

Employment of Disaster Victims Supporting the Reconstruction — the Role Played by the Emergency Job Creation Program in Emergency Temporary Housing Support¹

Akiko Ono

The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training

Introduction

Many workers affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake lost their jobs as a result of the disaster, the number of displaced workers exceeding 110,000 some months afterwards². As well as losing their jobs, many of these workers were also forced to leave their residential communities, owing to the earthquake, the tsunami, the nuclear power accident or other reasons. Creating and allocating jobs with priority to disaster victims who have lost their places of work not only lets them earn an income with which to maintain their lives; it also offers a psychological support by maintaining connections with the local community amid a life of evacuation, when there is a tendency to become withdrawn. For the disaster-affected areas, too, it goes without saying that the vitality of local residents is essential to the process of recovery and reconstruction.

On the nature of disaster reconstruction, Nagamatsu [2012] explains the rationale he calls “Cash for Work (CFW)”. According to Nagamatsu, CFW means “support through compensation for labor”; in other words, it is “a method of supporting the lives of disaster victims in areas stricken by natural disasters, conflict, etc., whereby the disaster victims themselves work toward and participate in the recovery and reconstruction, and are paid compensation for their labor”. The essential philosophy of CFW differs greatly from unemployment countermeasure projects primarily intended to maintain employment, in that “it builds a system for disaster victims themselves to become involved in activities aimed at improving the disaster area”. In other words, rather than simply finding jobs, greater emphasis is placed on sharing activity with the disaster victims, allowing them to reconstruct the disaster area and thus build a better future.

¹ This paper is a partially rewritten version of Ono [2013].

² According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (data published on May 25, 2011), a total of 111,573 unemployment insurance separation certificates and other documents proving unemployment were issued in the three disaster-stricken prefectures over about two and a half months from March 12 to May 22, 2011. This figure only covers workers enrolled in employment insurance; if self-employed and other displaced workers not enrolled in employment insurance are taken into account, the actual number is thought to be much higher.

In the disaster area of the Great East Japan Earthquake, 55,000 workers³ have been hired in the three affected prefectures by way of (additional) funding from the “Emergency Job Creation Program (Disaster and Other Emergency Employment Response Project)” implemented by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. The scale of this Program was 50 billion yen in the First Supplementary Budget for FY2011, 200 billion yen in the Third Supplementary Budget for the same year, and 50 billion yen in the Supplementary Budget for FY2012, making a total of 300 billion yen. While the scheme and other details of the Program will be examined further below, the “Emergency Job Creation Program” provides a framework for packages of unemployment measures that had originally been implemented since before the disaster; it was not created under any concept of how disaster victims should be employed. However, as the current employment status of the disaster victims in the disaster area comes increasingly under scrutiny, the importance of the local reconstruction role played by this Program has been noticed, with the possibility that a situation close to the CFW advocated by Nagamatsu exists on a greater scale in the disaster area.

In this paper, issues and future directions will be discussed with reference to examples where the program has been used to employ disaster victims, on the perception that employing disaster victims as a driving force for the revival of communities is the primary significance of employing disaster victims. The paper will be composed as follows. First, an outline of the Emergency Job Creation Program will be given, and the basic scheme and its implementation in the three disaster-affected prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima) will be summarized. Next, temporary housing support projects in Ofunato City and Otsuchi-cho, Ishinomaki City, Tagajo City, Watari-cho and Iitate-mura will be highlighted, and comments added from case studies. The role played by this program in maintaining and reviving local communities will be discussed, based on the way the program is managed and on the job content of support workers. Finally, the roles and problems of the program at the time of a major disaster will be extrapolated from the nature of these temporary housing support workers.

Chapter 1 Disaster Response by the Emergency Job Creation Program

1. Meaning and progress of the government’s role as an implementing body for employment of disaster victims

In recent years, local governments in Japan have been attempting to reduce their budgets and cut personnel. Under such circumstances, it was impossible for disaster-affected authorities to implement projects for reconstruction from a sudden major disaster using their own financial and human resources alone; therefore, some kind of support and relief measures were called for. As well as infrastructure and other “hard” recovery, there was an overwhelming need for manpower (“soft”) to meet the rapid increase of work in the disaster area. Amid the confusion, the “Emergency Job Creation Program”, which had been introduced

³ In data as of December 31, 2012 gathered by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 13,923 workers were hired in Iwate Prefecture, 16,437 in Miyagi Prefecture and 24,498 in Fukushima Prefecture. The total for the whole country was around 119,000.

by the government as a measure to combat unemployment after the Lehman shock, started to function as a receptacle for employing unemployed workers affected by the disaster. In many local authorities, in fact, projects using this framework were started two months after the disaster, and the fact that projects were able to start quickly when large numbers of manpower were required for recovery of the disaster area has been highly praised. Moreover, disaster-affected authorities were not hurt financially, as the funding for this program is sourced 100% from state coffers. And although there are several conditions and limitations when implementing projects (more detail on this later), the project content can be set relatively broadly and generously (although half of the project funding must be used as the wages for the employees). This is because the Program was basically created with the aim of employing unemployed workers in the short term. As a result, funding from this Program has come to be applied in a variety of projects where manpower is needed in disaster areas.

Major disasters such as the Great East Japan Earthquake are said to occur once in a thousand years. The fact that this Program, which seems capable of application without too much institutional input, existed quite by chance when such a disaster occurred was a stroke of good fortune in the midst of misfortune⁴. If it had not existed, the disaster area would almost certainly have struggled for means of securing human resources, and the reconstruction would have been delayed.


2. Scheme of the Emergency Job Creation Program

The Emergency Job Creation Program was created in 2008 as an emergency measure to safeguard employment and protect the livelihoods of workers after the Lehman shock. To combat the harsh state of local employment and unemployment, funds are established by issuing “Emergency Job Creation Program Temporary Special Provision Grants” to the prefectures, where they are used to create temporary job opportunities for unemployed workers (Fig. 1).

The Emergency Job Creation Program consists of two projects – one designed to locate temporary employment as a means of relief for the unemployed (“Emergency Employment Project”), and another that also includes human resource development to create new employment opportunities in nursing, healthcare, agriculture and forestry, the environment and other growth fields (“Priority Sector Employment Creation Project”). The “Disaster and Other Emergency Employment Response Project” (hereinafter “Disaster Response Project”) was created by adding 200 billion yen to the fund of this “Priority Sector Employment Creation Project” in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake.⁵

⁴ In the past, employment measures from funds after major disasters have involved setting up and using a reconstruction fund. Employment measures after the Unzen-Fugen Volcanic Eruption, the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the Chuetsu Earthquake, the Noto Peninsula Earthquake and the Chuetsu Offshore Earthquake are summarized in JILPT [2012], where the necessity of a “Cash for Work” rationale is also explained.

⁵ As employment creation projects for disaster reconstruction within the Emergency Job Creation Program, the “Business Reconstruction Type Employment Creation Project” (hereinafter “Business Reconstruction Type”) was created in FY2011 and the “Lifelong Commitment / Full Participation / Generational Succession Type Employment Creation Project” (hereinafter “Local Employment Type”) in FY2012. In the Business Reconstruction Type, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, local councils and others assist private companies in a disaster area with the costs of developing facilities, etc. At the same time, the funds are used to subsidize the cost of hiring staff. Employers must offer stable employment, i.e. “employment with no specified term, or fixed-term employment of at least 1 year with the option of renewal”, and support is expected to last for a maximum of 3 years. By contrast, the Local Employment Type is an outsourcing-based project whereby projects to assist locally rooted working styles and

Fig. 1: Schematic diagram of the Emergency Job Creation Program

(Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare)

Under the “Disaster Response Project”, the conditions for eligible workers are that they should have “lost their jobs due to the impact of an earthquake or other disaster; however, disaster-affected jobseekers shall be employed with priority”. Here, disaster-affected jobseekers as defined as “persons who were employed by businesses in areas subject to application of the Disaster Relief Act, i.e. the prefectures of Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki, Nagano, Niigata, Tochigi and Chiba, and jobseekers who were resident in those areas”. Another stipulation is that the projects involved should be “suitable as short-term employment opportunities for workers who have lost their jobs due to the impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake, etc., until they find their next employment, or projects for employing such workers and carrying out human resource development by teaching them the knowledge and skills necessary to gain employment in local companies, etc.”. In other words, the aim of the project is that it should combine the characteristic of “bridging employment” with that of training and other human resource development.

