Keynote Report

REGIONAL PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: NORTH AMERICAN PRESENT AND FUTURE

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Executive Summary

The North American migration system includes some of the world's major sources and destinations of migrants. Canada and the US, for example, include about 5 percent of the world's population and accept about half of the world's 2.5 million anticipated legal settler immigrants each year. Mexico is a major source of migrants, sending 200,000 to 300,000 legal settlers abroad and at least as many unauthorized settlers. Other Latin American countries similarly send legal settlers, legal nonimmigrant tourist and foreign workers, and unauthorized migrants abroad, so that, in many Latin American countries, over 10 percent of the persons born in the country are abroad.

Foreigners enter Canada and the US through doors labeled immigrant, nonimmigrant, or unauthorized, but many do not stay in the channel associated with their entry door. For example, over half of the immigrants "to the US" in recent years were already in the US when they got their immigrant visas; they arrived as nonimmigrant tourists or students, or

arrived illegally, and later adjusted to immigrant status. The canals linking the three major entry channels have become far more complex, but the most important result is that regardless of how a foreigner arrived, he or she may be able to eventually achieve immigrant status. On the other hand, especially since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, US immigration policy has adopted a one-strike-and-you-are-out policy, meaning that committing a crime in the US can lead to deportation.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada, and Mexico went into effect on January 1, 1994, and was expected to allow increased investment and trade to substitute for Mexico-US migration. Trade increased, but so did migration—there was a migration hump or more Mexico-US migration in the 1990s as Mexicans displaced from agriculture and other previously protected sectors migrated northward, many of the women to border-area factories known as maquiladoras and many of the men to the US. Instead of deepening Nafta, the US is negotiating more bilateral and regional free trade agreements and considering proposals to legalize at least some Mexicans illegally in the US.

Migrants in the US are concentrated at the extremes of the education ladder, with more years of schooling than the average American and less. All migrants seem to find US jobs relatively easily, and those with college degrees or more usually earn as much or more than similar Americans. However, about 40 percent of the foreign-born US residents have not finished secondary schools, meaning that they have less than 12 years of education, and many are having a hard time closing the gap between their US incomes and the incomes of similar Americans.

Trade is the major relationship between Canada and the US—there is over $1 billion a day in two-way trade, and cross-border commuting, just-in-time parts deliveries in the auto industry, and increased integration in industries from agriculture and natural resources to manufacturing helped to ensure that, even after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the border did not disrupt economic ties. About 20,000 Canadians a year migrate to the US, but the fastest growth in Canada-US migration has been under Nafta's Chapter 16, which permits Canadian and Mexican professionals in 60+ occupations to accept US job offers and stay in the US indefinitely. The number of Canadian entries tripled between the mid-1990s and 2002 to 70,000 a year, while the number of Mexican entries has remained below 2,500 a year.

Migration remains the most important relationship with Mexico and most other Latin American countries, which is one reason why Mexican President Vincente Fox made a new migration agreement his number one foreign policy priority after being elected in 2000. There was discussion of a "whole enchilada" migration agreement in 2001 that would include exempting Mexico from immigration quotas, cooperation to reduce deaths of migrants trying to enter the US, a new guest worker program and legalization for irregular Mexicans in the US. Discussion of what to do about especially unauthorized migrants was renewed in the US in January 2004, but it is not clear if the outcome of these negotiations will be legalizing irregular migrants, turning them into guest workers,

giving them a temporary status that can later be converted to immigrant status, or some combination of these options.

The US is pursuing additional bilateral and regional trade agreements. The agreements with Chile and Singapore included Nafta-type provisions that allow the entry of professionals to accept US jobs; the Central American Free Trade Agreement and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas do not have such migration provisions. There is hope that increased trade and investment can be a substitute for irregular migration, but the experience under Nafta shows that migration is likely to first increase with economic integration before hopefully decreasing.

Introduction

The North American migration system includes some of the world's major emigration and immigration destinations, defined in volume terms (migration between Mexico and the US averaged 2,300,000 legal immigrants a year in the 1990s, plus 300,000 unauthorized settlers) or in per capita terms (between 10 and 20 percent of persons born in the Dominican Republic and El Salvador have emigrated; Canada aims to increase its population by one percent a year via immigration).

Migration has demographic and economic impacts in both sending and receiving areas. Canada and the US have some of the fastest growing populations among industrial countries, and especially in the US the normal route to immigrant status is to enter in another status, such as student, tourist, or unauthorized foreigner, and later adjust to immigrant status—over half of US immigrants in recent years were in the US and adjusted their status. Many Latin American countries are very dependent on remittances from migrants abroad, including Mexico, which received about $12 billion in 2003. Finally, there is growing migration within the region, as from Nicaragua to Costa Rica, Haiti to Dominican Republic, and Guatemala to Mexico.

Canada

Canada has relatively high levels of immigration, generous social welfare programs, and significant public satisfaction with its immigration policies, which many analysts attribute to the fact that Canada does not border on a major emigration country, has very flexible policies, and admits most immigrants under a point system designed to ensure that they are an economic asset to Canada. Canada, with 32 million residents, would like more immigrants: Prime Minister Jean Chretien in July 2002 said that Canada's "population is not growing as fast as it should. And it's why we have a very open immigration policy. We're working to reform it because we don't achieve as many immigrants as we would like to have in the Canadian economy."

Canada admitted 229,000 immigrants in 2002, above its of 200,000 to 225,000 target but close to the average annual intake during the 1990s, which was 221,500. Canada has three major avenues of entry for legal immigrants:

- economic or independent skilled workers and business investors,
- family unification,
- refugees,

The leading immigrant countries of origin are China, India, and Pakistan and the Philippines.

A quarter of Canadian immigrants are selected under a system that awards points for, inter alia, years of education, knowledge of English or French, and whether the applicant has been offered a job in Canada. The point system assesses foreigners wishing to immigrate for economic reasons against nine criteria on which an applicant can score a maximum 107 points, and must score at least 70 points to qualify for an immigrant visa (75 points after March 2003).[1] Some 59,000 immigrants, a quarter of the total, were admitted under the point system in 2002; another 80,000 spouses and dependents received immigrant visas because the family principal got an immigration visa, and then got immigrant visas for family members.

