26.3 | 60.1 |
| Turkey | 16.7 | 10.1 |
| Netherlands | 16.6 | 59.3 |
| Denmark | 12.5 | 42.6 |
| Hungary | 11.2 | 38.4 |
| New Zealand | 11.1 | 23.9 |
| Norway | 8.8 | 48.0 |
| Ireland | 8.2 | 75.8 |
| Czech Republic | 7.8 | 61.4 |
| Poland | 6.7 | 24.6 |
| Finland | 6.3 | 35.4 |
| Korea | 3.9 | 26.1 |
| Mexico | 1.9 | 37.2 |
| Slovak Republic | 1.7 | 39.1 |
| Iceland | 0.4 | 81.5 |

*Source:* Database on Education, OECD.

Table 4. **Main regularisation programmes of immigrants in an irregular situation in selected OECD countries, by nationality**

Thousands

| **Belgium** | | **France** | | | | **Greece** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **(2000)[1]** | | **(1981-1982)[2]** | | **(1997-1998)** | | **(1997-1998)[3]** | | **(2001)[4]** | |
| Dem. Rep. of Congo | 8.8 | Tunisia | 17.3 | Algeria | 12.5 | Albania | 239.9 | | |
| Morocco | 6.2 | Morocco | 16.7 | Morocco | 9.2 | Bulgaria | 24.9 | | |
| | | African countries | 15.0 | China | 7.6 | Romania | 16.7 | | |
| | | Portugal | 12.7 | Dem. Rep. of Congo | 6.3 | Pakistan | 10.8 | | |
| | | Algeria | 11.7 | Tunisia | 4.1 | Ukraine | 9.8 | | |
| | | Turkey | 8.6 | | | Poland | 8.6 | | |
| Other | 36.9 | Other | 39.1 | Other | 38.1 | Other | 60.3 | | |
| **Total** | **52.0** | **Total** | **121.1** | **Total** | **77.8** | **Total** | **371.0** | **Total** | **351.0** |

| **Italy** | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **(1987-1988)** | | **(1990)** | | **(1996)[5]** | | **(1998)[5]** | | **(2002)[6]** | |
| Morocco | 21.7 | Morocco | 49.9 | Morocco | 34.3 | Albania | 39.0 | | |
| Sri Lanka | 10.7 | Tunisia | 25.5 | Albania | 29.7 | Romania | 24.1 | | |
| Philippines | 10.7 | Senegal | 17.0 | Philippines | 21.4 | Morocco | 23.9 | | |
| Tunisia | 10.0 | Former Yugoslavia | 11.3 | China | 14.4 | China | 16.8 | | |
| Senegal | 8.4 | Philippines | 8.7 | Peru | 12.8 | Senegal | 10.7 | | |
| Former Yugoslavia | 7.1 | China | 8.3 | Romania | 11.1 | Egypt | 9.5 | | |
| Other | 50.1 | Other | 97.1 | Other | 120.8 | Other | 93.2 | | |
| **Total** | **118.7** | **Total** | **217.7** | **Total** | **244.5** | **Total** | **217.1** | **Total** | **702.2** |

| **Portugal** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **(1992-1993)** | | **(1996)** | | **(2001)[7]** | |
| Angola | 12.5 | Angola | 6.9 | Ukraine | 63.5 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 6.9 | Cape Verde | 5.0 | Brazil | 36.6 |
| Cape Verde | 6.8 | Guinea-Bissau | 4.0 | Rep. of Moldova | 12.3 |
| Brazil | 5.3 | Sao Tome and Principe | 1.2 | Romania | 10.7 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 1.4 | Brazil | 2.0 | Cape Verde | 8.3 |
| Senegal | 1.4 | | | Angola | 8.1 |
| Other | 4.8 | Other | 3.7 | Other | 39.8 |
| **Total** | **39.2** | **Total** | **21.8** | **Total** | **179.2** |