There are three possible routes for funds to flow from the prefectures. In the first route, the prefecture directly implements the project (directly employs human resources involved in public projects). In the second, the project is outsourced to private companies and other project managing businesses, which then employ human resources. The third route involves assisting municipalities, which may also implement the projects directly. As such, this route is subdivided into a route whereby the local council employs human resources directly, and another whereby the project is outsourced to a project managing business. These are recommended to advertise vacant positions via Hello Work. In other words, the project is

future independence are outsourced to private companies, NPOs and others. The employment term is at least 1 year and is renewable. The project scheme of the Local Employment Type adopts more or less the same format as when the existing Disaster Response Project is outsourced to businesses.

broadly divided into direct employment by public bodies, and recruitment outsourced to private companies, NPOs, and others.

The specific use of the Disaster Response Project is broadly divided into employment in evacuation shelters and temporary housing, etc., employment in administrative work, and employment in recovery and reconstruction projects. Employment in evacuation shelters and temporary housing includes custodial work such as safety patrols and psychological care, and managerial work related to cleaning, transporting provisions, etc. Administrative work involves assisting public employees and responding to the rapidly growing list of administrative procedures resulting from a disaster (issuing documents, telephone exchange work, guidance at information desks, consultation, etc.). Recovery and reconstruction projects involve the work of clearing large amounts of rubble collapsed or washed away by the earthquake and tsunami, gathering fishing gear, etc., tidying elderly residents' homes and cleaning tourist facilities, parks, and other areas. Work related to local reconstruction, meanwhile, includes delivering meals and shopping for the elderly, accompanying them on hospital outpatient visits, and support work for tourism, shopping malls and community business. When local governments do not employ directly via the fund route mentioned above, they outsource the project to companies, NPOs, chambers of commerce and industry, agricultural cooperatives, fishery cooperatives and others. The unemployed disaster victims are then employed by these organizations.

In principle, work provided under the "Emergency Employment Promotion Project" must have a duration of less than six months, renewable once only. On the other hand, employment under the "Priority Sector Employment Creation Project" may continue for up to 1 year. The same is true of the "Disaster Response Project", although the latter can be renewed more than once. The projects were originally meant to remain in force until the end of FY2013, but considering the reconstruction status of the disaster area, among other factors, workers were permitted to remain in employment until FY2014 provided employment contracts had been exchanged during FY2013.

3. Implementation Situation of the Emergency Job Creation Program in the 3 affected prefectures

About a total of 45,000 workers have been employed under the Emergency Employment and Disaster Response Projects in the three disaster-affected prefectures (around 23,000 in FY2011 and around 22,000 in FY2012). The project is either implemented directly or outsourced by the local council. In a breakdown of the numbers employed, 62% are employed via outsourced projects and 38% directly⁶. In terms of the actual project lists of local councils, projects with particularly large numbers of employees are those outsourced to companies, NPOs and other organizations. The disaster-affected authorities face a vast shortage of manpower for local recovery and reconstruction, while on the other hand there are limitations in terms of human resources and capacity (such as hiring, management and deployment) when directly implementing projects. For these reasons, outsourcing is considered the more efficient option.


The implementation status of the Emergency Job Creation Program is similar in Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures. That is, municipalities have basically been instrumental in implementing the Program. This is not the case in Fukushima Prefecture, however; there, the

⁶ From data published by the Regional Employment Measures Office, Employment Security Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, FY2012. Calculated from actual employment figures for FY2011.

damage from the nuclear power accident was greater than the direct earthquake or tsunami damage, and evacuees were scattered throughout the prefecture. As a result, the situation had to be considered in terms of measures going beyond the problems of individual municipalities and embracing the whole prefecture⁷. The prefecture therefore took the initiative to implement a “community bond-making support project” (referred to below as the “bond-making project”) using the Emergency Job Creation Program. The purpose of this project is to “form bonds between evacuees and with local residents, etc., by strengthening the system of operating temporary housing, etc., and at the same time to provide financial support for evacuees and unemployed workers through employment” (Fukushima Prefecture website).

The system of support in the bond-making project is shown in Fig. 2. The prefecture is divided into six areas, each with its own employment support company (temporary employment agency) as an outsourcing business, and these have created employment for about 2,000 workers each year.

Fig. 2: Scheme of the Fukushima Prefecture “Community Bond-Making Support Project” (FY2012)



(Source: Fukushima Prefecture)

The general corporate foundation Cash for Work Japan (CFW-Japan [2013]) conducted a questionnaire survey of workers involved in the bond-making project⁸. The survey clarified

⁷ For example, municipal residents who were forced to evacuate following the nuclear power accident are living in temporary housing built by the prefecture, or in “deemed temporary housing” (private apartments rented for evacuees). In projects related to this temporary housing, for example, there is uncertainty over which body is responsible for implementing them – the affected municipality, the evacuation-site municipality, or the prefecture. Normally, the disaster-affected authority would need to be in charge, but the local offices may themselves have fallen victim to the disaster and their staff evacuated, preventing them from taking the lead. In such cases, therefore, the prefecture took blanket control of the whole prefectural area and oversaw projects on behalf of the municipalities.

⁸ Survey conducted in March 2012. Questionnaires distributed to and collected from workers employed in the bond-making project via the employment support company. Questionnaires distributed: 1,133, collected: 894 (collection rate 78.9%).

a number of issues, such as the type of disaster victims employed by the Emergency Job Creation Program, and what sort of awareness they bring to their work.

Firstly, in their previous occupation, workers employed under the bond-making project tended more frequently to be in a relatively fragile employment environment compared to regular employees securely covered by employment insurance and the like (in other words, non-regular employees, etc.); 40% of them were currently the main earner in their household. Next, the content of the work was most commonly clerical work (44.5%), followed by light work (17.6%) and local community work (17.0%) accounting for about 80% of the total⁹. Also, experience of work before the disaster was being applied to the present occupation in more than 60% of cases; on wage levels, similarly, more than 60% responded that the level was “Just right”, suggesting that job matching had generally been successful. What was very interesting was the employees’ evaluation of the bond-making project. For example, to the statement “Having a job gives me hope for the future” (5-stage evaluation), the responses “Very much agree” and “Somewhat agree” accounted for 61.8% of all replies, while the statement “My affection for Fukushima has increased” received a positive response from 57.1% of those surveyed. These reveal that a sense of psychological fulfillment and affection for the locality has been engendered by being involved in the reconstruction project. Also, the results of factor analysis of psychological fulfillment (“Sense of connection”, “Sense of positivity”¹⁰) make it clear that working under the bond-making project is more effective in raising psychological fulfillment in those living under evacuation in temporary housing, etc.

Chapter 2 Allocation and the Jobs of Emergency Temporary Housing Support Workers: Comparative Case Studies

1. Outline of evacuees and emergency temporary housing

In Chapter 2, emergency temporary housing support implemented under the Emergency Job Creation Program will be examined from case studies. First, however, the number of evacuees and the general situation of emergency temporary housing after the Great East Japan Earthquake will be summarized.

Emergency temporary housing is housing for disaster victims built in line with the Disaster Relief Act. The area per dwelling is stipulated as 29.7m² and the construction cost is 2,387,000 yen. When a disaster occurs, those displaced by the disaster (disaster victims) gather in primary evacuation shelters such as public halls and schools to ensure their own safety. In the next stage, victims made homeless due to collapsed buildings, etc., stay at inns, hotels or other similar facilities designated by the local council, or stay with friends or relatives, until they can move into emergency temporary housing (secondary evacuation

⁹ In 4th place was radiation-related work, as an assignment unique to Fukushima Prefecture, with 16.3%.