The purpose of the point system is to attract immigrants most likely to be successful, and by some measures, it is working. In 2002, almost half of 178,000 principal immigrants and their dependents 15 and older had post-secondary (terteriary) schooling, such as college or advanced degrees and over half spoke English or French.[2]

Table 1. Canadian Immigration, 2002

Category	Number	Distribution
Family	65,277	28%
Economic-Principals	58,906	26%
	79,600	35%
Dependents-Econ		
Refugees	25,111	11%
Other	164	
Total	229,058	100%

Source: www.cic.gc.ca/english/monitor/issue03/02-immigrants.html (January 7, 2004)

Canada has in recent years received more nonimmigrants than immigrants--264,000 arrived in 2002, including 88,000 foreign workers, 69,000 foreign students, 32,000 humanitarian admissions (asylum applicants), and 76,000 other nonimmigrants. During the 1990s, the number of foreign workers averaged about 76,000, the number of foreign students more than doubled, and the number of asylum seekers fell.

[1] For example, language skills (knowing English and/or French) can earn an applicant a maximum 15 points and education beyond a BA can earn a potential immigrant up to 16 points. The educational training factor (ETF) is worth up to 18 points—it reflects the level of education and training required for an applicant's occupation-- and up to 10 points are awarded to applicants between the ages of 21 and 44.

[2] In 2002, of 229,000 immigrants, 43 percent spoke English, 5 percent French, and 6 percent both English and French. CIC. 2002. **Facts and Figures: Immigration. www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/index-2.html#statistics**

Table 2-1. Canada Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Admissions, 1990-2002

	Immigrants	Nonimmigrants	For Workers	For Students	Humanitarian	Other
1990	216,396	224,767	85,381	30,677	42,849	65,860
1991	232,744	203,275	77,858	30,700	33,263	61,454
1992	254,817	190,336	70,489	29,420	37,066	53,361
1993	256,741	165,365	65,433	28,189	21,398	50,345
1994	224,364	166,429	67,549	28,059	21,510	49,311
1995	212,859	179,768	69,617	32,648	25,582	51,921
1996	226,039	187,648	71,390	40,092	25,504	50,662
1997	216,014	195,226	75,452	42,697	24,367	52,710
1998	174,159	199,375	79,788	41,280	24,995	53,312
1999	189,922	234,326	85,932	51,629	37,944	58,821
2000	227,346	263,335	94,893	62,984	37,143	68,315
2001	250,484	284,045	95,555	73,607	43,418	71,465
2002	229,091	263,935	87,910	68,820	31,500	75,705
Ave 1991-2000	221,501	198,508	75,840	38,770	28,877	55,021

Source: www.cic.gc.ca/english/monitor/issue03/02-immigrants.html (January 7, 2004)

Canada has traditionally had few unauthorized foreigners because it has no land borders with emigration countries. However, the Greater Toronto Home Builders Association says that many unauthorized foreigners are employed in construction, and that "If we didn't have them, we wouldn't be able to build houses." There are an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 unauthorized foreigners in Canada, including 75,000 in the Ontario construction industry, 36,000 failed asylum applicants who have not been removed, and eight percent overstays among the 800,000 foreigners issued work, student and visitor visas in 2002.

United States

The US accepts four major types of immigrants: family, employment, refugees and diversity, and the number admitted each year is partially fixed by quota and partially not regulated by quotas. Immigration averaged about 935,000 a year in the past 12 years. The 1.8 million immigrants in 1991 reflected legalization in 1987-88, and rising numbers in recent years reflect more immigrants becoming naturalized US citizens and sponsoring their immediate family members. Most types of family, employment, refugee and diversity visas are regulated by quota, but there is no limit on the number of immediate relatives of US citizens who can be admitted.

Table 2-2 Immigration to the US, 1991-2002

	Admissions
1991	1,827,167
1992	973,977
1993	904,292
1994	804,416
1995	720,461
1996	915,900
1997	798,378
1998	654,451
1999	646,568
2000	849,807
2001	1,064,318
2002	1,063,732
Average	935,289

Source: Immigration Yearbook, http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/ybpage.htm

Family immigrants have US citizen or legal immigrant relative relatives in the US who petition for the admission of relatives still abroad--about two thirds of US immigrants enter under family preferences. One-sixth of US immigrants (including their family members) are admitted because they have extraordinary ability or because US employers sponsored their admission, which means the US employer proved to the satisfaction of the US Department of Labor that US workers were not available to fill the job for which the employer is seeking an immigrant. The third group is refugees and asylees and the fourth group includes diversity[3] and other immigrants.

Immigration is sometimes referred to as the front-door to the US, which makes nonimmigrant admissions the side door and illegal immigration the back door. Nonimmigrants are foreigners who come to the United States to visit, work, or study. The number of nonimmigrants tripled in the past 20 years, primarily because of the growing number of tourists and business visitors, but there has also been significant growth in admissions of temporary foreign workers --some 1.1 million were admitted in FY2002 (the same individual could be counted several times in admission data). One-third of the temporary foreign worker admission were for foreign professionals with H-1B visas--about half are from India, and over half work in IT-related fields while they stay in the US up to six years. The next largest group of foreign workers are intra-company transfers with L-1 visas, foreigners transferred to the US branch of a multinational enterprise, and the their largest group are Nafta professionals--most are from Canada.

[3] Diversity immigrants are persons who applied for a US immigrant visa in a lottery open to those from countries that sent fewer than 50,000 immigrants to the US in the previous five years.

Table 3. Persons Entering the US, Fiscal Year 2002

Category	FY2001	FY2002
Immigrants	1,064,318	1,063,732
Immediate relatives of US Citizens	443,035	485,960
Other family-sponsored immigrants	232,143	187,069
Employment-based	179,195	174,968
Refugees and Aslyees	108,506	126,084
Diversity immigrants	42,015	42,829
Other Immigrants	59,424	46,822
Estimated Emigration	220,000	220,000
Nonimmigrants	32,824,088	27,907,139
Visitors for Pleasure/Business	29,419,601	24,344,216
Foreign Students	688,970	637,954
Temporary Foreign Workers	990,708	1,123,914
Illegal Immigration		
Apprehensions	1,387,486	1,062,279
Deportations	177,452	148,619
Estimated illegal population (2000)	7,000,000	7,000,000
Additional illegal settlers per year (1990-2000)	350,000	350,000

Source: 2002 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.
www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/2000ExecSumm.pdf
Nonimmigrant and apprehension data can double-count the same individual
Temporary foreign workers (2002) include 370,500 H-1B admissions, 314,700 L-1 intra-company transfers, and 73,700 Nafta professionals
Estimated illegal population if for 2000

A second important category of nonimmigrants is that of foreign students. Some 637,954 foreigners with student visas entered the United States in FY2002. Foreign students became more controversial after the September 11, 2001 because some of the terrorists entered the US with student visas. In many cases, foreigners coming to the US to study plan to and do remain in the US, finding employers via internships and jobs arranged by the universities and colleges where they study.