| **Spain** | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **(1985-1986)[8]** | | **(1991)** | | **(1996)** | | **(2000)[9]** | | **(2001)[10]** | |
| Morocco | 7.9 | Morocco | 49.2 | Morocco | 7.0 | Morocco | 45.2 | Ecuador | 52.3 |
| Portugal | 3.8 | Argentina | 7.5 | Peru | 1.9 | Ecuador | 20.2 | Colombia | 40.8 |
| Senegal | 3.6 | Peru | 5.7 | China | 1.4 | Colombia | 12.5 | Morocco | 31.7 |
| Argentina | 2.9 | Dominican Rep. | 5.5 | Argentina | 1.3 | China | 8.8 | Romania | 20.4 |
| United Kingdom | 2.6 | China | 4.2 | Poland | 1.1 | Pakistan | 7.3 | | |
| Philippines | 1.9 | Poland | 3.3 | Dominican Rep. | 0.8 | Romania | 6.9 | | |
| Other | 21.1 | Other | 34.7 | Other | 7.8 | Other | 63.1 | Other | 89.4 |
| **Total** | **43.8** | **Total** | **110.1** | **Total** | **21.3** | **Total** | **163.9** | **Total** | **234.6** |

| **Switzerland** | | **United States** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **(2000)[11]** | | **(1986)[12]** | | **(1997-1998)[13]** | | **(2000)[14]** | |
| Sri Lanka | 8.9 | Mexico | 2 008.6 | El Salvador | | | |
| Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia | 4.9 | El Salvador | 152.3 | /Guatemala | 300.0 | | |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 0.6 | Caribbean | 110.5 | Haiti | 50.0 | | |
| Turkey | 0.3 | Guatemala | 64.0 | Nicaragua | 40.0 | | |
| | | Colombia | 30.3 | Eastern Europe | 10.0 | | |
| | | Philippines | 25.7 | Cuba | 5.0 | | |
| Other | 0.5 | Other | 293.5 | | | | |
| **Total** | **15.2** | **Total** | **2 684.9** | **Total** | **405.0** | **Total** | **400.0** |

1. A regularisation programme started in January 2000. Asylum seekers who were residing in Belgium in October 1999 and who fill certain conditions could apply. Figures indicate the number of persons who applied (including dependents). A total of 35 000 dossiers have been received.
2. Excluding seasonal workers (6 681 persons) and around 1 200 small traders not broken down by nationality.
3. Persons who were granted a white card (first stage of the regularisation). Data by nationality are preliminary.
4. Number of applications of work and residence permits according to the October 2001 law.
5. Number of permits granted based on estimates done by M. Carfagna, "I sommersi e i sanati. Le regolarizzazioni degli immigrati in Italia" in Stranieri in Italia: Assimilati ed esclusi, A. Colombo and G. Sciortino (eds.), Mulino, Bologna, 2002.
6. Data refer to the number of applications.
7. The new foreigners act (January 2001) allowed the regularisation of undocumented Non-EU citizens in possession of registered work contracts.
8. Number of applications received.
9. Regularisation programme held from 23 March to 31 July 2000.
10. "Arraigo" programme. Excluding 24 600 other applications which have not yet been examined.
11. Programme called "Action humanitaire 2000." People accepted should have been in Switzerland since 31 December 1992 and have encountered big troubles.
12. Data refer to all persons granted a permanent residence permit (excluding their dependents) during the period 1989-1996 following the 1986 Immigration and Reform Control Act. Data are broken down by country of birth.
13. Includes some estimates of foreigners who are eligible for the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (November 1997) and for the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (October 1998).
14. Estimates of applications for legalization under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act.

*Sources:* Switzerland: Office des étrangers; France: Office des migrations internationales; Greece: National Employment Observatory; Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain: Ministry of the Interior; United States: Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Table 5. **Acquisition of nationality in selected OECD countries**
Thousands and percentages

| | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Countries where the national / foreign distinction is prevalent** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Austria | 11.9 | 14.4 | 16.3 | 15.3 | 16.2 | 16.3 | 18.3 | 25.0 | 24.6 | 32.1 |
| % of foreign population | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 4.2 |
| Belgium | 46.4 | 16.4 | 25.8 | 26.1 | 24.6 | 31.7 | 34.0 | 24.3 | 62.1 | 63.0 |
| % of foreign population | 5.0 | 1.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 2.7 | 6.9 | 7.3 |
| Czech Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 7.3 | 6.4 | 4.5 |
| % of foreign population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3.3 | 2.8 | 2.2 |
| Denmark | 5.1 | 5.0 | 5.7 | 5.3 | 7.3 | 5.5 | 10.3 | 12.4 | 18.8 | 11.9 |
| % of foreign population | 3.0 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 3.3 | 2.3 | 4.1 | 4.8 | 7.3 | 4.6 |
| Finland | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 4.0 | 4.7 | 3.0 | 2.2 |
| % of foreign population | 2.3 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 5.0 | 5.6 | 3.4 | 2.5 |
| France | 95.3 | 95.5 | 126.3 | 92.4 | 109.8 | 116.2 | 122.3 | 145.4 | 150.0 | 127.6 |
| % of foreign population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.5 | .. | .. |
| Germany | 179.9 | 199.4 | 259.2 | 313.6 | 302.8 | 271.8 | 236.1 | 248.2 | 186.7 | 178.1 |
| % of foreign population | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.8 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 3.7 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 2.5 | 2.4 |
| Hungary | 21.9 | 11.8 | 9.9 | 10.0 | 12.3 | 8.7 | 6.4 | 6.1 | 7.5 | 8.4 |
| % of foreign population | .. | .. | .. | 7.3 | 8.8 | 6.1 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 5.9 | 7.7 |
| Italy | 4.4 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 7.4 | 7.0 | 9.2 | 9.8 | 11.3 | 9.6 | 10.4 |
| % of foreign population | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| Japan | 9.4 | 10.5 | 11.1 | 14.1 | 14.5 | 15.1 | 14.8 | 16.1 | 15.8 | 15.3 |
| % of foreign population | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 0.9 |
| Korea | 0.6 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| % of foreign population | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 1.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Luxembourg | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 |
| % of foreign population | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| Netherlands | 36.2 | 43.1 | 49.5 | 71.4 | 82.7 | 59.8 | 59.2 | 62.1 | 50.0 | 46.7 |
| % of foreign population | 4.9 | 5.7 | 6.3 | 9.4 | 11.4 | 8.8 | 8.7 | 9.4 | 7.7 | 7.0 |
| Norway | 5.1 | 5.5 | 8.8 | 11.8 | 12.2 | 12.0 | 9.2 | 8.0 | 9.5 | 10.8 |
| % of foreign population | 3.5 | 3.6 | 5.4 | 7.2 | 7.6 | 7.6 | 5.8 | 4.8 | 5.3 | 5.9 |
| Portugal | .. | .. | .. | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 1.1 |
| % of foreign population | .. | .. | .. | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.5 |
| Spain | 5.3 | 8.4 | 7.8 | 6.8 | 8.4 | 10.3 | 13.2 | 16.4 | 12.0 | 16.7 |
| % of foreign population | 1.5 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 1.9 |
| Sweden | 29.3 | 42.7 | 35.1 | 32.0 | 25.6 | 28.9 | 46.5 | 37.8 | 43.5 | 36.4 |
| % of foreign population | 5.9 | 8.5 | 6.9 | 6.0 | 4.8 | 5.5 | 8.9 | 7.6 | 8.9 | 7.6 |
| Switzerland | 11.2 | 12.9 | 13.8 | 16.8 | 19.4 | 19.2 | 21.3 | 20.4 | 28.7 | 27.6 |
| % of foreign population | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
| United Kingdom | 42.2 | 45.8 | 44.0 | 40.5 | 43.1 | 37.0 | 53.9 | 54.9 | 82.2 | 90.3 |
| % of foreign population | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 3.7 | 3.9 |
| **Countries where the native-born / foreign-born distinction is prevalent** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 125.2 | 122.1 | 112.2 | 114.8 | 111.6 | 108.3 | 112.3 | 76.5 | 70.8 | 72.1 |
| Canada | 116.2 | 150.6 | 217.3 | 227.7 | 155.6 | 154.6 | 134.5 | 158.8 | 214.6 | 167.4 |
| United States | 240.3 | 314.7 | 434.1 | 488.1 | 1 044.7 | 598.2 | 463.1 | 839.9 | 888.8 | 608.2 |
| **EU** [1] | **457.5** | **478.7** | **577.6** | **612.3** | **629.3** | **588.9** | **608.2** | **643.1** | **643.1** | **615.8** |
| **EEA** [1] | **473.9** | **497.2** | **600.2** | **640.9** | **660.9** | **620.1** | **638.7** | **671.4** | **681.3** | **654.3** |
| **North America** | **356.5** | **465.3** | **651.4** | **715.8** | **1 200.3** | **752.8** | **597.5** | **998.7** | **1 103.4** | **775.6** |