¹⁰ The evaluation of the bond-making project comprised 14 statements, from which factors related to a “Sense of connection” and a “Sense of positivity” were extrapolated via factor analysis. “Sense of connection” consisted of “I have a greater sense of solidarity with other disaster victims”, “The supported temporary housing complexes and local communities have been energized”, “I have been able to give support without hesitation, because we are all disaster victims”, “I can easily understand what support the disaster victims need, because we are all disaster victims”, “I am thanked by the disaster victims through the work”, “The bond-making project has allowed me to collaborate with voluntary local activity by neighborhood associations, residents’ associations, etc.” and “Those around us also understand that we project employees are also disaster victims”. “Sense of positivity” consisted of “My affection for Fukushima increased”, “I think I am encouraging disaster victims to be independent through this work”, “Having a job gives me hope for the future” and “The bond-making project has given me confidence in my future employment prospects”.

shelters). At some later point, they move into emergency temporary housing or “deemed temporary housing” once it is built. Since the Great East Japan Earthquake, about 54,000 units of emergency temporary housing have been built (report by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, April 2013). The first of these was completed in early April (Rikuzentakata, Iwate Prefecture); it was not until nearly a year later in February 2012 that all primary and secondary evacuation shelters in the three disaster-affected prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima) were closed.

According to an investigation by the Reconstruction Agency, the Great East Japan Earthquake produced a maximum of around 347,000 evacuees. Although this number started to fall some 18 months after the disaster in September 2012, even another year later (as of September 12, 2013), 286,000 displaced residents were still living as evacuees in emergency temporary housing, etc. Factors contributing to this prolonged period of evacuation include the barriers imposed by various systems, laws and regulations on the purchase of land by local councils, accompanying moves to higher ground in coastal areas ravaged by the tsunami. Another major factor was the considerable time needed to negotiate with landowners and build consensus with displaced residents on the location of their new homes, among other processes.

Emergency temporary housing was initially to be provided for 2 years, based on the Disaster Relief Act, but this period of residence was later extended to 3 years, and again to 4 years this year. However, considering that temporary housing after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake remained in use for five years, coupled with the current state of delay in the construction of public housing for disaster victims, it is surely inevitable that the period will be further extended.

A problem that is feared to arise from this prolonged evacuation lifestyle is that of “solitary deaths”. After the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, there were many reports of people who had lost their jobs (mostly men), and with their community links severed, confined themselves to their rooms in temporary housing, succumbed to alcoholism and died alone. This was taken over as a challenge for future disasters. Subsequently, the need for “monitoring” and “patrols” was advocated from an early stage, in conjunction with the creation of emergency temporary housing after the Great East Japan Earthquake. This was partly due to the fact that population aging was particularly advanced in the disaster area. As a result, support workers came to be allocated to virtually all temporary housing. Most of these support systems make use of the Emergency Job Creation Program, and the activation of a support mechanism immediately after the completion of temporary housing was only possible because of the existence of the Program.

The points to be examined from the case studies are threefold. The first is to analyze what kind of project operation is being implemented using the Emergency Job Creation Program. Many cases involve outsourced projects, although some are also implemented as direct projects by local councils. The mechanism and organizational structure of support worker projects will also be examined here. The second point will be to divide the content of work by support workers into four types and to describe the content of each. Particular mention in this regard will be given to the rationale on caretaker work and the nature of local communities, and to differences in implementation. The third point will be to appraise the characteristics of support workers (gender, age, previous occupation, etc.) and to identify issues concerning the Program’s employment conditions.

These points are summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Emergency Temporary Housing Support Worker Projects

	Ofunato City & Otsuchi-cho, Iwate Prefecture	Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture	Tagajo City, Miyagi Prefecture	Wataricho, Miyagi Prefecture	Iitate-mura, Fukushima Prefecture (Matsukawa Dai-ichi Kasetsu Jutaku, Fukushima City)
Project format	Outsourced (by Kitakami City)	Outsourced	Outsourced	Implemented directly (hired as temporary employees of the local council)	Outsourced (by Fukushima Prefecture, “community bond-making support project”)
	Collaborative team formed by local NPO (intermediate support group) and local private business (human resources business company)	Council for Social Welfare	Private business (subcontracting of public work, etc.)	—	Private business (human resource business company) responsible for northern Fukushima in the prefecture’s “bond support project”
Number of temporary housing units (numbers built)	37 complexes, 1,811 units (Ofunato City) 48 complexes, 2,106 units (Otsuchi-cho)	134 complexes, 7,153 units	6 complexes, 373 units	9 complexes, 1,126 units	118 units (for Iitate-mura: 9 complexes and 665 units within Fukushima Prefecture)
Number of temporary housing support workers employed (in brackets: number of housing units per worker) (FY2011)	103 (Ofunato City, 1/18), including 6 as work share (part-time) 103 (Otsuchi-cho, 1/20), including 20 as work share (part-time)	169 (1/42)	23 (1/16), including 2 as work share (part-time)	23 (1/48)	7 (1/16)
Organization and system	City divided into 6 districts, each allocated a secretariat, district manager and support workers, permanently stationed on weekdays. Meeting places and common rooms inside temporary housing used as bases.	City divided into 10 districts, each allocated a district officer, supervisor and support workers. Districts patrolled by car, no permanent stationing.	Divided into 2 districts with 3 complexes and a district chief each. 2-6 workers allocated to each complex based on the number of units. Permanently stationed every day on a shift basis. Work in groups of two. Based at meeting places inside temporary housing. Social welfare council takes care of coordinating events, etc.	3 workers allocated to each of 7 meeting places, permanently stationed on a shift basis every day except year end / New Year holiday.	After forming residents’ associations, officers of the association employed as support workers. Temporary housing caretakers (1 full-time) permanently stationed in the meeting places, directly hired as temporary employees of Iitate-mura.

Table 1: Emergency Temporary Housing Support Worker Projects (Continued)

	Ofunato City & Otsuchi-cho, Iwate Prefecture	Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture	Tagajo City, Miyagi Prefecture	Wataricho, Miyagi Prefecture	Iitate-mura, Fukushima Prefecture (Matsukawa Dai-ichi Kasetsu Jutaku, Fukushima City)
Content and scope of work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring via permanent stationing and patrols on weekdays Organizing and distributing relief supplies Coordinating communication with volunteers and support groups Relaying public information, reporting problems and requests inside complexes to the local authority, social welfare council, etc. Encouraging and managing use of meeting places “Helping” with community building, such as holding interactive events and salons within temporary housing Reception-type role in temporary housing complexes, guard-type role to maintain security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring via individual unit visits and patrols (standard time 2 minutes for patrols / 10 minutes for visits per unit) Distributing relief supplies Introducing specialist staff to residents requiring specialist care for mental health, illness, etc. Role of reporting problems and requests inside complexes to the local authority and service providers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring and confirming safety via permanent stationing and patrols every day After surveying health, reporting to specialists Organizing and distributing relief supplies Relaying public information, reporting problems and requests inside complexes to the local authority Encouraging use of meeting places, installing and managing noticeboards Supporting activities of residents’ associations Reception-type role in temporary housing complexes, guard-type role to maintain security Cleaning, weeding and other work inside sites Looking after deliveries when addressee is absent 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring via permanent stationing as well as visits and patrols to individual units every day Distributing information leaflets, relief supplies Reporting problems and requests inside complexes to the local authority Managing meeting places Checking rooms when vacated by residents Handling certain administrative services, such as accepting Change of Address Notifications (in the early stages of the disaster) “Helping” with community building and interactive events inside temporary housing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Distributing relief supplies, posting public notices Planning, preparing and organizing residents’ association activities (events) Patrolling inside temporary residence complexes Providing certain administrative services mainly covered by the social welfare council)
Wages (funded by the Emergency Job Creation Program)	Support workers: hourly wage 850 yen Managers: monthly salary 210,000 yen	Support workers: Daily wage 6,400 yen, traveling expenses 1,000 yen per day	Management: 250,000 yen Support workers: Monthly salary 160,000 yen (+ 5,000 yen for chiefs)	Hourly wage 840 yen	Support workers: Hourly wage 850 yen Leaders: Monthly allowance 10,000 yen
Working hours	8:30-17:30 (including 1 hour break) Work share: 4 hours per day (2 workers = 8 hours)	8:30-17:15 (including 1 hour break)	40 hours a week (basic) on a shift basis; for work share, 20 hours/week each for 2 employees	Shift system, early shift: 8:30-4:30, late shift: 9:15-5:15, including 1 hour break	2 hours a day, 3 days a week (FY2012), 5 days a week (FY2011)