The back door refers to unauthorized, illegal, or irregular migrants. No one knows exactly how many unauthorized foreigners are in the United States: some 1.1 million were apprehended in FY2002, and 95 percent were Mexicans caught just inside the US border. US government estimates of unauthorized foreigners have been increased several times in the 1990s, and the best independent estimates of the number of unauthorized foreigners

are over 20 percent higher than the government estimates in Table 3, and suggest that the rate of growth is twice as fast as government estimates suggest.

Table 4. Unauthorized Foreigners in the US: 1980-2000

Year	Millions	Annual Average Change
1980	3	
1986	4	167,000
1989	2.5	-500,000
1992	3.9	467,000
1995	5	367,000
2000	8.5	700,000

Source: Jeff Passel, Urban Institute

About 2.7 million unauthorized foreigners were legalized in 1987-88

In the mid-1990s, the INS changed its border enforcement strategy, adding agents, fences, lights, and cameras in the urban areas to deter illegal entry attempts. Apprehensions fell in urban areas, but many migrants turned to smugglers, who brought them into the US via the deserts and mountains of Arizona. The smugglers, known as *polleros* or *coyotes*, who lead migrants in groups of 20 to 40, but sometimes fail to provide water or make transportation arrangements, so that an average of one migrant a day has been dying for the past several years attempting illegal entry.

If unauthorized foreigners are found inside the US, they are removed in one of two ways: voluntary return and formal removal or deportation. Mexicans inside the US may choose to be returned "voluntarily" to Mexico, which means they are fingerprinted, photographed and taken to the border by bus, but are not usually prosecuted if they are apprehended again in the US. Formal removal or deportation, on the other hand, means that an immigration judge has ordered deportation, and deported foreigners can be prosecuted if they re-enter the US. In 2002, some 149,000 foreigners were removed formally from the US; 80 percent of those removed were Mexicans.

Latin America

Most Latin American countries are net emigration areas: they send more people abroad than they receive as immigrants. Mexico is the major emigration country in Latin America. Mexico-US migration began with the recruitment of rural Mexicans to work on US farms during World War I and II. In both cases, the recruitment continued after the war ended, and Mexicans and US employers developed a mutual dependence that encouraged the migration to continue illegally after government-approved recruitment stopped. Thus, it is not surprising that most Mexican immigrants were previously unauthorized foreigners in the US, and that almost half of the nine million Mexicans in the US in 2000 were believed to be unauthorized.

Mexico during the 1990s took steps to reduce future emigration and to protect its citizens in the US. In 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement went into effect, lowering trade and investment barriers between Canada, Mexico, and the US. One hoped for side

effect of NAFTA is faster economic and job growth in Mexico, and thus less economically motivated migration. Mexican President Salinas, in urging the US to negotiate NAFTA, said: " We want to export goods, not people."[4] Mexican economic and job growth in the 1990s was very uneven, but NAFTA encouraged rapid expansion of border-area maquiladoras, foreign-owned plants that hire Mexican workers to assemble components into televisions and cars that are exported to the US.

Mexican President Vicente Fox, elected in 2000, made protecting Mexicans in the US one of his major priorities. Fox called Mexicans in the US "heroes" for the $1 billion a month they send to Mexico in remittances, and Presidents Bush and Fox established a working group to develop creating "an orderly framework for migration that ensures humane treatment [and] legal security, and dignifies labor conditions."

The seven countries of Central America, with 36 million residents, were not major sources of immigrants to the US before the 1980s—over 90 percent of Central American immigrants arrived since 1980. El Salvador (6 million population), Guatemala (13 million), Honduras (6 million), and Nicaragua (5 million) were wracked by civil wars in the 1980s, and many residents fled to neighboring countries as well as the US. US foreign policy concerns influenced decisions on whether to grant Central Americans asylum, so that asylum was granted to Nicaraguans (the US supported the rebels) but not to Salvadorans (the US was supporting the government). Lawsuits kept most Central Americans denied asylum in the US, and legislation eventually allowed many to become immigrants.

Natural disasters have repeated the pattern of Central Americans in the US receiving temporary protected status (TPS) that allowed them to stay for years. In October-November 1998, Hurricane Mitch caused massive destruction in Honduras and Nicaragua. The US gave TPS to Hondurans and Nicaraguans so they could send home remittances to help rebuilding. In 2001, after earthquakes in El Salvador, TPS was granted to Salvadorans for the same reason.

The 15 independent Caribbean nations, plus several dependencies, have some of the highest emigration rates in the world.[5] Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica include about 75 percent of the 36 million Caribbean residents, and their major destination is the US, although some Caribbean migrants move to former colonial powers in Europe and to Canada. There are 900,000 Cuban immigrants in the US, meaning that almost 10 percent of persons born in Cuba are in the US. Most Cuban immigrants settled in southern Florida, where they have been extraordinarily successful in business in politics, helping to turn Miami into a gateway to the Americas in business and finance.

Cubans migrated to the US in three major waves: after Castro came to power in 1959, during the Mariel boat lift in 1980, and during the summer of 1994. The 1994 influx was stopped by an agreement guarantees 20,000 immigrant visas a year to Cubans, but

[4] Quoted in President Bush's letter to Congress, May 1, 1991, p. 17

[5] During the 1960s and 1970s, many former Caribbean colonies became independent countries. Since 1983, most islands have voted against independence, including Puerto Rico in 1998.

continues the wet-foot, dry-foot policy—Cubans who reach US soil are allowed to stay as immigrants, but those intercepted at sea are returned to Cuba.[6] Private boats regularly bring Cubans to Florida, and six-year old Elian Gonzalez was aboard one of these boats when it sank on Thanksgiving Day, 1999. Two fishermen brought Elian to Florida, and after he was turned over to his Miami relatives, they refused to give him to his father, who wanted to take Elian back to Cuba. After five months, the INS took Elian from his Miami relatives, and his father took him back to Cuba.[7]

Over 800,000 Dominicans have immigrated to the US, most since 1985; most settled in New York City. According to a 1997 poll, half of the residents of the Dominican Republic have relatives in the US, and two-thirds would move to the US if they could. Some 570,000 Jamaicans have emigrated to the US in one of the oldest migrations from the Caribbean. Jamaicans were recruited to work in US agriculture beginning in 1943, and 10,000 to 12,000 a year arrived to cut sugar cane in Florida and pick apples on the East Coast until the mid-1990s.