*Note:* Statistics cover all means of acquiring the nationality of a country, except where otherwise indicated. These include standard naturalisation procedures subject to criteria such as age, residency, etc., as well as situations where nationality is acquired through a declaration or by option (following marriage, adoption, or other situations related to residency or descent), recovery of former nationality and other special means of acquiring the nationality of a country. For more details on sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex. The naturalisation rate ("% of foreign population") gives the number of persons acquiring the nationality of the country as a percentage of the stock of the foreign population at the beginning of the year.

1. Above countries only excluding Portugal.

Table 6. **Participation rate and unemployment rate of nationals and foreigners by sex in selected OECD countries, 2001-2002 average**

| | Participation rate | | | | Unemployment rate | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Men | | Women | | Men | | Women | |
| | Nationals | Foreigners | Nationals | Foreigners | Nationals | Foreigners | Nationals | Foreigners |
| Austria | 78.7 | 84.6 | 63.2 | 63.1 | 4.0 | 9.3 | 4.0 | 8.2 |
| Belgium | 72.8 | 71.2 | 56.2 | 42.7 | 5.1 | 14.3 | 6.6 | 17.8 |
| Czech Republic | 78.5 | 84.1 | 62.8 | 61.6 | 6.3 | 9.1 | 9.1 | 13.2 |
| France | 75.2 | 76.1 | 63.4 | 48.4 | 6.7 | 16.6 | 9.6 | 21.0 |
| Germany | 78.9 | 77.6 | 65.2 | 51.5 | 7.7 | 13.7 | 7.7 | 12.1 |
| Greece | 75.8 | 89.4 | 49.1 | 57.8 | 6.6 | 6.9 | 15.2 | 16.1 |
| Hungary (2001) | 67.5 | 77.3 | 52.4 | 53.1 | 6.3 | 2.2 | 5.0 | 7.7 |
| Ireland | 78.8 | 77.3 | 56.7 | 56.4 | 4.3 | 4.9 | 3.6 | 5.5 |
| Luxembourg | 73.0 | 81.8 | 48.4 | 59.1 | 1.3 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 4.2 |
| Netherlands | 85.3 | 68.9 | 68.1 | 52.1 | 2.0 | 4.4 | 2.6 | 5.0 |
| Spain | 78.3 | 88.3 | 51.2 | 63.8 | 7.4 | 11.4 | 15.7 | 17.0 |
| Sweden | 80.5 | 71.0 | 76.9 | 60.4 | 4.9 | 12.1 | 4.3 | 9.3 |
| Switzerland | 88.8 | 89.6 | 74.1 | 71.2 | 1.7 | 4.6 | 2.6 | 6.2 |
| United Kingdom | 82.7 | 76.4 | 68.7 | 56.3 | 5.3 | 8.4 | 4.1 | 7.5 |
| Australia (2001) [1] | 81.7 | 77.8 | 67.6 | 59.3 | 7.8 | 8.6 | 6.2 | 8.1 |
| Canada (2001) [1] | 73.9 | 68.7 | 62.3 | 54.6 | 7.8 | 6.8 | 7.0 | 8.1 |
| United States [1] | 82.0 | 86.5 | 72.2 | 62.6 | 6.0 | 5.6 | 4.7 | 6.3 |

*Note:* Calculations are made on labour force aged 15 to 64 with the exception of Canada (15 and over) and the United States (16 to 64 years old).

1. The data refer to the native and foreign-born populations.

*Sources:* Labour force surveys, figures supplied by Eurostat; 2001 Census, Australian Bureau of Statistics; 2001 Census, Statistics Canada; Current Population Survey March Supplement, US Bureau of the Census.