Training	Development of support workers' manuals, PC skills, listening skills, case study seminar on Chuetsu Earthquake, AED training, etc. Task sharing workshops held on site.	Training programs created by accounting consultancy firm at no cost. Training held over 4-5 days based on the firm's textbooks.	Training program exists. Participate in external programs of NPOs and disaster victim support centers, etc. After the training, reports are submitted and circulated to all workers to deepen understanding. Shared by all to promote common awareness. Collective training held once a month (evenings).	None in particular. Rely on accumulation of task sharing by taking over and passing on activities.	None in particular
Recruitment & hiring	Widely recruited using Hello Work, radio commercials, newspaper insert ads, direct posting, etc. Hiring ratio generally 2 to 1.	Recruited via Hello Work. Recruitment and hiring operation partly outsourced to human resources company. Narrowed down to a certain number of applicants based on qualifications, ability, etc., then social welfare council made hiring decisions based on factors such as the living hardship level of applicants. Hiring ratio about 1.7 to 1.	Recruited via Hello Work, but at first the response was poor, and candidates were assembled by word of mouth. Recruitment in around summer 2011 resulted in a hiring ratio of around 2-4 to 1. When comparing candidates on a fixed level of ability, those with greater living hardship in their households were hired with priority.	Recruited via Hello Work and the local council's newsletter	Applications based on recommendations from residents' associations and the village
Characteristics of support workers	More than 70% are over 40. Females account for 70%. Apart from regular employees, previous occupations are most commonly part-time workers, self-employed workers (marine product processing) and fishery workers, among others.	Over 40s and women are in the majority. Previous occupation often tends to be self-employed worker and marine processing worker. Those with living hardship are given priority.	Over-40s account for 70% of the total. Men and women half and half. Factory employees, food company employees, etc., self-employed workers (commerce). Some come from neighboring Sendai City.	Average age 42, female-male ratio 2:1. Farmers and self-employed workers (commerce) particularly common.	Mainly over-60s
Relationship with local community	Support workers are merely "helpers" for the community, and do not proactively undertake work such as grass-mowing or cleaning. These are not identified as their work, to prevent the community from depending to heavily on support workers.	Though community support has been requested, this is entrusted to another reconstruction support NPO. Considering possibility of work related to community building support in future, including salons and tea parties.	Attempting community support, but it is extremely difficult. Even when residents' associations are created and their officers appointed, the awareness of "temporary residence" remains strong, and ties with the associations are weak.	It is difficult to maintain communities in the temporary housing, partly because people have moved into large-scale complexes in Watari-cho without having any previous community connection. Nevertheless, support workers are helping with functions and events at meeting places, in the hope that ties will be created.	Rebuilding local communities. Although residences are scattered over different districts, residents' associations were set up following a request from the village, and support workers are serving on these concurrently.
Interview date	09/06/2012	09/12/2012	10/31/2012	10/31/2012	11/20/2012

2. Operational methods and organizational structure of projects

The operational methods and organizational formats of temporary housing support projects in the five municipalities, though similar in many respects, are not uniform. This is because the projects have evolved differently as each municipality has added its own ideas in accordance with need. Differences are also influenced to no small degree by the regional characteristics of the disaster areas, the rationale of local councils, the number of temporary housing and the size of housing complexes.

(1) Whether outsourced or implemented directly

Of the temporary housing complexes in the five municipalities, four are operated under outsourcing agreements; the exception is Watari-cho in Miyagi Prefecture. In Watari-cho, support workers are directly employed as temporary staff of the local council, making it a rare case hardly found in any other disaster-affected municipality.

Broadly speaking, there could be three reasons why so many municipalities outsource support worker projects. The first is that outsourcing makes it easier to package them as single projects. The second is that these projects have not been experienced or implemented by municipalities before, and so must inevitably be entrusted to external organizations. And the third reason is that the large numbers of workers employed would generate a large volume of administrative work, such as recruiting and managing labor, and this would place too great a burden on the municipalities if implemented directly. Another reason given was that “There is a greater sense of speed than if we (i.e. the council) were to do it” (local council representative). This is probably because, if the project were implemented within the council, various procedures would have to be followed rigorously, but a private-sector project manager would be able to simplify these and thereby achieve greater efficiency.

Although these same circumstances also applied to Watari-cho, the main reason why direct employment was chosen was that support workers needed to handle information on disaster victims that only directly employed public officials could handle. The Watari-cho office building was already scheduled for rebuilding due to dilapidation, even before the disaster occurred, but given the increased risk of collapse due to disaster damage, it was hurriedly demolished and the council’s work was transferred to temporary premises. However, the temporary office building was extremely cramped, making it impossible to respond to the many disaster victims visiting for a variety of procedures. Therefore, they were permitted to follow these procedures in the meeting places of temporary housing complexes, without having to go to the council offices. Although this response was implemented by administrative personnel who had come from all over Japan to provide support, the procedures were taken over by the support workers.

Let us now look in slightly more detail at funding patterns for these outsourced projects. Even municipalities that implement outsourced projects can be broadly divided into two formats (Fig. 3). The first involves cases where a disaster-affected municipality outsources temporary housing support to a private-sector project manager (arrows ① and ② in the Figure), this being the usual pattern. This first case applies particularly to Ishinomaki City, Tagajo City and other municipalities in Miyagi Prefecture. The second format involves cases where a disaster-affected municipality has suffered considerable damage, and the prefecture or a neighboring local council uses the Program to outsource to a project manager on its behalf (arrows ③ and ④ in the Figure). Temporary housing


support in Ofunato City and Otsuchi-cho, Iwate Prefecture, has been outsourced and is operated by Kitakami City, further inland. Although this is an extremely rare case, it provides a good example for reappraising the role to be played by local councils adjacent to a disaster area stricken by a large-scale disaster.

A representative from Kitakami says that, from the early stages of the disaster, they had decided to provide some kind of support to local councils in coastal areas suffering manpower shortages. That is not to say that Kitakami itself remained entirely unscathed by the disaster. Given the squeeze on local finances, there was not exactly a surplus of personnel, so that even if the idea of providing support had been tabled, taking action in reality would have been difficult without considerable decisiveness by the leader and substantial ability to take action. The uniqueness of the action by Kitakami derived from the presence of a Mayor who had long been involved in civic activities, and the fact that NPOs and communities nurtured by municipal policy were in a position to be spontaneously activated by requests for support from coastal areas. In other words, the project could move forward with Kitakami providing backup behind the scenes, and the NPOs and communities actually carrying out the work in integrated fashion.

Meanwhile, a case in which a prefecture is acting on behalf of a municipality has been seen in Fukushima Prefecture, as stated above. This is the case where the prefecture is implementing a system of support workers as a bond-making project in all areas of the prefecture. Another reason for this must be that prefecture has judged that the disaster-affected authorities have nowhere near enough capacity to cover the disaster victims, who have been evacuated all over the prefecture.