Some 375,000 Haitians have migrated to the US, including one-third who arrived in the 1990s. Beginning in the late 1970s, Haitians began to make the 720-mile trip by boat to Florida, and 25,000 Haitians arrived in summer 1980. In 1991, the elected president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown by the military, and Haitians began leaving for the US in boats. The US restored Aristide to power in 1994, but Haitians continue to head for the US, often via the Bahamas. There are also an estimated 500,000 Haitian migrants in the neighboring Dominican Republic.

Puerto Ricans have been US citizens since 1917, and in 1998 there were about 2.7 million residents of Puerto Rican origin on the US mainland, and 3.8 million in Puerto Rico. Migration between the island and the mainland responds to changing economic conditions, especially in New York and Chicago, where most Puerto Ricans on the mainland live. Higher wages and lower unemployment on the mainland encouraged emigration until the mid-1970s, when minimum wages in Puerto Rico were raised, and job creation was induced by special tax breaks. As the US welfare system expanded, the combination of a narrowing wage gap in the 1980s and 1990s as well as the availability of Food Stamps and other assistance reduced net migration to practically zero.[8]

Legal and Policy Framework

Immigration Policies

The US legal and immigration policy frame work is complex; it is said that the immigration system is second only to the tax system in complexity. Canadian and US immigration policy went through three broad phases: laissez-faire, qualitative restrictions, and quantitative restrictions, with immigration policies mirroring each other. For example, the US barred Chinese immigrants in 1882, and Canada took steps to limit

[6] Established under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.
[7] Elian Returns to Cuba. Migration News. July 2000. Vol 7. No. 7 http://migration.ucdavis.edu
[8] In 1996, about 40 percent of Puerto Rico families received some form of federal welfare assistance.

Chinese immigrants in 1885. Immigration to Canada peaked between 1895 and 1913—some 2.5 million immigrants arrived in a country that had a 1913 population of 7 million, including 400,870 in 1913—the same period in which immigration to the US peaked. Canada's "white only" immigration policy, which favored entries from Europe and the US-- ended in 1962; the US abandoned its national origins quotas that favored northern and Western Europe in 1965.

During the laissez-faire immigration policy period, federal, state, and local governments, private employers, shipping companies and railroads, and churches were free to promote immigration to the United States, and some government policies encouraged immigration. Subsidizing railroad construction, for example, led to the recruitment of immigrant workers by private railroad companies, while high tariffs kept out European goods and thus created a demand for more workers in American factories. No fees or admissions tests were imposed on immigrants, but after 1819, the federal government required ship captains to collect and report data on the immigrants they brought to the US.

The fear of foreigners in the 1870s led to the imposition of qualitative restrictions aimed at barring certain types of immigrants, including convicts and prostitutes in 1875 and Chinese nationals in 1882. After 1917, immigrants over age 16 had to know how to read in one language. Finally, in 1921, the US imposed quantitative restrictions on the annual number of immigrants allowed each year, and limited the number from each country to a percentage of those from that country already in the US, the so-called national origins formula.

In 1965, the current US immigration policy framework was adopted, maintaining ceilings or quotas on how many foreigners could arrive each year, but replacing the national origins preferences with a preference system that favored the admission of immigrants who already had relatives in the US and who had US employers who wanted to hire them. The result was a change in the origins of immigrants from Europe to Latin America and Asia. Illegal migration from Mexico increased in the 1980s, prompting enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which introduced sanctions or fines on US employers who knowingly hired new workers without verifying their right to work in the US. IRCA also included several legalization programs that made 2.7 million foreigners legal immigrants.

The Immigration Act of 1990 raised the annual ceiling on immigration from 270,000, plus immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, to 675,000 including relatives, plus refugees, and more than doubled the number of immigrant visas available for foreigners sponsored by US employers, to 140,000 a year (including the family members of the workers sponsored). In 1996, the US enacted several laws, including the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which made it easier to remove foreigners who committed crimes in the US, which made newly arriving legal immigrants ineligible for social assistance or welfare benefits, and which called for a doubling of the Border Patrol to 10,000 agents.

As a result of these 1996 laws, the major agency charged with preventing illegal immigration and providing services to immigrants became one of the fastest growing in the US government. However, the Immigration and Naturalization Service came under fire, and there were many proposals to break up the INS into 2 or more agencies before the September 11, 2001 terrorism. The Uniting and Strengthening America Act by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 gave the government new powers to detain foreigners, and the INS was moved into a new Cabinet agency, the Department of Homeland Security; within the DHS, enforcement is separated from services.

Despite terrorism, the US remains a nation of immigrants, with US presidents frequently invoking the motto "e pluribus unum," (from many one) to remind Americans that they share the experience of themselves or their forebearers leaving another country to begin anew in the US.[9] Immigration thus permits immigrants to better themselves as it strengthens the US, and most Americans agree with the conclusion of the recent Commission on Immigration Reform that: "a properly regulated system of legal immigration is in the national interest of the United States."

Foreign-born Population

The US foreign-born population[10] reached an all-time high of 32.4 million in the March 2002 Current Population Survey, 11.3 percent of US residents. Most foreign-born residents arrived recently; 64 percent of the 2002 foreign-born residents arrived since 1990. California had 9.1 foreign-born residents in 2002, 28 percent of the total, followed by New York with 4 million and Florida and Texas, 3 million each—the Big 4 states had 59 percent of America's foreign-born. Some 29.8 percent of the foreign-born residents in 2002 were born in Mexico, followed by China, 4.5 percent,[11] the Philippines, 4.4 percent, and India, 4 percent. About 55 percent were born in Latin America, 26 percent were born in Asia and the Middle East, and 14 percent were born in Europe.