Table 7. **Employment of foreigners by sectors, 2001-2002 average**

Percentage of total foreign employment

| | Agriculture and fishing | Mining, Manufacturing and Energy | Construction | Wholesale and retail trade | Hotels and restaurants | Education | Health and other community services | Households | Admin. and ETO | Other services |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 1.1 | **24.5** | **13.5** | 15.2 | **11.3** | 2.1 | 6.3 | **0.6** | 1.2 | **24.2** |
| Belgium | 0.9 | **21.4** | **9.0** | **16.0** | **7.9** | 4.3 | 8.0 | **0.9** | 8.3 | 23.3 |
| Czech Republic | 3.5 | 31.5 | **11.0** | **19.5** | **7.2** | 3.1 | 4.9 | .. | - | 18.2 |
| Finland | - | 15.3 | **7.8** | **14.5** | **11.0** | **10.8** | 11.5 | - | - | **27.2** |
| France | 3.2 | 17.2 | **17.5** | 11.3 | **7.3** | 3.2 | 5.1 | **6.7** | 2.7 | **25.8** |
| Germany | 1.2 | **32.6** | **8.1** | 12.9 | **11.3** | 2.7 | 7.0 | **0.6** | 2.3 | 21.4 |
| Greece | 3.2 | **17.9** | **27.6** | 11.2 | **10.2** | 1.6 | 1.6 | **17.2** | - | 9.2 |
| Ireland | 3.2 | 17.2 | 6.9 | 10.2 | **13.8** | 5.4 | **10.3** | - | - | **30.1** |
| Japan [1] | 0.4 | **61.5** | 2.0 | 9.3 | [1] | .. | .. | .. | .. | **26.8** |
| Luxembourg | 0.8 | 10.4 | **16.4** | **14.1** | **8.2** | 2.3 | 6.1 | **3.1** | 8.7 | **29.8** |
| Netherlands | **3.7** | **21.4** | 4.7 | 15.4 | **8.0** | 4.1 | 11.7 | .. | 3.5 | **27.6** |
| Norway | - | **16.1** | 6.1 | 12.5 | **7.3** | **9.5** | **21.3** | - | - | 23.1 |
| Spain | **8.6** | 11.2 | **15.8** | 10.9 | **16.5** | 3.2 | 1.9 | **14.8** | 0.5 | 16.8 |
| Sweden | - | **19.3** | 3.3 | 10.7 | **5.9** | **8.2** | **19.2** | - | 2.8 | **29.6** |
| Switzerland | 0.8 | **22.9** | **10.2** | **17.9** | **6.9** | 5.0 | 11.6 | **1.2** | 2.5 | 21.0 |
| United Kingdom | - | 12.0 | 4.4 | 12.0 | **11.0** | 7.7 | **14.0** | **1.3** | 4.1 | **33.1** |
| Australia [2] | 2.0 | **17.5** | 7.3 | 17.0 | 5.5 | 6.2 | **10.3** | 3.2 | 3.5 | **27.3** |
| Canada (2001) [2] | 1.8 | **19.1** | 4.7 | 14.2 | **7.4** | 5.7 | 9.4 | **0.6** | 3.9 | 33.2 |
| United States [2] | **3.2** | **17.2** | **8.2** | 20.1 | **10.3** | 5.7 | **10.6** | **1.5** | 2.2 | 20.9 |

*Note:* The numbers in bold indicate the sectors where foreigners are over-represented (*i.e.,* the share of foreign employment in the sector is larger than the share of foreign employment in total employment). The sign "-" indicates that the estimate is not statistically significant.

1. Data refer to June 2001. The "Hotels and restaurants" sector is included in the "Wholesale and retail trade" sector.

2. Data refer to the foreign-born population 15+.

*Sources:* European countries: European Community Labour Force Survey, data provided by Eurostat; Australia, Japan: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Survey March Supplements; Canada: 2001 Census.

Table 8. **Additional jobs required to equalise national and foreign unemployment rates in selected OECD countries, 2002**

| | Number (Thousands) | Per cent of the total labour force |
|---|---|---|
| Austria | 19.9 | 0.5 |
| Belgium | 38.3 | 0.9 |
| Denmark | 5.3 | 0.2 |
| Germany | 192.2 | 0.5 |
| France | 162.5 | 0.6 |
| Netherlands | 7.8 | 0.1 |
| Sweden | 14.0 | 0.3 |
| Switzerland | 30.3 | 0.8 |
| United Kingdom | 43.4 | 0.1 |
| United States | 119.1 | 0.1 |

*Note:* Secretariat calculations.