The fact that prefectures and neighboring councils have moved on behalf of these disaster-affected authorities to cover their shortcomings is based on the major premise of the Emergency Job Creation Program being funded 100% by the state. If local councils had needed to furnish even part of the project costs, one may imagine that things would not have gone so well.

Fig. 3 Emergency employment (Disaster Response Project) funding patterns



(2) A new collaborative format

The project managers responsible for temporary housing support projects include NPO corporations and social welfare councils, as well as private-sector temporary


employment agencies and outsourcing companies. Many of them already had experience of dealings with local councils since before the disaster, and most of them had started developing some kind of support for disaster victims independently as soon as the disaster struck. When operating temporary housing support projects, they provide support for local residents by complementing each other while linking up and collaborating with various other organizations and groups, rather than going it alone.

For example, the temporary housing project for Ofunato City and Otsuchi-cho in Iwate Prefecture was outsourced by Kitakami City to a temporary employment agency in Kitakami. The project adopts a scheme whereby an NPO in Kitakami and an NPO intermediate collaborative organization in Iwate Prefecture (Iwate Fukko Collaboration Center) formed a collaborative team to support the project operation. Meanwhile, they link up with the social welfare council in a coastal municipality to take care of custodial work (Fig. 4).

A representative from the NPO in Kitakami expressed the following extremely candid view on this kind of collaboration.

“The NPO doesn’t have that kind of capability, and Kitakami City doesn’t have the budget, so I think that on the contrary, we’re in a situation where everybody does what they can to somehow get through, using whatever is available. That’s why it’s very significant that we were joined by ... (the temporary employment agency) and a structure has been created in which we can each work in areas of our own expertise... (part omitted) ... So for that reason, I think it was quite inevitable that we would become partners like this.” (NPO in Kitakami City)

Fig. 4: Scheme of a temporary housing operation support project in a coastal disaster area implemented by Kitakami City



(Source: Kitakami City “Coastal Area Disaster Victims’ Support Project Team Activity Report” FY2011, p32.)

The NPOs are experienced and have knowhow in project content such as community building, while the temporary employment agency employs a lot of people and has capabilities including recruitment, hiring and labor management. The local social welfare council in the coastal area knows the situation of the local community very well from its activities at normal times. These organizations needed to execute the project while complementing each other's abilities by replacing their own shortcomings with each other's strengths. This enabled them to execute a project in which they were not experienced, with limited resources, and quickly resolve the plight of the area amid such utter devastation. As a result, a hitherto unknown form of collaboration between local councils, NPOs, temporary employment agencies and other private companies has come to be seen in various parts.

In Ishinomaki City, where the state of damage was particularly severe, many volunteers, NPOs, companies and others started support activity as soon as the disaster occurred. The Ishinomaki City Council of Social Welfare set up a Disaster Volunteer Center immediately after the disaster, and stood at the core of many support activities. Partly because of this, collaboration with companies and NPOs has been seen when promoting temporary housing support projects. Support worker projects currently implemented by the Ishinomaki City Council of Social Welfare take the form of patrolling rather than permanent posting in temporary housing complexes. The original idea for this was a scheme proposed at no cost by a certain consultancy company (auditing firm) as part of its corporate social contribution. Two of the company's employees are said to have been permanently stationed for about six months to provide support, together with the volunteers. A representative from the social welfare council had the following to say about their work.

“...I was quite nervous about getting them to commit to doing it at no cost. I thought they might want a huge fee. But we managed to exchange contracts based on a no-fee arrangement... (part omitted) ...Basically, we carefully decided the points on which we could collaborate, then the sequence of processes in order to achieve that, with each process according to a set time frame, and created a plan by setting up a schedule in this way. They would also create a training program. We showed them what we had done in various places and they researched that, saying what training was suitable for what stage of the project, or what was the minimum training we could do at a given time. They also advised us about estimates for visits. They did all of that... (part omitted) ...And so that was partly why we were given (the temporary housing support project).”

¹¹ (Representative of the Ishinomaki City Council of Social Welfare)

The project by the Ishinomaki City Council of Social Welfare takes the form of a small number of people taking care of many temporary homes efficiently, by carrying out monitoring activities and livelihood counseling while patrolling rather than being permanently stationed in the temporary housing. The other work for temporary housing support discussed below (for example, holding events, community support, etc.) has been mainly implemented by the NPO, and roles have been allocated while sharing information. This is a form of collaboration typical of Ishinomaki City, where conspicuously large numbers of NPOs and volunteers were accepted after the disaster¹².

¹¹ Parts in brackets have been added by the author to clarify the content of the statements. The same applies to other statements quoted below.

¹² In Ishinomaki City, where unprecedented levels of damage were suffered, support from many NPOs, NGOs and volunteers has been allocated and distributed functionally to create a major support effort not found in other areas. This is largely due to the Ishinomaki City Council of Social Welfare and the “Ishinomaki City Disaster Reconstruction Support Council” (now the General Corporate Foundation “Mirai

3. Content of work by support workers

From the case studies, the content of work by support workers can be broadly divided into the following four types.

Table 2: Content of work by support workers

1	Patrols and monitoring activity (including the role of linking consultation content with government authorities, various experts and expert institutions)
2	Organizing and distributing relief supplies, communicating and coordinating with volunteers and support groups
3	Caretaking work
	(1) Reception-type role for temporary housing
	(2) Managing meeting places, encouraging their use, installing and managing noticeboards
	(3) Cleaning and weeding inside grounds
	(4) Looking after deliveries when addressee is absent
	(5) Procedures for moving in and vacating
	(6) Some administrative services including acceptance of Change of Address Notifications
4	Supporting community activities, helping with events and salon activities

(1) Patrols and monitoring activity

The role of temporary housing support workers and the primary purpose of establishing projects was to prevent “solitary deaths” among the temporary housing residents. This was to avoid a repeat of events after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, when many disaster victims died alone. Therefore, all temporary housing support workers are expected first of all to keep a watchful eye on elderly, disabled or other disaster victims who could easily become isolated while living in temporary housing, and to help them with advice on their health and daily lives. Social welfare councils invest particular effort in monitoring and patrolling activity for the elderly, and offer subsistence counseling through patrol visits in their respective areas. As stated above, the support project of the Ishinomaki City Council of Social Welfare is being implemented with special emphasis on patrol visits. In Watari-cho, the temporary housing support workers of the local council and subsistence support workers of the social welfare council carry out monitoring activities with priority on the elderly and other vulnerable groups. At weekends, when the subsistence support workers of the social welfare council are off work, the temporary housing support workers of the local council take over the monitoring activity.

In many temporary housing complexes, support workers patrol the complex broadly but superficially, while for those residents who need further monitoring, subsistence counselors of the social welfare council collaborate to visit and carry out monitoring with priority. In this way, many temporary housing complexes are monitored by a number of organizations, which exchange information while making efforts to prevent solitary deaths and isolation.

(2) Organizing and distributing relief supplies, communicating and coordinating with volunteers and support groups

Support Ishinomaki City”) functioning as receptacles for support. The side receiving support during disaster reconstruction also needs to create a functional system, and this is without doubt the key to speedy recovery and reconstruction.

Next, organizing and distributing relief supplies, communicating and coordinating with volunteers and support groups are operations that invariably exist and whose implementation is shared in all temporary housing complexes. For the first year after the disaster, in particular, relief supplies were delivered without a single interruption. As well as supplies from municipalities, they were also brought in by various groups, companies and even individuals. The work of opening the boxes of relief supplies that have been received, then organizing and distributing the supplies is said to require a considerable investment of time and effort.