Foreign-born residents 18 and older are more likely than the US-born to be in the US work force, but they are younger, less educated, and have lower annual earnings. The average age of a US-born worker who worked a full-time schedule at least part of 2001 was 41, and median earnings were $31,200, while for the foreign-born residents, the average age was 39 and median earnings were $24,000. The sharpest contrast is with foreign-born residents who arrived since 1990: their average age was 32 and median earnings $20,000. These low earnings reflect the fact that 35 percent of these recent arrivals were not high

[9] The exceptions are Native Americans, slaves, and those who became US citizens by purchase or conquest, such as French nationals who became Americans with the Louisiana Purchase, Mexicans who became Americans with the settlement ending the Mexican War, and Puerto Ricans who became US citizens as a result of the American victory over Spain in 1898.

[10] Americans often refer to all foreign-born residents as immigrants, but not all of them are that. Between 1 and 2 percent are nonimmigrants, such as foreign students and guest workers. Another 9 million are unauthorized foreigners, which means that only about 62 percent of the foreign-born residents are immigrants

[11] Includes those born in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

school graduates.[12] By contrast, fewer than 8 percent of US –born residents had not finished high school.

Foreign-born residents were 14 percent of the US labor force, double their share of the US labor force in 1980, but below the over 20 percent foreign born share of the labor force early in the 20th century. Today, foreign-born workers are 44 percent of private household workers, 42 percent of those with non-managerial farming occupations, and 20 percent of operators, fabricators and laborers.

Table 5. Foreign-born Population and Labor Force, 1850-2002

	Foreign-born Population	Per-US Pop	Foreign-born Labor Force	Per-US LF
1850	2.2	9.7		
1860	4.1	13.2		
1870	5.6	14	2.7	21.6
1880	6.7	13.3	3.5	20.1
1890	9.2	14.6	5.1	26.1
1900	10.3	13.6	5.8	23
1910	13.5	14.7	7.8	24
1920	13.9	13.2	7.7	21.2
1930	14.2	11.6	7.4	17.4
1940	11.5	8.8	5.8	12.3
1950	10.3	6.9	4.8	9.2
1960	9.7	5.4	4.2	6.3
1970	9.6	4.7	4.2	5.1
1980	14.1	6.2	7.1	6.7
1990	19.8	7.9	11.6	9.3
2000	31.1	11.1	18.5	13.1
2002	32.5	11.5	20.3	14.1

Source: Roger Kramer, Developments in International Migration, 2003

About 16 percent of foreign-born residents, and 11 percent of US-born residents, had incomes below the poverty line in 2002. By country of origin, about 26 percent of those born in the Dominican Republic were poor, as were 20 percent of those born in Mexico and Pakistan, and 20 percent of those born in Cuba and Honduras. About 24 percent of households headed by foreign-born residents obtained a means-tested federal benefit in 2001, versus 16 percent of households headed by a US-born resident—the most common benefit used by both groups was Medicaid. Country of origin data for welfare use track poverty data—59 percent of households headed by a person born in the Dominican Republic obtained a means-tested federal benefit in 2001, 36 percent of those headed by a person born in Mexico, 35 percent of those headed by a person born in Cuba, and 33 percent of those headed by a person born in Haiti.

[12] This paragraph based on Camarota, Steven. 2002. Immigrants in the US—2002. Center for Immigration Studies. November.

Foreign-born residents are in their prime childbearing years, so the percentage of births to foreign-born women is higher than their share of US residents. In 2001, 22 percent of the 4 million total births were to women who were born outside the US, and 63 percent of the Hispanic births were to mothers born outside the US.[13] After five years of US residence, legal immigrants may file petitions to become naturalized US citizens.

Table 6. Naturalization Petitions filed, FY96-03

Fiscal year	Naturalization applications
1996	1,277,000
1997	1,413,000
1998	933,000
1999	765,000
2000	461,000
2001	502,000
2002	701,000
2003	524,000

Source: Yearbook of Immigration Statistics

NAFTA

In 1800, Mexico and the US had populations of roughly equal size, six million, and Mexico's GDP per capita was about half that of the US. There was relatively little Mexico-US migration until the US began to recruit Mexican workers, between 1917 and 1921 and again between 1942 and 1964. Illegal Mexico-US migration surged in the early 1980s, leading to IRCA's grand bargain of employer sanctions and legalization—the legalization succeeded and the sanctions failed-- and Mexico-US migration surged again in the 1990s, largely because the availability of false documents made it hard to enforce sanctions.

Mexico changed its economic policies from import-substitution to export-led in the mid-1980s, a US-Canada Free Trade Agreement went into effect with little fanfare in 1989, and Mexico proposed a North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) in the early 1990s as a way to solve the country's debt crisis and restore economic and job growth.[14] US unions bitterly opposed Nafta, and 1992 presidential candidate Ross Perot asserted that there would be a "giant sucking sound" as US jobs went to Mexico.

However, President Clinton won bipartisan support for Nafta as the best way to assure long-term economic growth in Mexico that would reduce Mexico-US migration by generating prosperity "from the Yukon to the Yucatan.". US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in November 1993, in arguing for Nafta, said: "As Mexico's economy

[13] National Vital Statistics Report, Vo1 51, No 2, December 18, 2002, p 45

[14] Mexico had borrowed heavily in the early 1980s in the expectation that oil prices would remain high, and when oil prices fell in the 1980s, Mexico had both a recession and debts.

prospers [under Nafta], higher wages and greater opportunity will reduce the pressure for illegal migration to the United States."

Nafta went into effect on January 1, 1994, and some Americans thought that Mexico-US migration would quickly stop. Instead, it continued, and included so-called banzai runs, in which groups of 50 to 80 migrants ran into the US against traffic on major freeways at the border, leading to a backlash that included voter approval of Proposition 187 in 1994. In 1995, Mexico suffered its worst-ever recession, losing about 10 percent of formal sector jobs. Mexico recovered from the crisis, and formal Mexican employment peaked in 2000, as employment in maquiladoras, which expanded under Nafta, reached 1.3 million, or 10 percent of formal sector jobs. However, wages fell sharply in the mid-1990s in dollar terms, and Mexico-US migration rose in the late 1990s, producing a migration hump, more migration with economic integration.