*Sources:* European countries: European Community Labour Force Survey (data provided by Eurostat); United States: Current Population Survey March Supplement; Denmark: Population register (2001).

Table 9. **Relative importance of the top 5 countries in the total immigration flows and stocks of foreigners in selected OECD countries**
Main immigrants' countries of origin in 2001

| Top 5 nationalities (according to the 2001 volume of inflows) | Inflows of foreigners in 2001[1] % of total inflows (A) | Stocks of foreigners in 2000[2] % of total stock of foreigners (B) | (A)/(B) | Top 5 nationalities (according to the 2001 volume of inflows) | Inflows of foreigners in 2001[1] % of total inflows (A) | Stocks of foreigners in 2000[2] % of total stock of foreigners (B) | (A)/(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Australia** | | | | **Austria** | | | |
| New Zealand | 17.6 | 8.3 | *2.1* | Germany | 13.9 | .. | .. |
| United Kingdom | 9.8 | 26.9 | *0.4* | Turkey | 10.3 | 17.3 | *0.6* |
| China | 7.5 | 3.7 | *2.0* | Bosnia-Herzegovina | 8.7 | | |
| South Africa | 6.4 | 1.8 | *3.6* | Federal Republic of Yugoslavia | 8.3 | 45.1 | *0.5* |
| India | 5.7 | 2.4 | *2.3* | Croatia | 7.2 | | |
| *Total (in thousands)* | *88.9* | *4 517.0* | | *Total (in thousands)* | *74.8* | *775.9* | |
| **Belgium** | | | | **Canada** | | | |
| Netherlands | 12.4 | 10.3 | *1.2* | China | 16.1 | 6.1 | *2.6* |
| France | 12.2 | 12.7 | *1.0* | India | 11.1 | 5.8 | *1.9* |
| Morocco | 10.7 | 12.4 | *0.9* | Pakistan | 6.1 | 1.5 | *4.2* |
| Turkey | 4.5 | 6.5 | *0.7* | Philippines | 5.2 | 4.3 | *1.2* |
| Poland | 4.4 | 0.8 | *5.5* | Korea | 3.8 | 1.3 | *3.0* |
| *Total (in thousands)* | *66.0* | *861.7* | | *Total (in thousands)* | *250.3* | *5 448.5* | |
| **Denmark** | | | | **Finland** | | | |
| Iraq | 12.6 | 5.3 | *2.4* | Russian Federation | 23.0 | 22.6 | *1.0* |
| Afghanistan | 11.9 | 1.6 | *7.3* | Estonia | 9.9 | 11.9 | *0.8* |
| Norway | 4.7 | 5.0 | *0.9* | Sweden | 6.1 | 8.7 | *0.7* |
| Somalia | 3.8 | 5.6 | *0.7* | China | 3.0 | 1.8 | *1.6* |
| Germany | 3.8 | 4.9 | *0.8* | Thailand | 2.6 | 1.4 | *1.8* |
| *Total (in thousands)* | *25.2* | *258.6* | | *Total (in thousands)* | *11.0* | *91.1* | |
| **France** | | | | **Germany** | | | |
| Morocco | 16.1 | 15.4 | *1.0* | Poland | 11.6 | 4.1 | *2.8* |
| Algeria | 13.0 | 14.6 | *0.9* | Turkey | 8.0 | 27.4 | *0.3* |
| Turkey | 5.9 | 6.4 | *0.9* | Federal Republic of Yugoslavia | 5.3 | 14.9 | *0.4* |
| Tunisia | 5.6 | 4.7 | *1.2* | Italy | 4.2 | 8.5 | *0.5* |
| United States | 2.2 | 0.7 | *3.2* | Russian Federation | 4.1 | 1.6 | *2.6* |
| *Total (in thousands)* | *128.1* | *3 263.2* | | *Total (in thousands)* | *685.3* | *7 296.9* | |
| **Hungary** | | | | **Italy** | | | |
| Romania | 51.8 | 37.8 | *1.4* | Albania | 12.0 | 10.2 | *1.2* |
| Ukraine | 12.5 | 8.1 | *1.5* | Romania | 8.0 | 5.0 | *1.6* |
| Former Yugoslavia | 5.2 | 11.5 | *0.5* | Morocco | 7.7 | 11.5 | *0.7* |
| Germany | 3.7 | 6.8 | *0.5* | China | 3.8 | 4.3 | *0.9* |
| Slovak Republic | 2.6 | 1.4 | *1.8* | Poland | 3.8 | 2.3 | *1.7* |
| *Total (in thousands)* | *19.5* | *110.0* | | *Total (in thousands)* | *232.8* | *1 388.2* | |