“We received supplies of hundreds of kilos of rice. Of course, the rice was in bags, so it came in 30 kilo bags. And these would be unloaded one by one, but that wasn’t the end of it. Heavy trucks just kept coming. And we were asked to distribute the rice equally to all households the next day, and all we got was orders like that... (part omitted) ... Equality is our motto, you see, and so we bought smaller rice bags for transferring it all, arranged for some weighing scales, and in a kind of human wave formation, all of the staff divided up the rice into smaller bags.” (Representative of temporary support project manager in Tagajo City)

Volunteers and support groups also make frequent visits to the temporary housing, where they deliver relief supplies and hold events, etc. Communication, daily coordination and other contacts with these individuals and organizations are also important aspects of the work. Having support workers act as an interface helps to produce fixed routes and orderliness in the support, the support needed by the residents can be conveyed to the supply side, and any possibility of canvassing by dubious religious and other organizations can be blocked before it happens. However, when a year has passed after the disaster, things gradually start to settle down, relief supplies decrease, and the number of volunteers and others also declines. As such, the burden of this work may be considered to decrease with the passage of time.

(3) Caretaking work

As shown in Table 2-3 above, caretaking work is highly varied; the range covered by this work differs from council to council. Permanent stationing tends to be the norm for caretaking work¹³. Permanently stationed support workers often base themselves in meeting places and common rooms built within temporary housing complexes. Because these are located near the entrance to the complex and anyone visiting the temporary housing must inevitably pass them, the workers serve a reception-type role.

In the temporary housing support projects in Ofunato City and Otsuchi-cho, the scope of caretaking work was decided from the very start of the project. The NPO at the core of the projects has set out “independence” of disaster victims as the “project theme”, and assumes the purpose of “helping”, “counseling” and “connecting” to achieve this independence. The attitude of the NPO is that work such as mowing grass and cleaning the inside of the complex is essentially community work; by providing services, community

¹³ When permanently stationed, more support workers are required in towns along the Sanriku Coast, as there is little flat land and small-scale complexes are scattered here and there. This is why, in a comparison based on Table 1 above, temporary housing complexes in Ofunato City and Otsuchi-cho are smaller in scale than the others (on average, 48 homes per complex in Ofunato and 44 in Otsuchi-cho), inevitably meaning that more support workers are required. By contrast, Watari-cho lies on a gentle plain. It included a large plot of land where the new council offices were originally due to be built, so the temporary housing was built there. As a result, there are more than 100 homes in a single complex, and even if support workers were permanently stationed there, the overall number of workers would not be so great.

activities could be reduced. In this case, providing support would actually become a hindrance, in a classic case of mistaken priorities. Furthermore, as soon as it became a service provider, dissatisfaction with the service and further demands would mount up, and the support workers could become exhausted. That is why the support workers basically take care of “helping” and “counseling” the residents and communities and “connecting” them to the relevant organizations. As for providing services, however, it was felt appropriate to “do nothing”.

“The value of the support workers lies in their just ‘being’ in the temporary housing and common rooms, rather than in their performance. By just being there, they serve to make various connections and help people. So it is not in achieving some kind of performance or producing an output where their value lies, but rather just in ‘being’ there.” (Representative of NPO in Kitakami City)

At first, the temporary employment agency entrusted with the project management could not understand this policy. However, the NPO explained the rationale to its counterpart, the temporary employment agency, and the local councils also showed a deep understanding of the policy.

“We (the temporary employment agency) wanted to take care of everything, but we weren’t allowed to. We were told so often, we got sick of hearing it – the workers would only be there to ‘help’.” (Temporary employment agency representative)

This approach also seems to have been difficult for the temporary housing residents to understand at first. The support workers would occupy the meeting places during the day, making them hard to use, and complaints were received from residents, questioning what kind of work the support workers were actually doing. The temporary employment agency, as the project manager, repeatedly explained the role of support workers in this project to the residents. Now that a relationship of trust has been created with the residents, they also understand the work of the support workers and are happy to gather in the meeting places. There, an environment for holding tea parties and knitting classes, playing *Go*, using personal computers and others has been created. Support workers and residents have found reassurance by meeting face to face, and community bonds are being recreated.

A different situation pertained in Tagajo City, where the project manager was extremely confused at the start of the project. In the words of a representative, “My biggest regret is that we could not clearly explain the position (of the project manager) to the residents at first.” At the beginning of the project, the municipal authority also gathered residents and held an explanation meeting about the temporary housing support, but not all of the residents understood the project. Many of them did not even attend the meeting, and even those who did were so preoccupied with their daily lives that talk of support worker projects “went in one ear and out the other”. With the project off to such a poor start, there was a succession of complaints and problems, starting with “What are you people doing here?!” and including the difficulty of using the meeting places, as they were occupied. The city representatives were also busy, and even if problems occurred they had no time to follow them up each time. The fact that the project manager was not a non-profit body such as an NPO or social welfare council but an ordinary private company was also disastrous in terms of the project’s image.

Viewed objectively, this project manager is taking its efforts very seriously indeed. Detailed reports are written every day, and the training is also better organized than in other groups. Reports during the training are detailed, as are comments on these. Services

to residents are also provided in meticulous detail. “As the staff were expected to try their hardest, they approached the work with a strong determination that they could take everything on themselves,” the representative said to describe the troubled situation. It was not until about six months after the start of the project that things began to settle down.

“I think it is the fact that we understood each other. For our part, what we needed to do gradually came clear, and as for the residents, they eventually understood the role of (name of project managing business).” (Tagajo City project manager)

While the relationship between the project manager and the residents was gradually settling down, the media continued to fire shots at the city council, by suggesting that the project manager was unfit for the project. The city took the matter seriously and conducted a questionnaire survey of the temporary housing residents. The results proved that 97.8% of the residents want the project to be continued by the project manager in question. Based on this course of events, the project manager was to continue implementing the project in FY2012.

In Watari-cho, too, support workers are also dealing with everyday matters that would normally be handled by local communities or individuals – for example, cleaning rooms, toilets and other communal spaces in the meeting places, or fixing faults in the temporary housing (counseling on complaints about power interruptions, blocked toilets, etc., and dealing with faults in home appliances issued as relief supplies). For the local people, however, they appear to have the image more of local council representatives permanently stationed in the meeting places than of temporary housing support workers; the confusion seen in Tagajo City and elsewhere at the start of the project was completely absent.

“For the people in the temporary housing, I think there are some who feel that, though not actually from the council, they are like temporary employees of the council, and so they are just like local officials... (part omitted) ...It’s like a place of reassurance for the residents, in various senses. I think the idea is probably rooted in their consciousness that, whenever there is a problem, if they go to the meeting place something will be done about it.” (Watari-cho employee)

As this shows, the key to success in outsourced projects seems to lie in setting and explaining aims from the outset. Clarifying the range of the work, repeated explanation by the local authority of the project manager’s role, and meticulous follow-up of teething problems will lead to smooth project operation later on. The support workers also need to convey to the residents that they are disaster victims too.

(4) Supporting community activities

As with the temporary housing support in Ofunato City and Otsuchi-cho, there are places where, by confining the management work to a stance of “helping” local community work, the aim is to energize the community. On the other hand, there are others such as Tagajo City and Watari-cho, where community work is actively undertaken through substitution by caretaking work.

Watari-cho originally had strong communities based on strawberry farming, fishery and other occupations, and even since the disaster, exchanges going beyond the temporary housing have continued. For the time being, the functions of residents’ associations were substituted by support workers in both Tagajo and Watari-cho, and no inconvenience has been felt. This raises the question of how necessary it is to set up residents’ associations in temporary housing, which has the status of provisional residence.

In Watari-cho, the absence of a residents' association is said to be an advantage, if anything, in that it enables decisions to be made more quickly. When organizing a residents' association, questionnaire surveys or others are sometimes requested via the head of the association, but with this route it takes time to collect the responses. On the other hand, when support workers posted the forms directly to the residents, virtually 100% could be collected and collated in a short time. According to an employee of Watari-cho, "(Because there is no residents' association) Sometimes, work that they (the disaster-affected residents) should really be doing themselves seems to be just left to the meeting places." Nevertheless, it is effective for support workers to shoulder part of the work of community building, while maintaining a sense of distance so that the residents do not become unduly dependent on them. Another problem was said to arise after residents leave temporary housing and move to their next home. Although there would be no problem if local communities before the disaster could again live together, if people were to move into disaster public housing, for example, it would mean that people from various districts would be mixed up together again. Then tremendous energy would need to be exerted to find methods of launching new residents' associations and creating good local communities. In Watari-cho, they are searching for ways of supporting the creation of communities in future.