A major reason for the Mexico-US migration hump was that 35 percent of Mexicans lived in rural areas and were dependent on agriculture for most of their earnings in the early 1990s. These farmers had little education, received subsidized water and other inputs to produce corn on land they could farm but not sell, and received a price for their corn from the government that was twice the world price, helping to anchor them to the land.[15] The US produces far more corn, and at about half the price paid by the Mexican government to Mexican farmers, so that freer trade in corn was expected to displace millions of rural corn farmers.

Nafta was expected to encourage Mexican corn farmers to become fruit and vegetable growers. Most could not because they lacked irrigation, knowledge of how to farm fresh fruits and vegetables, and they had limited access to credits and export markets. Instead of turning corn farmers into fruit and vegetable exporters, Nafta accelerated rural-urban migration, some of which spilled over Mexican borders into the US, in part because the late 1990s economic boom in the US made jobs readily available.

[15] Rural Mexico is dominated by ejidos, the communal farms that include 103 million hectares, or 56 percent of the arable land and 70 percent of the forests. In order to ensure that peasants had land, until the early 1990's,ejido land could not be sold, which limited productivity-increasing investments. The 29,162 ejidos became synonymous with rural poverty, and in 1992 the constitution was amended to allow the sale or rental of ejido land.

Figure 1. The Mexico-U.S. Migration Hump



Trade between the US and its Nafta partners increased sharply between 1993 and 2001—US exports to Canada went from $107 billion to $145 billion, and US exports to Mexico rose from $47 billion to $91 billion. US imports rose even faster: from Canada, from $129 billion to $217 billion, and from Mexico imports rose from $45 billion to $131 billion. However, despite this increased trade, Mexico's per capita economic growth was one percent a year between 1994 and 2003, versus 7 percent in China.

There have been many evaluations of the first 10 years of Nafta, with most concluding that Mexico is better off because of Nafta, but that the 1995 recession and a lack of Mexican reforms prevented Mexico from achieving all Nafta's promises. The World Bank, in a major assessment, estimated that Mexico's per capita income, which was $5,900 in 2002; would have been $5,600 without Nafta, or five percent lower.

Many of the evaluations of Nafta's first decade concluded that trade-led growth was not sufficient to bring prosperity to Mexico: real wages in Mexico were lower in 2001 than in 1994, income inequality is greater, poverty remains widespread: half of the 104 million Mexicans are considered poor, including 42 million who have less than $2 a day (the daily minimum wage is about $4 a day). One report concluded: "It takes more than just trade liberalization to improve the quality of life for poor people around the world."

Nafta speeded up changes in Mexico, creating jobs in services and manufacturing, especially in the northern states that border the US, and raising the demand for and wages of skilled workers. However, Mexico has relatively high labor costs for unskilled workers, and many assembly-line manufacturing jobs have moved to China. Mexico's period as a subcontractor for the US proved to be short-lived, roughly from the mid-1990s to 2001. Further south, Nafta's tariff reductions combined with other Mexican

policies to speed the displacement of labor from agriculture, but there was little job creation and wage growth for less skilled workers, including those leaving the farm.
The best estimate is that the number of unauthorized Mexicans in the US rose from two million in 1990 to 4.8 million in 2000.

Instead of deepening Nafta, the three Nafta partners have been signing bilateral free trade agreements. Since 1994, the United States, Mexico and Canada have signed bilateral free-trade agreements with more than 40 nations, and they are in negotiations or informal talks with about 50 more agreements.

Economic and Social Impacts

Most immigrants arrive for higher wages and more opportunities, and their work has significant effects on the economy and labor market. In 1997, the National Research Council (NRC) concluded that the economic benefits from legal and illegal immigration add $1 billion to $10 billion per year to U.S. Gross Domestic Product, largely because immigration holds down U.S. wages and thus prices, and increases the efficiency of the economy.[16] Thus, immigration is a net positive economic factor, but a very small factor in an $8 trillion economy that normally expands by $200 billion a year with 2.5 percent economic growth.[17]

The NRC report emphasized that the most important economic issues are distributional. Who benefits and who suffers from immigration? In particular, how does the presence of new arrivals affect settled immigrants and Americans similar in education and skills to the new arrivals? How quickly do immigrants climb the American job ladder? The NRC found that most of the economic benefits of immigration accrue to the immigrants themselves, to owners of capital, and to highly educated U.S. residents. The fact that highly educated U.S. residents benefit from immigration, and that immigrants, when ranked by years of education, are at the extremes of the distribution, means that immigration tends to increase inequality.

Among recent arrivals, 30 percent of the foreign-born population had an undergraduate, professional, or graduate degree in 1997, compared with 24 percent of U.S.-born Americans ages 25 and older. At the other end of the distribution, about 34 percent of the immigrants did not finish high school, versus 16 percent of the U.S.-born. Because education is the best predictor of a person's earnings, these percentages help explain the growing inequality between foreign born and U.S.-born Americans, and within the foreign-born population.

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[16] Smith and Edmonston, *The New Americans:* 135-65.

[17] The employment rates--the percentage of immigrants versus natives of the same age and sex--of immigrants have been declining, reflecting what the NRC termed the increased difficulty that recent immigrants have finding US jobs (p5-17). For example, in 1990, 22 percent more native-born women worked than immigrant women aged 25 to 34.

Research interest and policy concern focuses on how immigrants affect those in the bottom half of the labor market. In 1986, the President's Council on Economic Advisors (CEA) summarized the labor market effects of immigrants as follows:
"Although immigrant workers increase output, their addition to the supply of labor . . . [causes] wage rates in the immediately affected market [to be] bid down. . . Thus, native-born workers who compete with immigrants for jobs may experience reduced earnings or reduced employment."[18] However, it was very hard to measure these impacts of migrant workers on US labor markets.