Table 9. **Relative importance of the top 5 countries in the total immigration flows and stocks of foreigners in selected OECD countries** *(cont.)*
Main immigrants' countries of origin in 2001

| Top 5 nationalities (according to the 2001 volume of inflows) | Inflows of foreigners in 2001[1] % of total inflows (A) | Stocks of foreigners in 2000[2] % of total stock of foreigners (B) | (A)/(B) | Top 5 nationalities (according to the 2001 volume of inflows) | Inflows of foreigners in 2001[1] % of total inflows (A) | Stocks of foreigners in 2000[2] % of total stock of foreigners (B) | (A)/(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Japan** | | | | **Luxembourg** | | | |
| China | 24.6 | 19.9 | *1.2* | Portugal | 20.6 | 35.5 | *0.6* |
| Philippines | 24.2 | 8.6 | *2.8* | France | 19.1 | 12.2 | *1.6* |
| Brazil | 8.5 | 15.1 | *0.6* | Belgium | 13.4 | 9.2 | *1.5* |
| Korea | 7.0 | 37.7 | *0.2* | Germany | 5.9 | 6.4 | *0.9* |
| United States | 5.9 | 2.7 | *2.2* | Italy | 5.4 | 12.3 | *0.4* |
| *Total (in thousands)* | *351.2* | *1 686.4* | | *Total (in thousands)* | *11.1* | *164.7* | |
| **Netherlands** | | | | **New Zealand** | | | |
| United Kingdom | 6.2 | 6.2 | *1.0* | China | 19.1 | 5.6 | *3.4* |
| Germany | 5.4 | 8.2 | *0.7* | United Kingdom | 15.8 | 31.3 | *0.5* |
| Morocco | 5.2 | 16.7 | *0.3* | India | 7.8 | 3.0 | *2.6* |
| Turkey | 5.1 | 15.1 | *0.3* | Japan | 5.9 | 1.2 | *4.8* |
| United States | 3.3 | 2.2 | *1.5* | Australia | 5.9 | 8.1 | *0.7* |
| *Total (in thousands)* | *94.5* | *667.8* | | *Total (in thousands)* | *62.1* | 698.6 | |
| **Norway** | | | | **Portugal** | | | |
| Sweden | 12.1 | 13.7 | *0.9* | Angola | 13.3 | 9.8 | *1.4* |
| Denmark | 7.9 | 10.5 | *0.8* | Cape Verde | 11.7 | 22.6 | *0.5* |
| Iraq | 4.6 | 5.4 | *0.9* | Brazil | 10.1 | 10.7 | *0.9* |
| Germany | 4.3 | 3.8 | *1.1* | Spain | 9.7 | 5.9 | *1.6* |
| Somalia | 4.2 | 3.3 | *1.2* | Guinea-Bissau | 9.4 | 7.7 | *1.2* |
| *Total (in thousands)* | *25.4* | *184.3* | | *Total (in thousands)* | *14.2* | *208.0* | |
| **Sweden** | | | | **Switzerland** | | | |
| Iraq | 14.8 | 6.9 | *2.1* | Germany | 14.6 | 8.0 | *1.8* |
| Finland | 7.8 | 20.7 | *0.4* | Former Yugoslavia | 7.5 | 24.4 | *0.3* |
| Norway | 6.9 | 6.7 | *1.0* | France | 6.5 | 4.4 | *1.5* |
| Denmark | 5.7 | 5.4 | *1.1* | Italy | 5.4 | 23.2 | *0.2* |
| Former Yugoslavia | 5.4 | 4.2 | *1.3* | United Kingdom | 3.9 | 1.5 | *2.6* |
| *Total (in thousands)* | *44.1* | *476.0* | | *Total (in thousands)* | *99.5* | *1 384.4* | |
| **United Kingdom** | | | | **United States** | | | |
| United States | 12.1 | 4.9 | *2.5* | Mexico | 19.4 | 29.5 | *0.7* |
| India | 10.0 | 6.5 | *1.5* | India | 6.6 | 3.3 | *2.0* |
| Australia | 9.8 | 3.2 | *3.1* | China | 5.3 | 3.2 | *1.7* |
| South Africa | 7.0 | 2.3 | *3.1* | Philippines | 5.0 | 4.4 | *1.1* |
| Philippines | 4.3 | 0.9 | *5.0* | Vietnam | 3.3 | 3.2 | *1.0* |
| *Total (in thousands)* | *373.3* | *2 342.0* | | *Total (in thousands)* | *1 064.3* | *31 107.9* | |

1. For Australia, New Zealand and United States, data relate to fiscal year.
2. Stock of foreign-born population for Australia, Canada (2001 Census), New Zealand (2001 census) and the United States.
Stock of foreigners for France is from 1999 census, except for US citizens where data are from 1990 Census.

*Sources:* National Statistical Offices. For details, refer to the Statistical Annex of *Trends in International Migration* (OECD, 2003).

Chart1. **Components of total population growth in the European Union and selected OECD countries, 1960-2001**

Per 1000 inhabitants at the beginning of the year



Chart 1. **Components of total population growth in the European Union and selected OECD countries, 1960-2001** *(cont.)*

Per 1000 inhabitants at the beginning of the year




1. Excluding Portugal and Greece for all years and the United Kingdom from 1999 on.

*Source: Labour Force Statistics,* OECD, 2002.

Chart 2. **Naturalisation rate in selected OECD countries, 1990-2001**
Annual average, per 100 foreigners




Annual average, per 100 foreign-born




*Note:* Number of naturalised persons as a percentage of the stock of foreigners (stock of foreign-born for Australia, Canada and the United States) at the beginning of the year.
*Source:* Refer to the Statistical Annex of *Trends in International Migration* (OECD, 2003).

Chart 3. **Changes in foreign and total employment during economic recoveries**
Index: trough=100[1,2]




1. Data for Australia and the United-States refer to the foreign-born population.
2. Grey areas and dates in parentheses indicate a recession (i.e., when GDP in volume decreased for two consecutive quarters).

*Sources:* European countries: European Community Labour Force Survey (data provided by Eurostat); Australia: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Survey.

Chart 4. **Inflows of foreigners in some OECD countries, 1980-2001**
Thousands, per 1 000 inhabitants and per 100 foreigners

**Inflows of foreigners [1], 1980-2001**
% of total population
**Permanent immigrants**




**Durations greater than one year**




**Durations greater than one year**




**Both short and long durations**




**Inflows of foreigners in 2001**
Thousands, per 1 000 inhabitants and per 100 foreigners

**Thousands**




**Per 1 000 inhabitants**




**Per 100 foreigners [6]**




*Note:* Data for the United Kingdom have been revised and come from the International Passenger Survey; for New Zealand, refer now to residence approvals. For Australia, Canada and the United States, data relate to new permanent immigrants; for France and South European countries, data are issued from residence permits.
For Australia, data refer to fiscal year (July to June of the given year) and for United States, data refer to fiscal year (October to September of the given year).
For all other countries, data are based on Population Registers.

1. The host countries have been split into 4 groups according to the duration of the resident permits. The first group relates to the countries in which inflows refer only to permanent stay; the second and the third, where the duration of stay is greater than one year; and the fourth group refers to both short and long durations of stay.
2. Excluding immigrants legalised in the United States under IRCA regularisation programme.
3. Data for Ireland come from LFS and include persons who have a residence in Ireland and who did not live there one year ago.
4. Excluding Iceland. Data for Nordic countries include Norway figures which cover envisaged stays for more than six months.
5. Including foreigners who benefited from the 1998 regularisation programme.
6. For Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, inflows in 2001 are related to the stocks of foreign-born residents.

*Sources:* National Statistical Offices, Canada: Census 2001. For more details on sources, refer to the Statistical Annex of *Trends in International Migration* (OECD, 2003).