In terms of maintaining or rebuilding local communities, a particularly notable method of operating temporary housing complexes is found in Iitate-mura. This is because officers of the residents' association have themselves become support workers. Iitate-mura is a locality with unique initiatives between the local community and the village council, and an area where administration based on resident participation had taken root – so much so that it is sometimes featured in local research, etc.¹⁴.

One problem when the whole village of Iitate-mura had to be evacuated following the nuclear power accident was how to maintain the local community. When places where people live are physically broken up, the local community collapses. The ideal was for the whole community to evacuate together if possible. Although the evacuation of the whole village was decided on April 11th, some people had already evacuated for fear of radiation; others had stayed in secondary evacuation shelters until they could move into their preferred temporary housing, even when temporary housing was already available; and others still remained until around August, in connection with looking after cows, etc. As a result, the timing of evacuation was disjointed, and entering temporary residence together was difficult in reality. However, Iitate-mura has endeavored to keep tabs on the evacuated villagers, to prevent them from becoming isolated after leaving the village. For those entering temporary housing created within Fukushima Prefecture, residents' associations were set up from the initial stages of evacuation by residents. The steering organization of the residents' associations includes several village employees; caretakers (as temporary village employees) were decided by recommendation from among the villagers living in temporary housing, and one caretaker was hired for each residents' association from the village budget¹⁵. A group leader was also chosen for each residents' association, and the

¹⁴ Community building in Iitate-mura has been described voluminously through long years of survey research by professors at the Faculty of Administration and Social Sciences, Fukushima University and others. For details, see Sakaino, Chiba and Matsuno [2011], and Chiba and Matsuno [2012].

¹⁵ Using the framework of the Emergency Job Creation Program, these are directly employed as temporary employees, not under the bond-making project but as part of an Iitate-mura project. Working hours are 8 hours per day on weekdays.

head and deputy head of the residents' associations were elected from among the group leaders. This is how the residents' associations were formed. After the bond-making project started in Fukushima Prefecture, officers of the residents' associations came to be employed as temporary housing support workers. Behind this lay the fact that, although these activities were undertaken by volunteers at first, too great a burden was being placed on them, and so the bond-making project would be used to pay compensation, by way of providing some assistance with living costs. Thus, in Iitate-mura, a system for actively promoting local communities has been created by having the group leaders of residents' associations act as temporary housing support workers.

4. Characteristics and attributes of support workers

(1) Recruitment and hiring

A condition for employment under the Emergency Job Creation Program is that the prospective employee should be a disaster victim and out of work. Recruitment and hiring of temporary housing support workers is mainly carried out by Hello Work, although other forms leading to hiring include recruitment by newspaper ads, fliers, the Internet, introductions by acquaintances, and independent recruitment by project managers. In many cases, it was difficult to gather enough people for the first recruitment, but then, in follow-up recruitment, more were at last encouraged to join in, thanks to word-of-mouth from others who were already employed as support workers.

When hiring, some project managing businesses take into account the degree of disaster damage, levels of subsistence hardship and other factors when making a judgment. For example, a representative of the Ishinomaki City project manager said the following.

“(When hiring) We gave priority to people who really had no work and were in a household with subsistence hardship, people with dependents who had difficulty making ends meet. They are (mostly) people in relatively high age groups. As for younger people, we tell them that they would be better off looking for a different job, because it (the project) will have an end some day. Being temporary employment, after all, it might only last for a year. So when young university graduates of 22 (years old) or so come along, they may have the right attitude but we sometimes are not so sure.” (Representative of the Ishinomaki City Council of Social Welfare)

The project manager in Tagajo City also states that it first asked prospective employees to write about the degree of disaster damage and level of subsistence hardship, to ascertain their situation before conducting interviews. For example, priority is given to employing single mothers who live in temporary housing. In one such case, the employee was only able to work part-time (20 hours) at first, in connection with childcare services, but then another person was found to work part-time, so that both could be employed in a kind of “worksharing” arrangement. Subsequently, the employee in question was permitted extended care hours at the day nursery and is now working full time.

“We recruit on the basis of a 40-hour week, but one of the people who came said she had children, and it might be a bit difficult, what with having to pick the children up and so on. As we asked further, she turned out to be a disaster victim living in temporary housing, who was single and desperate to find work, but couldn't do so because of her home circumstances. So then we thought we would hire her as far as we could – that is, if we employed one person like this, we would have to employ another, to fill in the gaps. This was the format (worksharing) we adopted.” (Representative of project manager in Tagajo City)

“She later said her situation had improved, and she had been allowed extended nursery hours at the day care center, so could work full time. She wanted to earn more. She asked if she could earn

more as she needed to earn money in order to be independent, and so we said OK, let's do that. So then, as she was now employed for a full 8 hours (a day), her half-day (4 hours a day) was freed up, so we then employed someone just to fill that half-day, and that's the format we now have." (Same as above)

As for the attributes of support workers, those in their 40s and above account for a high ratio, though this partly depends on the work content and the system of temporary housing. Considering that these workers also provide subsistence counseling via monitoring, patrol and other activity, they need to be good listeners, and it may be that disaster-affected residents feel more comfortable when talking to people of middle age and above. Women also tend to be easier to talk to, and the ratio of female workers is relatively high. However, the functions performed by support workers not only involve monitoring and patrol activities, but, for example, also include distributing relief supplies, as well as a security enforcement role in terms of preventing crime. Male workers are more suited to this kind of work. In particular, when the temporary housing had only just been built, relief supplies were sometimes delivered in large quantities and there was a greater emphasis on physical labor.

There is a highly regional aspect to the workers' previous occupations. In areas close to Sendai, company employees account for a higher ratio, but in areas further away from the city, there are more self-employed and primary industry workers. Some of the female workers originally worked part time, but in some cases full-time housewives took work because their spouse lost his job or suffered a fall in income.

The role of coordinators or community leaders who supervise the support workers is allocated to former city hall employees or others with detailed knowledge of the situation, former company managers or others with superior man-management skills, and people with specialist experience such as nurses and helpers, among others.

In many cases, the pay is the about the same as or slightly higher than the hourly wage paid to temporary employees of local councils. Because these are outsourced projects, rules on pay are entrusted to the project managers. In some cases the set hourly wage rises according to the job title and work level, and bonuses may also be paid. Even then, however, a five-day full-time working week will only earn between 130,000 and 250,000 per month (even for managerial posts). This would be hard enough for a single person to live on, let alone when supporting a family.

In Iitate-mura, as stated above, the group leaders of the residents' association are working as support workers, and in FY2012 the basic system was employment for two hours a day on three days per week. Given the hourly wage of 850 yen, the monthly income would only be around 20,000 yen. As this is nowhere near enough to make a living, the work is inevitably shouldered by older people.

(2) Problems with the Program's employment conditions

In some cases, project managers have problems with workers who, despite being members of the projects, remain unfunded as they do not meet the employment conditions of the Emergency Job Creation Program.

Since the very beginning of the disaster, people from all over the country have traveled to Ishinomaki to provide support as volunteers. The Ishinomaki City Council of Social Welfare itself became one of the volunteer centers. There, young people have devoted themselves solely to volunteer activities for no pay over a long period of time, and by around September, six months after the disaster when the temporary housing support

project started, they had become a core presence in support activity for disaster victims. The Council of Social Welfare wanted to employ these as coordinators or leaders, but could not go beyond the framework of the Emergency Job Creation Program, and is now making amends by applying a separate grant to them.

(Representative of Ishinomaki City Council of Social Welfare) "...They were using up their private means to live and work as volunteers all that time. For example, you yourself (former volunteer A) must have used up about a million yen?"

(Former volunteer A) "Well, I don't actually know how much I used..."

(Representative) "After all, you stayed for more than a year, without any income..."

The project manager in Tagajo City has also employed people who do not come under the framework of the Program, at its own expense, but this employment will be difficult to continue in the long term.

"At the moment, we have just one person who is not within the emergency employment framework. Actually, he was in Kanagawa Prefecture on March 11th, but his family home is here, so when the disaster occurred he abandoned his job and everything over there and came back here. We hired him because he said he wanted to be involved in the reconstruction work. But because he doesn't fit into the framework, we were going to have to let him go... (part omitted) ... So we said it would be OK for one year. But now, he is not included in the numbers for emergency employment. We are employing him completely at our own expense." (Representative of Tagajo City project manager)

One of the constraints of the Emergency Job Creation Program is that half of the project funding must be used as wages. The remainder may be used to employ workers outside the scope of emergency employment, but the necessary costs are quite heavy and losses will apparently be inevitable. Nevertheless, although it is certainly important to hire disaster victims for emergency employment, a more pressing need from the project manager's viewpoint is to execute the project without delay. To achieve that, it is vital to have human resources who will act as a fighting force at the core of the project. In that case, it would have been natural for project managers to want to hire eligible human resources beyond the constraint that they must be disaster victims. Many people have come to support the disaster area from outside, but however enthusiastic they are about the activity, they will not work for nothing indefinitely. A mechanism that can guarantee activities is needed.

On the other hand, there are also cases of disaster victims who are outside the scope of the Emergency Job Creation Program because they are not unemployed. In the case of Iitate-mura, for example, the working format of support workers involves short hours and short weeks, and in reality, it is possible to double up with work outside the project. When working elsewhere, however, they are not eligible for the Emergency Job Creation Program and are not paid compensation, even when just as active as the others. In other words, confusion arises because, even within the same residents' association, there are some who are paid and others who are not. To prevent such confusion, some workers in the Iitate-mura temporary housing complex were reappointed in paid positions, but as a result these consisted only of elderly people. Although it would normally be desirable to have a broad range of ages in residents' association activities, if only for their continued existence, the constraints imposed by the framework when using the Program have resulted in an unexpected consequence.

Chapter 3 Conclusion

This paper has examined temporary housing support worker projects funded by the Emergency Job Creation Program. Because this Program already existed before the disaster, support workers could be allocated as soon as the temporary housing was complete, and this had the effect of alleviating disaster victims' isolation, loneliness and anxiety.

To close this paper, the positive qualities and problems of the Program will be summarized, starting with the former.

Firstly, the Program has allowed project content to be set quite broadly, as the important thing is the "employment" itself. That is, funding can be applied to various projects thought necessary within the disaster area. Also worth noting is that the project was actively outsourced to NPO corporations, social welfare councils, fishery cooperatives and other local non-profit organizations as project managers, and that the projects have been developed by a composite structure combining private companies with local councils.

Secondly, the fact that project costs are 100% provided by the state. This made it possible to create flexible support systems involving not only disaster-affected municipalities but also collaboration from neighboring local councils on their behalf. One method of stimulating project activities has been the way in which the financial burden on the support provider has been reduced.

Thirdly, the fact that this Program already existed quite by chance. That it existed quite by chance was indeed a happy coincidence, but also highlighted the problems if it had not existed. While the Emergency Job Creation Program is a policy implemented by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, if we consider that this kind of function will always be required at a time of disaster reconstruction, we need to create a mechanism enabling the Program to be activated immediately, in combination with the Disaster Relief Act and others.

Next, problems that have emerged when applying the Emergency Job Creation Program to employ disaster victims will be enumerated.

Firstly, the condition that employment should be limited to disaster victims. Stipulating that people cannot be employed unless they are disaster victims and unemployed is somewhat troublesome, from the perspective of executing disaster area reconstruction and disaster victim support projects. If large numbers of people are to be hired to execute projects aimed at reconstruction, a suitable system of organization will also be necessary. Limiting the employment of human resources needed for project execution (including management and specialist personnel) to disaster victims presents a major hurdle to securing human resources. Under this condition, moreover, people from outside the disaster area could not be hired even if they wanted to be involved in reconstruction work in the disaster area. Although nothing would be gained by depriving disaster victims of employment opportunities, the system should be changed so that the human resources needed to propel a project can also be hired outside the framework of the Program.

Secondly, another point on the condition that workers must be disaster victims concerns workers who are disaster victims but are not unemployed¹⁶. When considering

¹⁶ There have been cases where representatives of NPOs and others created for disaster reconstruction were excluded from the framework of the Emergency Job Creation Program and lost their income, on grounds that they were not employees but employers – despite the fact that they were disaster victims who had lost their jobs.

the maintenance or revival of local communities, it should be possible for people to be involved in local reconstruction work, even if they are not completely unemployed. Jobs in local reconstruction need not necessarily be confined to full-time work alone. Using worksharing schemes to involve as many people as possible will increase awareness of reconstruction in the disaster area, and will also have advantages in the psychological fulfillment of the disaster victims and fostering communities.

Thirdly, there is the problem of duration. In FY2014, funding from this Program will temporarily close. The intention is that the Emergency Job Creation Program should serve the role of short-term employment as a bridge, and that there should be a shift to long-term employment as the policy for the next stage. However, the current state of the disaster area has yet to be resolved, and there are still many emergency needs characteristic of a disaster area. Temporary housing will probably continue to provide homes for people for some years to come. These people will still need to be monitored. We will need to identify the projects needed for each stage of recovery and reconstruction in the disaster area, and to continue the projects that are still necessary. Just as there are some projects that can be undertaken en masse over a short period, there are others that need to be continued painstakingly for longer periods. They should not be seen in the same light as unemployment countermeasure projects at normal times.

Fourthly, although the Emergency Job Creation Program has the purpose of “employing” and acting as a bridge, the act of “working” is not limited to “employment”. Considering that the disaster victims themselves will stand up and work toward reconstruction, support also needs to be given to people “working” as entrepreneurs and one-person businesses. In the disaster area, various autonomous activities have been developed by identifying local needs. This provides a stimulus not only for voluntary organizations but also for NPOs and social enterprises to launch themselves as community businesses; in fact, many groups have sprung up and are active, but their business situation is uniformly harsh. Schemes are also required to support work by disaster victims, including the creation of groups and business development.

Fifthly, the way in which projects related to local communities are undertaken. Immediately after a disaster, the victims must have enough on their minds just trying to protect their own and their family’s physical safety and livelihoods. In this kind of situation, it would be better to abandon any thought of the community as impossible. In particular, temporary housing is created in an emergency, and many people from different districts live packed together in a cramped space. It is self-explanatory that community building will not work as it does at normal times. Creating order in that space is a job for people engaged in caretaking work as an occupation, and should not be expected of the community.

People who live in temporary housing move away once their next abode is decided. As time passes, empty units become noticeable. When people who were once enthusiastic about community activity have moved away, a hollow is created, and it becomes harder to maintain communities in temporary housing. If anything, the main issue should be to focus on community building in the places where people move after leaving the temporary housing. Community building in the new localities will create differences in regional strengths. It is felt necessary to include this aspect when creating systems of support for disaster victims.

In this paper, the nature of employment of disaster victims has been discussed, based on case studies of temporary housing support funded by the Emergency Job Creation

Program. As a country with its national landmass in a region where major earthquake disasters will inevitably occur, we need to review the benefits and challenges of funded projects as initiatives toward recovery and reconstruction after this major earthquake disaster. They should be allowed to develop as work by the disaster victims and local reconstruction projects, without being confined only to unemployment measures and employment policy. Finally, we need to build mechanisms that can be activated as soon as a disaster occurs.

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