Econometric studies of migrant worker impacts begin with the assumption that, if immigrants depress wages or displace workers, then a higher percentage of migrants in a city's work force, the lower are wages for similar US workers or the higher are their unemployment rates. To the surprise of economists, such studies found few wage or labor market effects related to immigration, so that economist George Borjas could summarize the research literature in 1990 as follows: "modern econometrics cannot detect a single shred of evidence that immigrants have a sizable adverse impact on the earnings and employment opportunities of natives in the United States."[19]

As more data became available in the 1990s, however, researchers were able to measure some of the labor market and wage effects of immigration that economic theory predicted. The most important new evidence involved studies of migration patterns within the United States, which found that workers who must compete with immigrants were moving away from the cities that were attracting the most immigrants—presumably to avoid competing with them in the labor market. The effects of immigration on wages and unemployment in Los Angeles or Houston were thus dissipated throughout the United States in a process that demographer William Frey called "the new white flight."[20]

Econometric studies also began to acknowledge that the effects of immigration have been hard to measure because a large majority of workers in a city are not in competition for the types of unskilled jobs usually held by newly arrived immigrants. The wages of government employees are set at federal or state levels, and the earnings of many union workers are determined by national or regional collective bargaining agreements. If workers who compete with unskilled immigrants move away and the workers who do not compete remain, the effect of immigrants will not be detected in the city's labor market.[21]

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[18] Council of Economic Advisors, *The Economic Effects of Immigration* (Washington, DC: Council of Economic Advisors, 1986), 213-34 quoted on p221
[19] George J. Borjas, *Friends or Strangers: The Impact of Immigrants on the U.S. Economy* (New York: Basic Books, 1990): 81.
[20] William H. Frey, "The New White Flight," *American Demographics* (April 1994): 40-48; and George J. Borjas, "The Economics of Immigration," *Journal of Economic Literature* XXXII (December 1994): 1667-717.
[21] William H. Frey, "The New White Flight," *American Demographics* (April 1994): 40-48; and George J. Borjas, "The Economics of Immigration," *Journal of Economic Literature* XXXII (December 1994): 1667-717

How well are immigrants doing? Economic mobility or integration studies start from the fact that "immigrants on average earn less than native workers [and] this gap...has widened recently...[as] the skills [years of education] of immigrants have declined relative to those of the native-born."[22] The average educational level of immigrants has been rising, but the educational level of U.S.-born residents has risen faster, which explains the widening education gap. Because education is the best predictor of a person's earnings, the fact that the US-born residents have more years of schooling helps to explain the fact that they have higher incomes than immigrants

However, economist Barry Chiswick in the 1970s concluded that the energy and ambition of immigrants is sufficient for them to catch up to similar US workers and eventually to earn more than them. The immigrant men Chiswick studied initially earned 10 percent less than did similar U.S.-born men, but they closed the earnings gap after an average of 13 years, and earned six percent more than similar U.S.-born men after 23 years in the United States.[23]

Economist George Borjas found the opposite result, which he attributed to the time period covered by Chiswick's study: Chiswick included large numbers of highly skilled Asian immigrants who arrived after 1965 policy changes. Borjas focused on Mexican and Central American immigrant men, who in 1970 had earnings 25 percent to 40 percent lower than similar US-born men, and by 1990 this earnings gap had risen to 50 percent. Instead of catching up to Americans in earnings, Borjas concluded that immigration could expand the low-income population.[24]

Borjas and many other economists advocate reserving a higher percentage of immigration visas for foreigners who are admitted because of their special qualifications or because they were requested by US employers. An average of only 6 percent of US immigrants were issued to principals, the persons whose extraordinary abilities allow entry without any test of the US labor market and those requested by US employers after undergoing labor certification to demonstrate that US workers are not available. Only four percent of the principals, 1st preference immigrants with extraordinary ability, can be admitted without a US employer or labor certification. Outstanding professors and multinational executives require US employers but not labor certification, most of the remaining 70 percent of the foreigners require both US employers and labor certification.

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[22] Smith and Edmonston, *The New Americans:* 5-33

[23] The immigrant men were compared to US-born men of the same age and education. Barry Chiswick, "The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-Born Men," *Journal. of Political Economy,* 86 (October 1978): 897-921.

[24] Between 1970 and 1990, the proportion of the U.S. male labor force who had not completed high school by age 25 fell from about 40 percent to 15 percent, while the proportion of immigrants without a high school diploma fell only from 48 percent to 37 percent. See George Borjas, "Assimilation and Changes in Cohort Quality Revisited: What Happened to Immigrant Earnings in the 1980s?" National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4866. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 1994.

Table 7. Employment-based Immigration, 1998-2002

	1998	2000	2002	Average	Per Dist
Principals getting visas	33,771	50,135	79,802	54,569	100%
1st preference	8,709	11,452	13,807	11,323	21%
Aliens with extraordinary ability	1,691	2,002	2,881	2,191	4%
Outstanding professors/researchers	1,835	2,667	2,737	2,413	4%
Multinational executives/managers	5,183	6,783	8,189	6,718	12%
2nd pref Professionals with advanced degrees	6,933	9,815	21,334	12,694	23%
3rd preference	15,143	24,373	41,238	26,918	49%
Skilled workers	8,515	13,651	17,788	13,318	24%
College graduates	3,927	8,771	21,679	11,459	21%
Other workers (unskilled workers)	2,701	1,951	1,771	2,141	4%
4th preference, religious	2,695	4,403	3,366	3,488	6%
5th preference, investors	259	79	52	130	0%
Principals-Per of US immigration	5%	6%	8%	6%	
Dependents of Principals	43,746	56,889	95,166	65,267	
Total US Immigration	654,451	849,807	1,063,732	855,997	

Source: Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/ybpage.htm
Data are for calendar years; total can exceed 140,000 a year because visas can be used up to six months after being issued

Migration and Regional Integration

The major relationship between Canada and the US is a trade relationship. There is a migration relationship—an average 20,000 Canadians a year migrated to the US in the 1990s, but the $1 billion a day in two-way trade, cross-border commuting, and movement of Canadians to work in the US under Nafta's Chapter 16,[25] which created a fairly open labor market for professionals, are more important than legal or illegal migration.

The number of Canadian professionals entering the US to accept jobs with Nafta-TN visas almost tripled since 1995, from about 25,000 entries a year to 70,000 entries a year, but the number of Mexican entries remains low, generally less than 2,000 a year. To enter, a Canadian (and Mexican since January 1, 2004) shows the US inspector at the port of entry a written offer that spells out the entrant's job duties, expected length of stay, and

[25] Under US immigration law, three of the four groups of trade-related migrants under Nafta's Chapter 16 enter with other visas, e.g. business visitors use B-1 visas, treaty traders and investors use E-1 and E-2 visas, and intra-company transferees L-1 visas.

salary arrangements, and signed by the potential employer and proof of Canadian or Mexican citizenship and the requisite education, generally at least a college degree.

Table 8. US Admissions of Nafta Professionals, 1994-2002

	Canadians	Mexicans	Total
1994	25,104	16	25,120
1995	25,598	63	25,661
1996	28,237	229	28,466
1997	48,430	436	48,866
1998	60,742	785	61,527
1999	60,755	1,242	61,997
2000	89,864	2,354	92,218
2001	70,229	1,806	72,035
2002	71,082	1,732	72,814

Source: Roger Kramer, Developments in International Migration to the US, 2003
Calendar year data

Migration remains the major relationship between the US and its southern neighbors despite Nafta, which is one reason why Mexican President Vincente Fox has been pushing for a new migration agreement with the US since his election in 2000.

Conclusions

The North American migration system includes some of the world's major sources and destinations of migrants. Canada and the US, for example, include about 5 percent of the world's population and accept about half of the world's 2.5 million anticipated legal settler immigrants each year. Mexico is a major source of migrants, sending 200,000 to 300,000 legal settlers abroad and at least as many unauthorized settlers. Other Latin American countries similarly send legal settlers, legal nonimmigrant tourist and foreign workers, and unauthorized migrants abroad, so that, in many Latin American countries, over 10 percent of the persons born in the country are abroad.

Foreigners enter Canada and the US through doors labeled immigrant, nonimmigrant, or unauthorized, but many do not stay in the channel associated with their entry door. For example, over half of the immigrants "to the US" in recent years were already in the US when they got their immigrant visas; they arrived as nonimmigrant tourists or students, or arrived illegally, and later adjusted to immigrant status. The canals linking the three major entry channels have become far more complex, but the most important result is that regardless of how a foreigner arrived, he or she may be able to eventually achieve immigrant status. On the other hand, especially since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, US immigration policy has adopted a one-strike-and-you-are-out policy, meaning that committing a crime in the US can lead to deportation.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada, and Mexico went into effect on January 1, 1994, and was expected to allow

increased investment and trade to substitute for Mexico-US migration. Trade increased, but so did migration—there was a migration hump or more Mexico-US migration in the 1990s as Mexicans displaced from agriculture and other previously protected sectors migrated northward, many of the women to border-area factories known as maquiladoras and many of the men to the US. Instead of deepening Nafta, the US is negotiating more bilateral and regional free trade agreements and considering proposals to legalize at least some Mexicans illegally in the US.

Migrants in the US are concentrated at the extremes of the education ladder, with more years of schooling than the average American and less. All migrants seem to find US jobs relatively easily, and those with college degrees or more usually earn as much or more than similar Americans. However, about 40 percent of the foreign-born US residents have not finished secondary schools, meaning that they have less than 12 years of education, and many are having a hard time closing the gap between their US incomes and the incomes of similar Americans.

Trade is the major relationship between Canada and the US—there is over $1 billion a day in two-way trade, and cross-border commuting, just-in-time parts deliveries in the auto industry, and increased integration in industries from agriculture and natural resources to manufacturing helped to ensure that, even after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the border did not disrupt economic ties. About 20,000 Canadians a year migrate to the US, but the fastest growth in Canada-US migration has been under Nafta's Chapter 16, which permits Canadian and Mexican professionals in 60+ occupations to accept US job offers and stay in the US indefinitely. The number of Canadian entries tripled between the mid-1990s and 2002 to 70,000 a year, while the number of Mexican entries has remained below 2,500 a year.

Migration remains the most important relationship with Mexico and most other Latin American countries, which is one reason why Mexican President Vincente Fox made a new migration agreement his number one foreign policy priority after being elected in 2000. There was discussion of a "whole enchilada" migration agreement in 2001 that would include exempting Mexico from immigration quotas, cooperation to reduce deaths of migrants trying to enter the US, a new guest worker program and legalization for irregular Mexicans in the US. Discussion of what to do about especially unauthorized migrants was renewed in the US in January 2004, but it is not clear if the outcome of these negotiations will be legalizing irregular migrants, turning them into guest workers, giving them a temporary status that can later be converted to immigrant status, or some combination of these options.

The US is pursuing additional bilateral and regional trade agreements. The agreements with Chile and Singapore included Nafta-type provisions that allow the entry of professionals to accept US jobs; the Central American Free Trade Agreement and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas do not have such migration provisions. There is hope that increased trade and investment can be a substitute for irregular migration, but the experience under Nafta shows that migration is likely to first increase with economic integration before hopefully decreasing.

Appendix Professions covered by Nafta Chapter 16

General	**Teaching**
Accountant	College
Architect	Seminary
Computer Systems Analyst	University
Insurance Claims Adjuster	**Scientists**
Economist	Agriculturist/Agronomist
Engineer	Animal Breeder
Graphic Designer	Animal Scientist
Hotel Manager	Apiculturist
Industrial Designer	Astronomer
Interior Designer	Biochemist
Land Surveyor	Biologist
Landscape Architect	Chemist
Lawyer	Dairy Scientist
Librarian	Entomologist
Management Consultant	Epidemiologist
Mathematician/Statistician	Geneticist
Range Manager/Range Conservationalist	Geologist
Research Assistant (in college/uni)	Geochemist
Scientific Technician/Technologist	Geophysicist/Oceanographer
Social Worker	Horticulturist
Technical Publications Writer	Meteorologist
Urban Planner/Geographer	Pharmacologist
Vocational Counselor	Physicists
Medical -related	Plant Breeder
Dentist	Poultry Scientist
Dietitian	Soil Scientist
Medical Lab. Technologist	Sylviculturist (Forestry)
Dentist	Zoologist
Dietitian	
Medical Lab/Technologist	
Nutritionist	
Occupational Therapist	
Pharmacist	
Physician (teaching or research only)	
Physiotherapist/Physical Therapist	
Psychologist	
Recreational Therapist	
Registered Nurse	
Veterinarian	

Appendix IRCA Legalizations

Foreigners Legalized under IRCA, 1989-02

	Pre-1982	SAW	Total
1989	478,814		478,814
1990	823,704	56,668	880,372
1991	214,003	909,159	1,123,162
1992	46,962	116,380	163,342
1993	18,717	5,561	24,278
1994	4,436	1,586	6,022
1995	3,124	1,143	4,267
1996	3,286	1,349	4,635
1997	1,439	1,109	2,548
1998	954	1	955
1999	4	4	8
2000	413	8	421
2001	246	17	263
2002	48	7	55
Total	1,596,150	1,092,992	2,689,142
Dist	59%	41%	100%

Source: 2002 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics