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CONTENTS

Special Feature on Research Papers (I)

Japan Labor Issues is pleased to present its annual special feature on research papers. The papers in this special feature are selected by the Editorial Office of the journal from various relevant ones published within a year or two, from the viewpoint of communicating the current state of labor research in Japan to the rest of the world.

This year, seven significant papers will be presented for three (I-III) from this issue. The following pages contain the first two articles. Each author arranged the original papers written in Japanese, for the benefit of overseas readers. We sincerely thank authors for their kind effort.

These papers address the latest subjects as well as conventional themes on labor and surely will offer useful information and deeper insights into the state of labor in Japan.

Editorial Office, *Japan Labor Issues*

Changes in the Meaning of Work in Japan: A Cross-National Comparison between Developed Countries

YONEDA Yukihiro

This study aims to clarify how the meaning of work has changed for the Japanese over the past twenty years by examining the data of a cross-national comparison between developed countries. Using data from the World Values Survey and the International Social Survey Programme, it focuses on a number of indicators that include work centrality, employment commitment, organizational commitment, and job satisfaction, and summarizes the characteristics of work values and work attitudes as follows. (1) For the Japanese, work centrality was extremely high compared to other countries until the early 1980s but subsequently declined. In recent years, Japan's Absolute Work Centrality has ranked around the middle among developed countries, while its Relative Work Centrality has been slightly low. (2) Employment commitment in Japan was high in the 1990s in terms of both financial/instrumental work orientation and non-financial work orientation. However, in the 2010s, financial/instrumental work orientation remained consistently high but non-financial work orientation fell markedly. (3) Looking at organizational commitment, consistently strong willingness to stay (low inclination to change employment) was observed in Japan, despite weakness in terms of wanting to make efforts for the organization. Job satisfaction has been consistently extremely low, and fell even further in the 2010s. And (4), the Japanese do not have a particularly diligent work ethic, and they show a strong tendency to stress the comfort of workplace relationships as a condition of work. The study draws the conclusion that work is no longer as central to people's lives as it once was; that the fulfillment that comes from working, which was low to begin with, has fallen even further; and that there is a growing tendency to accept that "a job is a way of earning money" as people have more difficulty finding positive meaning in work. This represents a change not seen in other developed countries. Indeed, it can be said that the intrinsic value of work has become diluted for the Japanese people in the past twenty years.

I. Introduction

In this study, I will attempt to delineate how the meaning of work has changed for the Japanese over the past twenty years based on data obtained from international comparison. International comparison is essential not only for getting a picture of other countries, but also for stepping away from the self-righteous prejudices that one tends to hold about one's own country and seeing it correctly (Pirenne, 1931).

Japan was the first country outside of Europe and the United States to achieve economic success and join the ranks of advanced nations. Indeed, up until a certain point in time, Japan drew attention in Western society as a truly "special" country. International comparative studies were conducted to attempt to understand Japan, and numerous theories concerning the Japanese people and Japanese-style management were produced. However, as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, East Asian countries followed Japan to also attain economic progress, Japan lost its exceptional stature as the one successful non-Western country. Meanwhile, Japan's economy has been stagnant since the 1990s, which has diminished the amount of international attention it receives, while the growing availability of survey data for international comparisons has led to an increase in the number of comparable countries. As a result, Japan is no longer a unique country, and its characteristics are relativized as mere differences in degree. This same process also made it harder to find clear analytical focus points (point for discussion) for delineating Japan's characteristics.

In this paper, I would like to examine a number of points based on the background described above. In particular, (1) I wish to present a number of findings that are considered to be characteristic of Japanese values

Table 1. Variables used for work values and work attitudes

Work centrality (WVS)	• **Absolute Work Centrality** For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is: E) Work: 1. Very important / 2. Rather important (*yaya juyo*, or "Fairly important (*kanari juyo*)" only in the Wave 2 (1990) survey with a different translation in nuance) / 3. Not very important / 4. Not at all important • **Relative Work Centrality** The result obtained when the average Leisure Centrality score is subtracted from the average Absolute Work Centrality score (Hikspoors, Bjarnason and Håkansson, 2012). (Leisure Centrality is the option "C) Leisure time" of the same question.) (The averages of Table 2 are calculated after inverting the values of the options so that more important selections have higher scores.)
Employment commitment (ISSP)	• **Financial/instrumental work orientation** A job is just a way of earning money—no more. 1. Strongly agree / 2. Agree / 3. Neither agree nor disagree / 4. Disagree / 5. Strongly disagree • **Non-financial work orientation** I would enjoy having a paid job even if I did not need the money. 1. Strongly agree / 2. Agree / 3. Neither agree nor disagree / 4. Disagree / 5. Strongly disagree (The averages of Table 3 are calculated after inverting the values of the options so that selections indicating higher levels of agreement have higher scores.)
Organizational commitment (ISSP)	• **Effort** I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help the firm or organization I work for succeed. ("I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help the workplace I work for succeed" in the 1997 and 2005 surveys with a slight difference seen in translation.) 1. Strongly agree / 2. Agree / 3. Neither agree nor disagree / 4. Disagree / 5. Strongly disagree • **Willingness to stay** I would turn down another job that offered quite a bit more pay in order to stay with this organization. 1. Strongly agree / 2. Agree / 3. Neither agree nor disagree / 4. Disagree / 5. Strongly disagree (The averages of Table 4 are calculated after inverting the values of the options so that selections indicating higher levels of agreement have higher scores.)
Job satisfaction (ISSP)	How satisfied are you in your [main] job? 1. Completely satisfied / 2. Very Satisfied / 3. Fairly satisfied / 4. Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied / 5. Fairly dissatisfied / 6. Very dissatisfied / 7. Completely dissatisfied (The averages of Table 5 are calculated after inverting the values of the options so that selections indicating higher levels of satisfaction have higher scores.)

and attitudes toward work from various existing international comparative surveys. From there, (2) I would like to examine the extent to which the characteristics of Japanese values and attitudes toward work that were discussed when theories on the Japanese people and Japanese-style management were the rage in the early-1990s—such as the "high importance of work in daily life," "high commitment to work," and "low organizational commitment and job satisfaction"—still apply today based on data. Specifically, I will use data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) to make international and intertemporal comparisons among developed countries.[1]

I have summarized details concerning the variables for work values and attitudes that appear in this paper in Table 1. There are several points that deserve attention when looking at international comparison data. First, there is the problem that the circumstances of each country make it impossible to standardize survey and sampling methods. Also, there are differences in nuance arise as a result of language translation. Thus, it must be recognized that limits exist with respect to the strict comparison of numerical values, and that only general trends can be grasped.

II. Work centrality and trends

1. Findings of previous surveys

It has often been said that "work is a highly important part of Japanese people's daily lives" and that "work is at the center of their lives." This findings of an international comparative study called The Meaning of Working (1982) (abbreviated as "MOW") are well known with respect to this (MOW International Research Team 1987: ch 5; Misumi, 1987). The survey was conducted in eight countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, Yugoslavia, Israel, and Japan). Using two methods, it asked people about "work centrality," which is an indicator of the general importance that work has in daily life. The first method was to ask people to assign points indicating the importance of each of five domains (leisure, community, work, religion, and family), making a point total of 100% (i.e., work centrality seen in relative terms). The other was to ask people to rate the importance of work in their overall lives (Absolute Work Centrality) on a seven-point scale. In both cases, Japan was found to have the highest work centrality among the seven countries.[2] Additionally, a remarkable trend was observed only among Japanese males: While work centrality was not particularly high among those in their teens, it rose dramatically among men in their 20s (England and Misumi, 1987; Misumi, 1987). This means that men's work-centered attitudes are formed through their working lives after entering the workforce, and it indicates how large the socialization function of Japanese firms is (England and Misumi, 1987).[3]

The MOW survey was followed by a second survey (1989-1991) in four countries (Japan, the United States, West Germany, and Belgium). This survey revealed that work centrality declined in all countries over a period of about 10 years. In Japan, work centrality declined more steeply with younger age groups. Among the four countries, Japan could be said to have the highest work centrality only among those in their 40s or older (Misumi, 1994; Misumi and Yamori, 1993).

Entering the 2000s, data from the WVS indicated that the work centrality of Japanese people was rather low internationally (Nippon Research Center, Dentsu Institute (ed.), 2004; Dentsu Institute and Doshisha University, 2021; etc.). However, work centrality is related to economic affluence, and therefore I will limit my comparisons below to developed countries.

2. Recent trends

Let us take a look at medium- and long-term trends using WVS data (Table 2). Here, I use a questionnaire item for which respondents were asked to rate the importance of different areas of their daily lives (work, leisure, family, religion, and politics) on a four-point scale (absolute centrality scores of work, leisure, family, religion, and politics). In addition, following the lead of previous studies that used the same WVS data, I use results

Table 2. Trends in work centrality: absolute and relative (WVS)

	Average values and changes of "absolute work centrality"							Average values and changes of "relative work centrality"						
	Wave 2 1989-93	Wave 3 1994-98	Wave 4 1999-04	Wave 5 2005-09	Wave 6 2010-14	Wave 7 2017-20	Change	Wave 2 1989-93	Wave 3 1994-98	Wave 4 1999-04	Wave 5 2005-09	Wave 6 2010-14	Wave 7 2017-20	Change
United States	3.41	3.30	3.40	3.03	3.05	3.15	-0.26	0.14	0.01	0.07	-0.22	-0.26	-0.12	-0.26
Australia	—	3.34	—	3.13	3.03	3.00	-0.34	—	0.00	—	-0.26	-0.29	-0.36	-0.36
Canada	3.42	—	3.37	3.28	—	3.01	-0.41	0.13	—	0.12	-0.03	—	-0.46	-0.59
New Zealand	—	3.35	—	3.20	3.18	3.02	-0.33	—	-0.04	—	-0.21	-0.24	-0.41	-0.37
United Kingdom	—	—	—	3.02	—	3.16	0.14	—	—	—	-0.31	—	-0.19	0.12
Sweden	—	3.58	3.42	3.42	3.40	3.52	-0.06	—	0.13	-0.06	-0.07	-0.10	-0.09	-0.22
Norway	—	3.50	—	3.43	—	3.52	0.02	—	0.21	—	0.00	—	0.05	-0.16
Netherlands	—	—	—	3.02	3.07	3.13	0.11	—	—	—	-0.48	-0.28	-0.36	0.12
Switzerland	3.40	3.37	—	3.46	—	3.39	-0.01	0.09	0.11	—	0.19	—	0.02	-0.07
Germany	—	3.35	—	3.24	3.19	3.20	-0.15	—	0.16	—	0.16	0.00	-0.09	-0.25
France	—	—	—	3.59	—	3.52	-0.07	—	—	—	0.35	—	0.33	-0.02
Italy	—	—	—	3.57	—	3.69	0.12	—	—	—	0.40	—	0.42	0.02
Spain	3.58	3.46	3.41	3.55	3.44	3.65	0.07	0.35	0.34	0.17	0.03	0.07	0.26	-0.09
Japan	(3.22)	3.44	3.36	3.36	3.42	3.19	-0.25	0.18	0.13	0.00	0.02	0.07	-0.18	-0.31
South Korea	3.64	3.49	3.53	3.53	3.47	3.26	-0.38	0.61	0.41	0.46	0.41	0.29	0.10	-0.51
Taiwan	—	3.34	—	3.49	3.49	3.49	0.15	—	0.32	—	0.31	0.26	0.16	-0.15
Hong Kong	—	—	—	3.08	3.07	3.09	0.01	—	—	—	-0.02	-0.14	-0.07	-0.05
Singapore	—	—	3.51	—	3.26	3,13	-0.38	—	—	0.36	—	-0.02	-0.02	-0.41
Ranking of Japan	(6/6)	5/11	7/7	8/17	4/12	10/18		3/6	6/11	6/7	8/17	3/12	13/18	

Notes: 1. The average values are calculated as follows: "Very important" = 4 points, "Rather important" = 3 points, "Not very important" = 2 points, "Not at all important" = 1 point
2. Note that the option "Rather important" (*yaya juyo* in Japanese) was "Fairly important" (*kanari juyo*) with a slightly different translation only in the Wave 2 (1990) survey.
3. "Change" is calculated as the difference between the figure for the earliest survey and that for the latest Wave 7 survey of each country.
4. The Wave 7 survey figures for the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and Norway were calculated based on aggregations by the Dentsu Institute and Doshisha University (2021).

obtained by subtracting "leisure centrality" scores from work centrality scores as an indicator of Relative Work Centrality (Bjarnason and Håkansson, 2020; Hikspoors, Bjarnason and Håkansson, 2012).[4] This is to examine the possibility that (as has been said with respect to European young people) the relative importance of work decreases as the importance of leisure increases, even if the importance of work itself has not decreased (Méda and Vendramin, 2017).

Table 2 shows changes over the past thirty years or so. We can see that the importance of work has declined in Japan over the past thirty years in both absolute and relative terms. In Japan's case, the relative decline that is attributable to increased importance of leisure is slight, while the decline in the importance of work in absolute terms is much larger.

Other countries for which changes since the 1990s can be observed have also seen general declines in work centrality. If viewed in terms of type based on the production regimes and employment regimes of capitalism, the degree of decline tends to be larger in countries with "liberal market economies" (Hall and Soskice, 2001-2007) and "market employment regimes" (Gallie, 2007) (the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) and in East Asian countries, and smaller in European countries. Incidentally, among countries with liberal market economies, work centrality appears not to have declined exceptionally in the United Kingdom. However, according to the European Values Survey (EVS), which allows comparison from the 1990s, it has in fact declined in the United Kingdom as well (Hikspoors, Bjarnason and Håkansson, 2012).

There are several possible reasons why work centrality is declining in many developed countries, including Japan. For example, advancing industrialization, better accessibility to education, and growing inequality have been found to be factors that reduce work centrality (Parboteeah and Cullen, 2003). If we apply these factors to the Japan of the past few decades, we see all of these factors may have affected the decline in work centrality.



**Source*: IMF World Economic Outlook Database

Figure 1. The relationship between economic affluence and work centrality (relative)

Thus, identifying factors becomes a task that should be tackled in the future.

Looking again at Table 2, we see that Japan's ranking among developed countries fluctuates widely depending on the time of the survey, and that the work centrality of the Japanese is neither particularly high nor low. The reasons for the large fluctuations in ranking may include wavering due to temporary "period effects" inherent to each country, differences in comparable countries at each survey point in time, and changes within the margin of error. In any event, the results of the latest Wave 7 survey (2017-20) show that the Absolute Work Centrality of the Japanese ranks at around the middle of developed countries, while their Relative Work Centrality is somewhat on the low side. In terms of the aforementioned capitalism types, Relative Work Centrality tends to be low in countries with liberal market economies and market employment regimes, followed by Japan. In Europe, the Netherlands is an exception in that its Relative Work Centrality is lower than that of Japan.

Figure 1 plots the relationship between economic affluence and work centrality (relative) in terms of per-capita GDP. A tendency for work centrality to decrease with higher economic affluence is apparent up to a certain point. The high level of work centrality of the Japanese does not deviate significantly from the level that could be expected from their economic affluence, being neither particularly high nor low. In fact, if anything, it seems to be somewhat low among developed countries.

III. Employment commitment and trends

1. Findings of previous surveys

Another characteristic of the Japanese people that has been mentioned repeatedly is a high motivation with respect to work. It has been said that Japanese people do not see work as a mere means of earning a living, but rather find "meaning" in work itself, and that they have a strong tendency to seek internal fulfillment through their working lives.

According to "A Cross-National Survey of Seven Countries" (1985-1993)[5] conducted by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, when survey respondents were asked whether they would continue to work even if they had enough money to live comfortably throughout their lives, Japan had the highest percentage (64.1%) of the seven surveyed countries that answered "continue to work." Japan also had the highest percentage of respondents (72.8%) who thought that "No matter how much money you have, life without work is unfulfilling" (Hayashi,

1998). This result means that the non-financial employment commitment of the Japanese was extremely high by international standards.

The Japanese tendency to find meaning in work itself, rather than viewing it merely as a means of earning a living, is also shown in the MOW International Comparison Survey discussed in section II above. In response to the so-called "lottery question," which asked respondents whether they would work even if they won the lottery or inherited a large fortune and could live comfortably without working, Japan had the lowest percentage (7%) of the seven countries that answered they would quit working, while the percentage answering they would keep their current job (66%) was the highest (Misumi, 1987).

When the MOW survey asked respondents what they value in a job, Japan ranked second among the eight countries (behind the Netherlands) with respect to valuing the "expressive dimension" of a job, such as that the job "matches" personal abilities and experience, is interesting, or provides a high degree of autonomy (MOW International Research Team 1987: ch7). Viewed in terms of the commonly used "work values" classification, this means that the Japanese tended to emphasize the intrinsic values of work.

It must be noted here that the latter result of the MOW survey above indicates a trend that emerged from a response method that involved choosing priority based on an ordinal scale. When respondents were asked to rate individual items on a scale indicating job desirability, as is the case with the ISSP survey, Japan of recent years has been lower than the average for almost all items. In other words, not a great deal of importance was given to either external values (such as high salary and job security) or intrinsic values (such as being interesting and providing opportunities to help others) relative to other countries (Nishi and Aramaki, 2009; Volk and Hadler, 2018). Various other surveys also exist, but their results are often inconsistent. The causes for this can be difficult to pinpoint: Is such inconsistency due to differences in the way the questions are prepared or changes in attitudes over time? Or is it due to differences in the countries being compared or differences in the survey targets (for examples, workers in specific companies or factories, or subjects selected through random sampling)? Thus, careful interpretation is necessary.

Returning to the topic of employment commitment, an international comparison based on the ISSP 1997 survey reveals that, subsequently, Japan, despite its economic affluence, has the strong financial/instrumental work orientation of "A job is just a way of earning money—no more" (71% of "strongly agree" and "agree" combined). On the other hand, the non-financial work orientation "I would enjoy having a paid job even if I did not need the money" was also relatively strong at 69% (Onodera, 2001). The fact that both financial/instrumental work orientation and non-financial work orientation are high suggests after all that Japanese people have high employment commitment and find considerable meaning in working.

2. Recent trends

Let us look at more recent trends based on the above previous studies. Looking at ISSP work-themed surveys conducted in 1997, 2005, and 2015 allows us to see changes over a period of about twenty years. Table 3 summarizes trends in employment commitment from two aspects: financial/instrumental work orientation and non-financial work orientation. In the original sense, the term "employment commitment" refers to "non-financial" commitment and means an orientation that finds meaning in work itself. Conversely, high financial/instrumental work orientation has been viewed as implying "low" employment commitment (Hult, 2004). Certainly, two questions that are used in the ISSP surveys appear to be expressible along a one-dimensional axis of instrumental/financial orientation versus non-financial orientation, as they ask the same thing from opposite angles and the correlation between them is strong. However, as the aforementioned previous studies have shown, it is possible to have both high financial/instrumental work orientation and high non-financial work orientation, and therefore I am taking the step of treating them as independent dimensions in this paper.

Looking at Table 3, the two indicators of financial/instrumental work orientation and non-financial work orientation are moving in contrasting directions in Japan. From 1997 to 2015, financial/instrumental work orientation was showing slight increases and consistently ranked high among developed countries. On the other

Table 3. Trends in employment commitment: financial/instrumental work orientation and non-financial work orientation (ISSP)

	Average values and changes of "financial/instrumental work orientation"				Average values and changes of "non-financial work orientation"			
	1997	2005	2015	Change	1997	2005	2015	Change
United States	2.56	2.57	2.66	0.10	3.44	3.51	3.66	0.22
New Zealand	2.49	2.55	2.38	-0.12	3.57	3.62	3.69	0.13
Australia	—	2.64	2.28	-0.36	—	3.47	3.72	0.24
Canada	2.50	2.43	—	-0.07	3.32	3.40	—	0.07
United Kingdom	2.80	2.76	2.67	-0.12	3.31	3.35	3.68	0.36
Norway	2.10	2.07	1.90	-0.20	3.71	3.78	3.94	0.24
Sweden	2.41	2.43	2.36	-0.05	3.74	3.62	3.78	0.05
Denmark	2.18	2.27	—	0.08	4.04	3.92	—	-0.12
Finland	—	2.75	2.70	-0.05	—	2.83	2.93	0.10
Belgium	—	2.51	2.52	0.01	—	3.28	3.56	0.29
Netherlands	2.39	2.35	—	-0.04	3.27	3.28	—	0.00
Switzerland	2.27	2.26	2.42	0.15	3.59	3.70	3.81	0.22
Germany (former West Germany)	2.64	2.69	2.59	-0.05	3.52	3.55	3.82	0.30
France	2.75	2.63	2.69	-0.06	3.21	3.32	3.36	0.15
Spain	3.04	3.52	2.77	-0.27	3.19	3.03	3.28	0.08
Portugal	3.00	2.86	—	-0.14	3.54	3.40	—	-0.14
Japan	2.85	2.92	2.93	0.08	3.84	3.78	3.55	-0.29
Taiwan	—	3.03	3.15	0.13	—	3.85	3.89	0.04
Ranking of Japan	3/14	2/18	2/14		2/14	4/18	11/14	

Notes: 1. Ages between 18 and 69.
2. Figures for countries that were left out of the analysis in certain instances due to low response collection rates or other reasons are provided for reference.
3. For Germany, figures for the former West Germany are used to maintain commonality across time points.
4. Figures are rounded to the nearest two decimal places. Consequently, the results of change calculations may differ slightly from the figures appearing in the table.

hand, non-financial work orientation declined to a large degree not seen in other countries. As a result, the non-financial work orientation of Japanese people, which had been among the highest in the 1997 survey, fell significantly to the lower group in the 2015 survey. In other developed countries, movement that could be interpreted as strengthening postmaterialist values in the form of "weakening financial/instrumental orientation and strengthening non-financial orientation" became the mainstream during the same period of about twenty years. Japan is moving in the opposite direction to the main trends of other developed countries.[6]

Studies in Europe and the United States have pointed out that financial/instrumental work orientation tends to be higher in countries with "liberal market economies" and "market employment regimes" (more or less the Anglo-Saxon countries), where the tendency to depend on paid work for livelihood is strong, and that non-financial work orientation tends to be higher in Nordic countries, which have more well-developed welfare systems (Esser, 2009; Furåker, 2020; Hult and Svallfors, 2002). Such a tendency is apparent if we look at Table 3. However, there are some aspects that do not fit this scheme, such as the stronger financial/instrumental orientation in Spain and Portugal. In addition, there is an analysis indicating that in East Asia, such as in South Korea, the financial/instrumental orientation is stronger than in countries with market employment regimes (Kim, 2008).

According to these types, Japan was once a rare country where both financial/instrumental work orientation and non-financial work orientation were high. However, the Japanese people's attitudes vis-à-vis work changed dramatically as they experienced the Japanese economy's "two lost decades." Today's Japan is a country with a strong orientation toward seeing work as "a way of earning money" and a weak non-financial work orientation. It is moving closer to the characteristics of countries with "liberal market economies" and a "market employment regimes." Table 3 shows that Taiwan has a high employment orientation resembling that of Japan as it used to be.



**Source*: IMF World Economic Outlook Database

Figure 2. The relationship between economic affluence and financial/instrumental work orientation

As Figure 2 shows, financial/instrumental work orientation has a fairly strong correlation with economic affluence (per-capita GDP). The figure shows that the more economically affluent a country is, the less likely it is that its people will work solely for monetary motives. This fits well with the argument put forth by Inglehart (2018-2019) of a shift in values from "materialism to postmaterialism" or from "survival to self-expression." Although Japan has been described as "having a stronger financial/instrumental work orientation than a developed country typically has," the figure shows that Japan is simply maintaining a level that is roughly commensurate with its economic affluence. It deserves noting that non-financial work orientation does not show such a clear relationship with economic affluence (figure omitted).

IV. Organizational commitment and job satisfaction, and trends

1. Findings of previous surveys: Low organizational commitment and job satisfaction

The third characteristic that has often been mentioned as a characteristic of Japanese people's values and attitudes toward work is their somewhat low organizational commitment and extremely low job satisfaction. This view became well known particularly through several comparative surveys of company workers in Japan and the United States (Cole, 1979; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1985, 1990).[7]

At first glance, this fact seems to contradict findings indicating a significantly high level of commitment at the behavioral level, such as low absenteeism rates, high retention rates in companies (low job change rate), and long working hours. The contradictory fact of "high behavioral level" and "low attitude level" in organizational commitment may have puzzled Western researchers who have tried to find the strength of Japanese-style management in measures that elicit "loyalty to the organization" and "voluntary diligence" from workers.

In explaining the low levels of Japanese organizational commitment and attitude with respect to job satisfaction, Cole (1979) and Lincoln and Kalleberg (1985, 1990) give as reasons the national character of Japanese people to be reserved in their responses and the high expectations Japanese have for their jobs (unlike Americans, who simply view their jobs as instrumental). Focusing on the fact that the difference in organizational commitment between Japan and the U.S. is small but the difference in job satisfaction is large, they point out that

there is a strong positive correlation in that job satisfaction leads to higher organizational commitment. However, the relationship is more complex in Japan, where substantial commitment is higher. That commitment creates higher expectations for work, making it more difficult to achieve job satisfaction, which in turn holds down satisfaction.

On the other hand, Besser (1993) and Suzuki (1994), who criticized these interpretations, attempt different explanations for the gap between "low attitude level" and "high behavioral level." Put simply, unlike American workers who actively change jobs in search of a satisfactory workplace, workers in Japan often find it difficult and disadvantageous to change jobs and therefore they tend to stay put even if they are dissatisfied. Consequently, their commitment to and satisfaction with the organization tend to be low at the attitude level. At the same time, because workers cannot easily move, they must show a high level of commitment at the behavioral level to ensure that their position in the workplace does not deteriorate.

Both interpretations likely have some validity. There is another suggestive study on Japanese organizational commitment from more recent times. The study conducted an analysis of 17 countries using ISSP data and found that, after controlling for all factors (such as job quality, workplace relationships, unemployment risk, and job satisfaction), Japan's organizational commitment was the highest (Furåker and Håkansson, 2020). According to this finding, the "apparent" low organizational commitment of the Japanese is commensurate with the inferior quality of various conditions in their workplaces (and low job satisfaction). Considering this, their organizational commitment is actually at a high level. The same explanation may partially explain the low level of job satisfaction among the Japanese.

2. Findings of previous surveys: Strong willingness to stay with organization

The characteristics of Japanese people's organizational commitment can also be revealed by looking at "the strength of willingness to stay with employer (weakness of inclination to change jobs)."[8] A comparative survey of Japanese and U.S. factory workers (1975) that was introduced in Whitehill and Takezawa (1981) provides such a look. When the survey asked workers what they would do if their company were in a long-term slump and another employer doing good business was out there, the most common response among American workers was "leave the company and take the job with the more prosperous company" (36%). In contrast, the most common response among Japanese workers was "stay with the company provided management pledges to try to keep you employed and not reduce your pay" (45%).

Willingness to stay among the Japanese people is also consistently demonstrated in the International Survey of Youth Attitude (1972-2008), which targets young people between the ages of 18 and 24 (based on each year's survey report; e.g., Director-General for Policy Planning, Cabinet Office, 2009). However, it should be noted here that active willingness to stay is weak. When the survey asked whether respondents want to continue working at their current job, the response rate for the negative-leaning option of "I will probably continue, although sometimes I think about changing" (this option was available from the second through fifth surveys)—rather than "I want to continue"—was higher for Japan than other countries. This indicated a conspicuous tendency for Japanese respondents to stay with their organizations even when they are dissatisfied. Similarly, in the sixth through eighth surveys, when the response options were changed, the response rate for "It is better to change jobs if one feels dissatisfaction with one's place of work" was low, while the response rate for the negative option "Changing jobs is unavoidable if one feels strong dissatisfaction with one's place of work" was consistently high.

A survey called *Soshiki de Hataraku Seishonen no Ishiki Chosa* (survey of the attitudes of youth working in organizations) (1976), which was a three-country comparison between Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom, asked respondents about their intentions with respect to changing jobs and then asked them to provide their "reasons for wanting to continue working." In Japan, the most common reasons given were, in order, "my job is worthwhile" (35.8%), "there is no other place I can work" (34.4%), and "it would be the same if I went elsewhere" (33.3%). The latter two negative-leaning options had higher response rates in Japan compared to the

U.S. and U.K. This is in contrast to the more positive-leaning reasons given by many respondents in the U.K. and the U.S.; namely, "my job is rewarding" (U.K. 52.1%, U.S. 60.6%), "I am satisfied with my salary and position" (55.2%, 50.1%, respectively), and "I have good colleagues" (44.8%, 40.1%, respectively) (Youth Development Headquarters, Prime Minister's Office (ed.), 1979). It is clear that in Japan, where changing jobs is often disadvantageous, people have a strong inclination to maintain the status quo by choosing to stay with their current organization even when dissatisfied with it.

3. Recent trends

The trend of "low organizational commitment and job satisfaction, but strong willingness to stay with the organization (weak inclination to change jobs)," which has been found in several surveys, was also confirmed in the 1997 and 2005 ISSP surveys (Onodera, 2001; Nishi and Aramaki, 2009). The same trend did not change significantly even in the most recent ISSP 2015 survey (Table 4). As for organizational commitment (effort), this was originally somewhat low and appears to have declined even further. However, this cannot be determined with certainty, as the Japanese wording was changed (see Table 1). In any case, all three time points share the fact that Japan does not rank highly among developed countries.

A slight change can be seen in the height of figures for the willingness to stay with employer. In the 1997 and 2005 surveys, the Japanese ranked first in terms of the level of their willingness to stay, showing figures that are by far the highest among the comparator countries. However, in the 2015 survey, the number has dropped significantly, and it is no longer at a noteworthy level though it still remains in the upper group.

Looking at job satisfaction (Table 5), Japanese people's job satisfaction is consistently at the bottom among the developed countries that are used for comparison. Moreover, its decline has been more severe in Japan than in any other country over the past two decades, with job satisfaction among the Japanese reaching an exceptionally low level in the most recent 2015 survey.

Table 4. Trends in organizational commitment: effort and willingness to stay (ISSP)

	Average values and changes of "organizational commitment: effort"				Average values and changes of "organizational commitment: willingness to stay"			
	1997	2005	2015	Change	1997	2005	2015	Change
United States	3.94	4.09	4.11	0.17	2.55	2.76	2.65	0.1
New Zealand	3.72	3.74	3.94	0.23	2.54	2.71	2.83	0.29
Australia	—	3.58	3.69	0.11	—	2.70	2.61	-0.09
Canada	3.71	3.65	—	-0.05	2.37	2.75	—	0.38
United Kingdom	3.63	3.70	3.83	0.19	2.45	2.63	2.76	0.31
Norway	3.57	3.57	3.72	0.15	2.60	2.66	2.84	0.24
Sweden	3.40	3.29	3.45	0.04	2.36	2.28	2.41	0.04
Denmark	3.62	3.66	—	0.04	2.67	2.63	—	-0.05
Finland	—	2.94	3.18	0.24	—	2.90	3.13	0.23
Belgium	—	3.34	3.23	-0.12	—	2.94	2.68	-0.25
Netherlands	3.63	3.57	—	-0.06	2.62	2.76	—	0.14
Switzerland	3.65	3.85	3.84	0.19	2.82	3.20	3.23	0.41
Germany (former West Germany)	3.52	3.63	3.51	-0.01	2.63	2.92	2.91	0.28
France	2.80	2.61	2.79	-0.02	2.40	2.23	2.45	-0.05
Spain	3.35	2.97	3.53	0.18	2.50	2.51	2.53	0.03
Portugal	3.71	3.58	—	-0.13	3.06	3.11	—	0.05
Japan	(3.62)	(3.65)	3.34	(-0.28)	3.12	3.44	2.88	-0.25
Taiwan	—	3.89	3.90	0.01	—	2.86	2.80	-0.06
Ranking of Japan	9/14	8/18	11/14		1/14	1/18	4/14	

Notes: 1. Employed people between the ages of 18 and 69. The other notes of Table 3 also apply here.
2. The wording of the question for "organizational commitment: effort" was changed in the 2015 survey for Japan (see Table 1).

Table 5. Trends in job satisfaction (ISSP)

	Average values and changes of "job satisfaction"			
	1997	2005	2015	Change
United States	5.34	5.46	5.44	0.11
New Zealand	5.26	5.23	5.32	0.06
Australia	—	5.17	5.16	-0.01
Canada	5.12	5.30	—	0.18
United Kingdom	5.12	5.27	5.35	0.23
Norway	5.22	5.27	5.42	0.20
Sweden	5.25	5.16	5.20	-0.05
Denmark	5.69	5.51	—	-0.18
Finland	—	5.30	5.43	0.13
Belgium	—	4.96	5.23	0.27
Netherlands	5.43	5.26	—	-0.17
Switzerland	5.48	5.70	5.75	0.27
Germany (former West Germany)	5.21	5.41	5.44	0.22
France	5.08	4.97	5.12	0.04
Spain	5.40	5.24	5.51	0.11
Portugal	5.17	5.28	—	0.11
Japan	4.83	4.90	4.44	-0.39
Taiwan	—	5.00	5.24	0.24
Ranking of Japan	14/14	18/18	14/14	

Note: Employed people between the ages of 18 and 69. The other notes of Table 3 also apply here.

V. Other indicators: Work ethic and workplace relationships

1. Work ethic

In this section, I will take a supplementary look at data that I believe are important for understanding the meaning of work for the Japanese. These data are outside of the indicators that I have discussed thus far. Here, I will draw attention to and briefly discuss two areas: diligent work ethic and human relations in the workplace.

A "diligent work ethic" is sometimes cited as a characteristic of Japanese work values. However, a multifaceted study comparing Japan, the U.S., the U.K., and West Germany that was edited by the Work Ethics Research Committee (1985) concluded that the work ethic of the Japanese was not particularly strong. But what about more recent years? Let us look at three questions taken from the latest Wave 7 of the WVS (conducted in Japan in 2019) (Dentsu Institute and Doshisha University, 2021).

(1) The Japanese view that "People who don't work become lazy" is quite strong among developed countries.

(2) The Japanese view that "Work should always come first, even if it means less free time work should always come first, even if it means less free time" is extremely weak among developed countries. The strong resistance to sacrificing leisure time may be due to the fact that Japanese people already work long hours.

(3) The Japanese view that "work is a duty toward society" ranks around the middle among developed countries. In a past survey of Japanese, American, and British young people (aged 18 to 24 years), the percentage of Japanese who selected "working is a fulfillment of one's duty to society" (24.8%) was far exceeded the percentages of those who selected the same response in the U.S. and U.K. (15.4% and 16.0%, respectively) (Youth Development Headquarters, Prime Minister's Office (ed.), 1979). The recent survey addressed this question in a completely different manner and targeted a different age range. Nonetheless, it is possible that the work ethic of the Japanese has changed significantly over the past 40 years in that they now feel less of a social obligation to work than their counterparts do in the U.S. and the U.K.

To summarize, the Japanese have a strong resistance to not working in itself, but that does not mean they think that work should be prioritized at the expense of leisure time. The Japanese have a moderate sense of social obligation to work. From the above, it cannot be said that the Japanese people of recent years have a particularly strong diligent work ethic. But by the same token, their diligent work ethic cannot be described as particularly weak either.

2. Interpersonal relationships in workplace

Finally, let us look at how people are placing more importance on interpersonal relationships in the workplace. In some years, the WVS has asked respondents about the conditions they stress when looking for a job. When the Wave 5 survey (conducted in Japan in 2005) asked what respondents stressed, the percentage of Japanese respondents who chose "working with people you like" was 25.6%, the second highest percentage after Sweden (27.2%). Dentsu Institute and Japan Research Center (ed.), 2008). Although not an international comparison, the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute conducts a survey called Japanese Value Orientations (conducted since 1973). Since the 1983 survey, the top ideal job condition chosen by respondents has consistently been "a job where I can enjoy working with my colleagues" (NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute (ed.), 2020). One reason why Japanese people are compelled to stress human relations in the workplace is thought to be a lack of clarity in Japanese workplaces with respect to individuals' duties and authorities. Such ambiguity makes it difficult for individuals to work autonomously on their own (Murata, 2018). Additionally, Nishi and Aramaki (2009) point out the possibility that under Japanese employment practices (such as lifelong employment and seniority by length of service), the atmosphere of the workplace and human relationships become more important than the conditions of the work itself.[9]

In the past, the communal nature of the Japanese workplace produced "a strong sense of camaraderie" (Hazama, 1979). Even without an intrinsic work ethic or desire to work, the Japanese workplace also brought out diligent work behavior through "a combination of coercion and voluntarism" (Suzuki, 1994). However, it has been pointed out that, since the 1990s, the communal nature of the workplace has become an impediment in terms of both increasing corporate productivity and motivating individuals (Ota, 2017). Moreover, one analysis shows that the low level of individual autonomy brought by the Japanese workplace's communal nature is a primary cause of job stress (Murata, 2018). Clarifying how Japanese-style employment and Japanese-style organizations are related to the work quality and deteriorating work attitudes will likely be an important issue going forward.

VI. Conclusion

In this paper, I have endeavored to clarify the meaning of work for Japanese people based on the findings of international comparative surveys. While admitting that there are some points and issues that I did not address, I used the findings of previous studies as a basis for focusing on four indicators—work centrality, employment commitment, organizational commitment, and job satisfaction—and summarized the characteristics of Japanese work values and work attitudes through comparisons with other developed countries. As a result, I observed that some of the characteristics that were once considered to be characteristic of the Japanese are no longer applicable.

(1) Japan's work centrality was the highest among developed countries until the early 1980s but subsequently declined. It is observed that, to some extent, more economically affluent countries have lower job centrality, and, accordingly, the low level of job centrality among the Japanese is generally commensurate with their affluence. According to recent surveys conducted in the 2010s, the Japanese people's work centrality cannot be described as particularly high or low when viewed in absolute terms. It is somewhat low among developed countries when viewed in relative terms.

(2) Employment commitment in Japan was high among developed countries from the standpoints of both financial/instrumental work orientation and non-financial work orientation until around the late 1990s, and overall desire to work was high. However, in the 2010s, financial/instrumental work orientation remained high but non-financial work orientation declined markedly, falling to the lower group among developed countries. Together with its decline in work centrality, Japan's recent tendency toward strong financial/instrumental work orientation and weak non-financial work orientation approaches the characteristics of countries with "liberal market economies" and "market employment regimes."

(3) Looking at organizational commitment, consistently strong willingness to stay with employers (weak

inclination to change jobs) was observed in Japan, despite weakness in terms of wanting to make efforts for employers, and no change has been observed in this tendency in recent years. However, willingness to stay is growing weaker in Japan, and it is not conspicuously high among developed countries like it once was. Japan's job satisfaction has consistently been the lowest among developed countries, and it has fallen even further in recent years.

(4) The Japanese do not have a particularly high or low work ethic, and they show a strong tendency to stress the comfort of workplace relationships as a condition of work.

Table 6 summarizes these findings. Some of the characteristics that were once considered characteristic of the Japanese no longer apply. A number of shifts have occurred over the past twenty years: Work is no longer as central to people's lives as it once was. The fulfillment that comes from working, which was low to begin with, has fallen even further. And there is a growing tendency to accept that "a job is a way of earning money" as people have more difficulty finding positive meaning in working. Those twenty years were a period of economic stagnation that became known as the Japanese economy's "two lost decades," and they were a time when the intrinsic meaning of work was also lost. Perhaps "lost" is too strong a word, but we can at least say that the meaning of work's intrinsic value has become diluted over the past twenty years.

The exploration of factors that have led to this decline in Japan's work values and work attitudes, which is unparalleled in other developed countries, is a task to tackle going forward. Among those factors will likely be the facts that, when viewed in comparison with other countries, Japan has low job autonomy, high job stress, a low percentage of people who find their jobs interesting, and not so good interpersonal relationships in the workplace (Murata, 2018). It will be necessary to examine how these conditions are related to Japanese-style employment and Japanese-style organizations and how they are (or are not) linked to the various aspects in the deterioration of work attitudes.

Survey data for international comparisons have become more complete, and as a result more overseas analyses are being conducted with focus on East Asian countries (such as Japan and South Korea) in addition to Western countries as targets for comparison. Yet, it still cannot be said that international comparisons of work values and work attitudes are actively underway in Japan. Since 2000, successive international comparative surveys have focused on regions ranging from East Asia, whose countries have close similarities to Japan, to the Pacific Rim, India, and Southeast Asia.[10] New attempts to shed light on Japan's occupational and labor views through comparisons with neighboring countries are also emerging (Miyoshi and Yoshino, 2005; Shibai and Yoshino, 2013). I look forward to seeing further progress in these studies.

Table 6. Trends in work values and work attitudes of the Japanese in comparison with other developed countries

	Past (up to the 1990s)	The present (2010s)	Change
Work centrality	Very high until the early 1980s	Neither particularly high nor low, but somewhat low on the relative side	↘
Employment commitment: financial/instrumental work orientation	Fairly high	Fairly high	↗
Employment commitment: non-financial work orientation	Fairly high	Fairly low	↘
Organizational commitment: effort	Somewhat low	Fairly low	↘ ?
Organizational commitment: willingness to stay	Very high	Fairly high	↘
Job satisfaction	Very low	Conspicuously low	↘
Other (from the 2000s)	・Diligent work ethic cannot be described as either particularly strong or particularly weak. ・The comfort of workplace relationships is stressed as a work condition.		

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Notes

1. See Ikeda (2016) for an overview of the WVS and Murata (2020) for an overview of the ISSP. For the public data that was used, see Inglehart et al. (eds.) (2020) and ISSP Research Group (1999, 2013, and 2017). Note that no weighting adjustment was applied to the analysis.
2. Misumi (1987) omitted Yugoslavia from comparison in MOW International Research Team (1987) found that Japan's work centrality was the highest in an analysis of eight countries that included Yugoslavia.
3. Incidentally, the work centrality of Japanese women was generally high from their teens and beyond (Misumi, 1987).
4. Because leisure time is not the only area of life that is outside of work, the criticism could be made that simply subtracting leisure centrality is not sufficient. Undoubtedly there is room for further study of this indicator.
5. The specific survey years of the seven countries are as follows: Germany: 1987; France: 1987; United Kingdom: 1987; United States: 1988; Japan: 1988; Italy: 1992; Netherlands: 1993.
6. Although not involving international comparison, there is a finding from a cohort analysis showing that there is a swing back to materialistic values among Japan's younger generation within the context of "work values," which refers to what people value in terms of work conditions (Tanami and Miyata, 2015).
7. The low degree of job satisfaction among Japanese people has been observed repeatedly in international comparative surveys conducted by the Japanese Electrical, Electronic and Information Union (All Japan Federation of Electric Machine Workers Unions) (1984-85, 1994-96, 1999-2001) and the International Survey of Youth Attitude (1972-2008) (Ishikawa and Shiraishi, 2005; Director-General for Policy Planning, Cabinet Office, 2009). For instance, the surveys of the above union asked about overall satisfaction with working life, and the results of its third survey (1999-2001) showed that Japan ranked ninth out of 13 countries in this respect. In general, job satisfaction tends to be higher in Western Europe and lower in East Asia.
8. It should be noted that Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990) found almost no difference between Japan and the United States in terms of willingness to stay with employers.
9. Although not an international comparison, Yamamoto (2010) demonstrates empirically the importance that interpersonal relationships in the workplace have in Japan.
10. A list of just the major surveys includes the following: Asia Barometer Survey (2003-present), East Asia Value Survey (2002–2005), Pacific Rim Values Survey (PRVS: 2004–2009), Asia Pacific Values Survey (APVS: 2010–2014), and East Asian Social Surveys (EASS: 2006-present).

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Is Japanese Internship for the Purpose of Education or Recruitment?: A Study of its Historical Background, and Recent Changes and Future Challenges

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This article examines internships for university students in Japan from the perspective of whether the internships are conducted for "educational purposes" or "employment and recruitment purposes," with regard to related policies, the present situation, comparison with other countries, and trends characteristic in recent years. The article provides an overview of the history of internships for Japanese universities, and elucidates the distinguishing features of Japanese internships using statistical data. Such features include 1) the fact that the number of participants in internships is increasing while the period of internships is short and becoming even shorter, and 2) the fact that while universities and public authorities emphasize that internships are intended for educational purposes, in reality they are used for seeking employment and hiring. A look at developments in other countries shows that internships are now growing as separate programs that target employment and hiring, while programs such as "cooperative education" in the United States and "sandwich courses" in England continue to play important roles as education conducted through industry-academia cooperation. This study also points out the need for awareness of the relevance of labor market characteristics when comparing the industry-university cooperative education programs such as internships with those in other companies. Furthermore, this article reviews the issues and positioning of three types of internships—i) long-term, ii) participated by students in lower school years, and iii) online—that are considered to represent its distinctive trends in Japan, and clarifies the contents with regard to the purposes of education and recruitment, as well as problems and positioning while comparing with efforts in other countries.

I. Introduction

1. Objectives

Internships for university students in Japan have expanded considerably since the late 1990s, when promotion of internships was positioned as a government policy, but they have developed in a form that diverges from their original purpose, and is unique compared to internships and industry-academia cooperative education in other countries. With this in mind, this article examines internships for university students in Japan from the perspective of whether the internships are conducted for educational purposes or employment and recruitment purposes, with regard to related policies, the present situation, comparison with other countries, and trends characteristic in recent years. In specific terms, the article begins by offering an overview of the history of internships for Japanese universities, and seeks to elucidate the distinguishing features of Japanese internships, including their relevance to recent changes. Also, to better clarify the characteristics of Japanese internships and recent changes, this article reviews the situation in other countries and discusses the challenges and future of internships in Japan. In particular, there is a discussion of recent developments, including long-term, early-age, and online internships. The article examines the content of these internships with both educational and employment/recruitment purposes with that in other countries.

2. Approach to educational purposes and employment/recruitment purposes

In September 1997, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Ministry of Labour, and Ministry of International Trade and Industry (all at that time) formulated the Basic Agreement on the Promotion of Internships (hereinafter, "Three-Ministry Agreement"). This served as a catalyst for the spread of internship programs at Japanese universities, with internships defined as "work experience related to students' majors and future careers while still enrolled at university." The agreement also defined internship in the phrases such as "educational activities for students conducted at enterprises, etc." and, for enterprises, "activities carried out from the perspective of human resource development through industry-academia collaboration, and thus corporate initiatives from a broad perspective, not limited to securing human resources for themselves." A partial amendment in 2014 added the phrase defining internships "could be positioned as part of education at universities and other institutions." As these phrases indicate, official government documents emphasize and reiterate that internships are intended to be educational activities and not employment/recruitment activities.

This article divides internships into the two categories of those for educational purposes and those for employment/recruitment purposes, and, focusing on the difference, discusses the history and current situation of internships in Japan, developments in other countries, and recent changes in Japan. First, let us discuss the differences between these two categories in specific terms. The Three-Ministry Agreement notes the significance of internships for universities and students as well as that for enterprises and so forth. The significance can be classified by purpose cited above, as shown in Figure 1. It is difficult to clearly demarcate internships for educational purposes and those for employment/recruitment purposes, and the classification is based on which objective is stronger in relative terms. From the perspective of universities and students, items strongly characterized as educational purposes include "improvement or enhancement of educational content and methods" and "significance for future career or professional education," while those more weakly characterized in this regard include "fostering a high level of professional awareness." Meanwhile, from the perspective of enterprises, items strongly characterized as educational purposes include "reflecting the needs of industry and other sectors in university education," while items strongly characterized as employment/recruitment purposes include "promoting understanding and communicating the appeal of enterprises."

	Significance to university and its students	Significance to enterprises, etc.	Ref. (DISCO 2019)
Educational purposes ⇕ Employment/ recruitment purposes	Improvement/enhancement of educational content/methods Significance for career/ professional education Cultivation of human resources with independence and originality Fostering a high level of professional awareness	Fostering a high level of professional awareness Cultivation of human resources with practical ability Promoting understanding and attractiveness of enterprises	Corporate contribution to community/social Human resource development through industry-academia collaboration Cultivation of professional outlook in students Corporate PR and image enhancement Formation of a human resource pool for recruiting Recruitment of excellent human resources (internships directly linked to hiring)

Sources: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2014); DISCO (2019).
Notes: 1. The above is based on the Three-Ministry Agreement as partially amended in 2014.
2. The author added DISCO 2019 as a reference quoting the purpose of the enterprise survey conducted by DISCO Inc., to supplement the somewhat confusing discussion of "significance to enterprises, etc." in the agreement.

Figure 1. Outline of categorization of internships as educational purposes or employment/recruitment purposes

II. History of internships in Japan with a focus on educational purposes and employment/ recruitment purposes

The term "internship" was first used in an official government document in the Program for Educational Reform: Toward the Realization of an "Educated Nation" in January 1997. Subsequently, based on the Action Plan for Economic Structural Reform (Cabinet decision of May 1997), internships were launched in earnest with the Three-Ministry Agreement of September 1997.

However, if the definition in the Three-Ministry Agreement ("work experience related to students' majors and future careers while still enrolled at university") is interpreted literally, then educational training, factory training, clinical training programs for doctors, and other required training for qualifications also qualify as internships, and these started long before the above-mentioned governmental measures.[1] However, while a broad interpretation of the concept of internships encompasses such training, for the purposes of this article they will not be included unless otherwise noted.

First, looking at the situation in the business community and at universities before the Three-Ministry Agreement[2], the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyukai, hereinafter, Doyukai) "Toward an Education of Choice" (1991) called for "support for student job internships as an interaction with the academic community," and the Japan Federation of Employers' Associations (a precursor of the Japan Business Federation, or Keidanren) "University Reforms and Enterprises' Response to the Challenges of a New Era" (1995) proposed that "in present-day university education... students' vocational training at enterprises and experiential learning (e.g., the internship system in the U.S.), as well as volunteer activities, should be included in curricula." Also, a council was established within the Employment Agreement Council, in which universities and enterprises discuss employment and hiring issues, to study the future of employment and hiring. In November 1996, members of the Subcommittee to Study Medium- and Long-term Employment and Recruitment were dispatched to Boston as a survey team to investigate employment, recruitment, and internships in the US, and the results were compiled in the "Survey Report on Employment and Recruitment in the US."

In other words, the initial purpose of considering internships was to address employment/recruitment issues associated with the abolition of employment agreements for university graduates, and internships were introduced as a buffer against conflicts over job-hunting activities (Yoshimoto 2020). Therefore, it can be said that internships

at the outset were seen as for employment/recruitment purposes.

Next, let us examine the history of internships in light of socioeconomic circumstances since the 1990s, amid the labor shortages of the economic bubble era around 1990. There was an increase in the cases of *aotagai* meaning the earlier recruitment of newcomers with the unofficial job offers to students well before graduation (which originally means "reaping rice before the harvest" in Japanese), and at the same time an increase in employees quitting soon after being hired. The challenge at the time was to reduce the number of the latter by matching recruits with suitable jobs through internships (Hashimoto 2013). In other words, the main focus was employment/recruitment purposes. However, after the bursting of the economic bubble, as the Japanese economy stagnated, business performance deteriorated, and educational programs within enterprises dwindled, there was a notable rise in industries' calling on educational institutions to develop outstanding human resources, and educational purposes became the main focus of internships.

After the Three-Ministry Agreement, the labor market for university graduates basically remained a seller's market with falling numbers of young people in the labor force due to the declining birthrate. In line with this, internships more prominently "for employment/recruitment purposes" became the norm. At the same time, there was a move toward expanding the definition of internships to include those that were called "one-day internships" but do not provide students actual "work experience." As if sounding an alarm over these trends, there were repeated reminders from the government that internships are primarily "for educational purposes."

On that note, let us examine proposals from the government and the business community since 2010, and discuss the current situation, which can be called a struggle between these two purposes of the internships. In 2013, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) released a report "Summary of Opinions on Measures to Promote Popularization and Qualitative Enhancement of Internships" as results of the discussions by the experts at its Research Conference on Further Enhancing Internships for the Promotion of Systematic Career and Professional Education. It described the promotion of internships for educational purposes, such as "medium- to long-term, overseas internships" and "internships with various formats (for younger undergraduates, combined with project-based learning [PBL], etc.)." Regarding the relationship with employment/recruitment activities, the report states that "internships should be considered separately from enterprises' recruitment activities... but as unique effects of linking these activities to university education have been observed, their significance and expansion should also be considered." The report thus cites the need for a consideration of internships "for employment/recruitment purposes" while taking a basically negative view on them.

In response to these developments, the 2014 partial amendment of the Three-Ministry Agreement newly added "significance as career/professional education" as a new aspect of internships' importance for universities and students, and newly clarified rules governing the use in employment and recruitment of student information obtained through internships, which can be seen as a strong clamp-down on internships for employment/recruitment purposes.[3]

Subsequently, in 2017, the MEXT released another report "Summary of Discussion toward Further Enhancement of Internships" by the Conference of Survey and Research Collaborators on Promotion of Internships, etc. While it continued to "position internships as a part of educational activities," the report devoted a section for "The Relation of Internships to Employment and Recruitment Activities" with a considerable amount of description of this point. The conference's conclusion was that "the current handling of internships as not directly related to employment and recruitment must be maintained," and "the relationship between internships and employment/recruitment activities should be examined as a med-term issue from a broad perspective among the parties concerned, based on the prerequisite that the quality of students' academic environments is ensured." The conference firmly maintained a generally negative position on internships for employment/recruitment purposes, as it had in the past. However, the same report notes that "various opinions were expressed," and introduced opinions regarding the flexible handling of student information obtained through internships. It can be said that employment/recruitment purposes were also given a certain degree of

consideration and positioning.

Meanwhile, as for developments within the business community, Keidanren discusses internships in its "Guidelines for Recruitment and Employment Screening" and the summary thereof. The December 2015 summary showed a negative view of employment/recruitment purposes. Specifically, it rejected internships of less than five days, and referred to "ensuring that all employees are informed that internships have nothing to do with recruitment and selection activities…" and also that "personal information obtained during internships is not to be used for subsequent recruitment and selection activities." However, in the April 2017 summary of the guidelines, the minimum requirement of five days was removed, and instead it was stated that "one-day programs that have little educational impact and act as PR for enterprises while connecting to subsequent employment screenings are not to be implemented." It recognizes internships of less than five days while clearly rejecting so-called "one-day internships."

Furthermore, the Industry-Academia Council on the Future of Recruitment and University Education (2021, hereinafter, "the Council"), consisting of university officials and Keidanren members, took up internships as an important issue for the future of university education and industry-academia cooperation, and proposed a review of the definition of internship after the Three-Ministry Agreement, and classification of industry-academia cooperative education according to four types. Specifically, it defines internships as "activities in which students gain work experience (practical experience at enterprises) related to their field of interest, including their major, and their future career, to determine whether or not they have the ability to work in that field (whether or not they are qualified for that job)," proposing a model of internships that is slightly more conscious of employment/recruitment purposes than previously.

To sum up, developments within the business community show an understanding of the principle of internships being for educational purposes, but also of a demand for employment/recruitment purposes. It can be said that the business community's stance is that discussions on internships should be separated from those on enterprise briefings which are very short term and do not include "work experience," while internships for employment/recruitment purposes should be recognized to a certain extent.

III. Grasping the current state of internships in Japan via statistical data

Now, let us attempt to quantitatively grasp the current situation of, and changes in, internships for university students in Japan (Tables 1 and 2). First, according to the "Status of Internships at Universities, etc." survey

Table 1. Number of internship participants and participation rate

		2006	2014	2015	2017	2019
Survey by the MEXT	Total undergraduates (persons)	50,430	66,125	79,840	75,369	77,594
	Internship participation rate (%)	1.8	2.6	3.1	2.9	3.0
	1st and 2nd year undergraduates as a percentage of all undergraduates (%)	20.1	26.2	28.6	30.5	35.1
	3rd year undergraduates as a percentage of all undergraduates (%)	71.1	61.2	56.4	56.5	51.4
Survey by private-sector employment information enterprises	Recruit Career Co., Ltd.	—	39.9	43.7	55.9	70.8
	Mynavi Corporation	—	58.2	62.1	78.7	85.3
	DISCO Inc.	—	42.7	51.2	70.0	77.2

Sources: MEXT, "Status of Internships at Universities, etc." (results for each year); Recruit Career/Recruit Shushoku Mirai Kenkyusho (2021a); Mynavi Corporation (2021); and DISCO (2021).
Notes: 1. The MEXT survey covers internships for which credit is given, and which are not related to the acquisition of a specific qualification.
2. The denominator of the participation rate in the MEXT survey is the total number of undergraduates, and assuming that students participate in the survey once during their time at university, the participation rate can be multiplied by four to obtain something closer to the actual figure.
3. The private-sector employment information enterprise survey was conducted on students (mainly third-year undergraduates) scheduled to graduate in March of the year after the following year. Recruit Career survey and MyNavi Corporation survey include first-year graduate students.

Table 2. Composition of students' internship participation duration

	2006	2014	2015	2017	2019	(Ref.) 2021 graduates (Recruit)
1 day	11.1	2.0	5.4	2.1	2.7	75.0
2 days or more/less than 1 week		29.4	31.9	30.8	35.0	56.8
1 week or more/less than 2 weeks	50.1	44.1	38.2	42.2	35.0	11.0
2 weeks or more/less than 3 weeks	27.3	11.7	9.0	7.1	11.1	5.2
3 weeks or more/less than 1 month	4.6	3.2	3.8	5.5	5.7	
1 month or more/less than 2 months	4.4	2.4	2.7	3.1	2.3	2.0
2 months or more/less than 3 months	1.9	1.0	2.6	2.2	2.8	
3 months or more	0.6	5.0	4.2	6.3	4.5	1.4
Unknown	0.0	1.3	2.0	0.7	0.9	—

Sources: MEXT, "Status of Internships at Universities, etc." (results for each year); Recruit Career/Recruit Shushoku Mirai Kenkyusho (2021a.)
Note: The total in the ref. does not add up to 100 as the survey by Recruit allows for multiple responses.

conducted by the MEXT, the status of "internships not related to acquisition of specific qualifications" is that (1) the number of participants in internships is steadily increasing, but (2) the participation rate remains relatively low and (3) the percentage of internships with short duration is high. These trends have become more pronounced in recent years.

Next, a survey of student internships conducted by private-sector employment information enterprises shows that the participation rate has generally been around 70-80% in recent years, indicating an upward trend. In terms of duration, "one-day internships" have accounted for the majority in recent years, meaning that the number of internships that cannot be considered "work experience" as defined by the Three-Ministry Agreement is on the rise.

The results of surveys conducted by the public sector (MEXT) and the private sector (employment information enterprises) show both similarities and differences in results, as follows. The similarities are that the participation rate of university students is basically rising, and that this trend is more pronounced due to the shorter duration of internships. Meanwhile, the differences are that there is a large gap in the participation rate, and that many students participate for longer periods of time according to the MEXT survey. The reason for this discrepancy can be attributed to the difference in the scope of the surveys: the MEXT survey targets only student initiatives that are known to the universities, and the details of internships that students apply for or participate in on their own without going through the university are basically unknown to the universities, whereas the employment information enterprise survey targets students who are registered with the same enterprises and are engaged in job hunting activities. Thus it can be said that the participation rate found by the employment information enterprise survey is naturally higher than that of the MEXT survey, which covers all years of university and not only the later years when students are job hunting. Since the former survey targets students who are registered with employment information enterprises, it shows the situation of those students who are more actively conducting job hunting activities than the average.

When quantitative changes are examined from the perspective of "educational purposes" and "employment/recruitment purposes," it can be said that, contrary to the historical background discussed in Section II, the reality is that employment/recruitment purposes are the main focus. It is for this reason that warning bells regarding this trend have repeatedly been sounded, in the form of reiterations of the idea that internships are for educational purposes.

IV. Present situation of internships in other countries in comparison with Japan

Internships in the United States are characterized by the existence of both internships and cooperative

education. According to the Industrial Structure Improvement Fund (1998), cooperative education, carried out by universities as part of curricula, is a type of educational program in which students alternate between learning a specialized field of study and actual work experience related to that field during their school years, and is proactively managed and administered by universities in cooperation with enterprises. Internships, on the other hand, are operated and managed by enterprises, and cooperation between universities and enterprises is rather weak, with internship programs generally offered during summer and spring vacations. Internships may be unpaid in some cases. In recent years, however, both types of internships are generally paid.

According to the Recruit Works Institute (2015a), internships in the US are characterized as follows: (1) over 90% of surveyed enterprises offer internships, but only about half of them offer both cooperative education and internship programs, and no enterprises were implementing only cooperative education. (2) The duration of internships was shorter than that of cooperative education, with most of the internships lasting 6 to 12 weeks. (3) The results also revealed that for about 70% of the respondents, the purpose of internships was "to recruit entry-level human resources," and in fact, 81% of interns who had done internships at their companies were hired as regular employees.

In other words, cooperative education is more strongly for educational purposes and is university-led, while internships are more strongly for employment/recruitment purposes and are implemented by enterprises. The duration of both types of programs is approximately six weeks to several months, which is very different from internships in Japan. As for internships implemented by enterprises, programs are conducted for the purpose of employment and recruitment, which is a point in common with the reality of Japanese internships. American internship programs are conducted so as to grasp the abilities of students, and participants are paid whereas Japanese internship programs are very short-term and are intended to form a pool of students from which to recruit employees. The fact that 80% of student interns are hired after completing internships during their school years indicates that internship selection plays a significant role in the actual hiring process in the US. In the US such early headhunting of students appears to be growing more commonplace. In Japan, where internship gained popularity amid accusations that enterprises were headhunting students too early during their university careers, the programs have avoided associating internships directly with employment, resulting in the spread of considerably short internships.

In the UK, the "sandwich course" is well known as a traditional form of industry-academia cooperative education. According to Inenaga (2013), it is a type of degree program that incorporates work experience into the undergraduate curriculum. As of the 2010/11 academic year, students taking sandwich courses accounted for 9.3% of all full-time undergraduate students. There are two kinds of courses, one entailing one year of work experience and the other two work experiences of about six months each, for which students are paid as a rule. Internships for the purpose of employment and recruitment are conducted separately from the sandwich courses, the same as those in the US. According to the Recruit Works Institute (2015b), some internships in the UK used to last from several months to a year, but recently they have grown shorter and usually last four to eight weeks during summer vacation, with some micro-internships, two to four weeks in length, also seen. While the shortening of the duration of internships resembles what is occurring in Japan, internships in the UK and those in the US, are longer than those in Japan.[4]

A phenomenon seen in both the US and the UK is the expansion of industry-academia cooperative education, including internships, with an orientation toward employment and recruitment. Traditional industry-academia cooperative education, such as American cooperative education and British sandwich courses, still plays an important role for educational purposes. However, with the problem of youth unemployment spreading globally, internships for the purpose of employment/recruitment are being enhanced and their duration shortened, either separately from or in addition to these programs. This trend can be seen in Japan as well, but the major differences are that internships generally last from a few weeks to a few months compared to Japan, where internships last for a few days, and that as a rule participants are paid.

In terms of research on internships, Iwai (2019a) summarized previous studies on internships in Japan and

Table 3. Industry-academia cooperative education, higher education system, labor market, and connections between education and labor market (Japan and other countries)

	Level of commitment to industry-academia cooperative education	Higher education system			Labor market			Connections between education and labor market	
		Relationship with society	Age range of students	Gaps in selectivity	Mobility	Human resource development	Wage differential	Relevance of education to occupation	Evaluation of utility of education
US	High	Medium	Low	High	High	Not in-house	Large	Medium	Medium
UK	Medium	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Not in-house	Large	Medium	Low
Germany	High	Strong High	High	Low	Medium	Not in-house	Medium	Medium	Medium
Finland	Medium	Strong High	High	Low	High	Not in-house	Small	High	High
China	Medium	Low	Low	High	High	Not in-house	Large	Low	Low
Japan	Low	Low	Low	High	Low	In-house	Large	Low	Low

Note: Broadly classified by the author on the basis of previous research.

abroad and points out that, compared to Japan, there are fewer studies on the educational effects of internships and rather more studies investigating the effects of internships on recruitment. Meanwhile, Mitate (2017) summarized previous studies on internships in Japan and found that there were fewer studies on connections between internships and recruitment and on connections between internships and careers after being hired compared to those on internship design and evaluation and on the role and definition of internships, and attributed this to the fact that internships in Japan were initially designed to be part of education.

Also, when industry-academia cooperative education including internships is viewed from an international comparative perspective, the OECD (2010), referring to the work of Acemoglu and Pischke (1999), found that the recruitment benefits of participating in industry-academia cooperative education in enterprises depend on labor market characteristics and regulations, such as labor mobility, wage elasticity, and the strength of job security. Table 3 summarizes differences in the degree of commitment to industry-academia cooperative education, the higher education system, the labor market, and the relationship between education and the labor market in Japan and other countries. For example, in countries where students tend to be older, industry-academia cooperative education may be easier, while the need for it may be relatively lower as students have more societal experience. In addition, countries where there is not extensive in-house training, enterprises may be more likely to recruit employees who are capable of working right away, and place more emphasis on students' professional skills and expertise, thus requiring a means of identifying appropriate recruits. Of course, it is difficult to clarify the relationship between internships and industry-academia cooperative education only through the data on this table. However, in the future, when making international comparisons of industry-academia cooperative education programs such as internships, it is necessary to refer to the labor market and enterprises' behavior, including differences in the working environment and employment management, in addition to the educational system and curriculum.

V. Recent changes to internships in Japan

Contrary to the intentions of universities and government, and regardless of their benefits and drawbacks, internships for the purpose of employment and recruitment have become mainstream. A similar trend can be seen in other countries as well, although the duration and content of internships differs greatly.

However, it is also true that as this trend has become mainstream there have been various criticisms over the years, and there have been some programs that do not include work experience and cannot actually be considered internships. For this reason, the MEXT established the "Internship Reporting and Commendation System for Universities, etc." in FY2018, and set six criteria for selecting internship programs for commendation: (1) the

program must involve work experience, (2) the program must be positioned within the regular educational curriculum, (3) the program must be positioned as an organized effort of the university or other educational institution, (4) a system must be in place to monitor the educational effects of the internship, (5) internship duration must be five days or more, and (6) the university and enterprise, etc. must collaborate on the internship program. (MEXT, Higher Education Bureau 2018). Judging from the above, it is clear that internships with greater emphasis on educational purposes are the focus. From among the initiatives[5] commended in FY2018 and FY2019, the following are some of the most distinctive examples: (1) long-term internships, (2) internships for younger students, and, in addition to these, as a new trend, (3) online internships implemented in many universities and enterprises since FY2020 from the perspective of preventing the transmission of COVID-19, and case studies of these programs and recent previous studies dealing with their effects were addressed. Section V-2 below will discuss the concept of programs that combine educational purposes and employment/recruitment purposes, focusing on comparisons with conventional internships and part-time jobs, as well as with approaches in other countries.

While Subsections V-1-(1) and V-1-(2) focus on university-led internships with an awareness of being for educational purposes, the internships discussed in V-2 can be said to transcend the dichotomy of "educational purposes" vs. "employment/recruitment purposes."

1. Recent changes

(1) Long-term internships

As described above, the extremely short duration of internships in Japan compared to other countries is a major issue, but some universities do offer long-term internships. According to a survey by the MEXT, a small but not negligible 9.6% (in 2019) of students participated in internships lasting more than one month (Table 2).

Based on a case study at one university, Takazawa and Kawai (2018) clarified the educational effects of long-term internships and identified three factors that contribute to their effectiveness: specific goal setting, reflection and feedback; mechanisms to support the stretch assignment experience; and an overall program design that consciously connects to the daily lives of university students. Yamamoto (2019), also based on a single-university case study, while noting that the effects of long-term internships remain at the stage of "opportunities to cultivate" various abilities, also positions them as a type of internship that ought to exist in the future. Yamamoto states that although it does not connect directly to hiring, it has been shown to be an opportunity to form a "potential pool of human resources" that is optimal for students and enterprises.

As described above, long-term internships are being implemented by many universities for educational purposes, but research on these internships is mainly based on single-university case studies, and more comprehensive research is expected to obtain further results in the future.

(2) Internships for students in earlier grades of university

Because internships in Japan, contrary to their originally intended purpose, have developed mainly for the purposes of employment and recruitment, the participants have primarily been third-year undergraduate students and first-year master's program students. However, as shown in Table 1, the internship participation rate of first- and second-year undergraduates is on the rise, though they are still in the minority.

The Council proposes that internships in their earlier grades of university, as distinguished from internships for those in later years, be promoted as "career education for early-year students" that will improve their understanding of work at enterprises, and of industries and occupations, and motivate their subsequent university studies (Industry-Academia Council on the Future of Employment and University Education 2020).

Also, based on the recommendations of Doyukai (2015), the Advanced Internship Institute of Doyukai, established by enterprises and universities and led by Doyukai, has been offering long-term internships for first- and second-year undergraduate students since 2016.[6] Kameno, Kaji, and Kawakami (2017) identified the characteristics and effects of internships conducted within this framework.

Matsuzaka and Yamamoto (2019) also found that internship participants in earlier grades became more career-conscious and expressed the significance of work verbally more than non-participants. In addition, Iwai (2019b) found that the effects of internship programs on university students' motivation to learn and to reevaluate university life were similar to those of the internship program for later-year students. However, none of these studies clearly compared the effects of internships with those for later-year students, and effects specific to younger students are unclear.

In the future, there is a need to systematize division of roles between internships for earlier- and later-grade students and integrate the two in an organic fashion, as well as to conduct empirical research on the effectiveness of such internships.

(3) Online internships

To prevent the spread of COVID-19, online internships rapidly grew more prevalent in FY2020. According to Recruit Career/Recruit Shushoku Mirai Kenkyusho (2021b), the rate of participation in face-to-face internships among the class of 2022 was 68.3%, while the online participation rate was 89.1%. Even taking into account the special circumstances that have made it difficult to conduct face-to-face internships during the pandemic, there is a high possibility that online internships will continue to play a significant role post-pandemic.

Under these circumstances, in the document "Points for Improving the Educational Value of Online Training" (2020), Doyukai clarified the strengths and weaknesses of online training, reaffirmed the unique educational effects of face-to-face training, and proposed an appropriate combination of face-to-face and online training in the post-pandemic world. Ito, Ogushi, and Nakai (2021) also note that remote internships have many advantages for workplaces by freeing them from temporal, spatial, and risk-management constraints, and that a hybrid of face-to-face and remote models can further expand the possibilities of internships.

As of today, there are few systematic studies of online internships, but the future of online internships in a post-pandemic environment is a focus of attention.

2. Programs for combined purposes of educational and employment/recruitment

As seen in Section I, there is no clear dichotomy between educational and employment/recruitment purposes, and there is middle ground between the two. The Council has proposed "job-type research internships" as a type of program that combines the two (Industry-Academia Council on the Future of Employment and University Education 2020).

Furthermore, based on the discussions in the Job-Type Research Internship Promotion Committee jointly established by the MEXT's Higher Education Bureau and Keidanren in 2020, the MEXT "Job-Based Research Internships (Innovative and Trial Programs) Implementation Policy (Guidelines)" set forth specific measures for the future of job-based research internships (MEXT, Higher Education Bureau 2021). The guidelines state that such internship programs are to be long-term, paid job-type internships, with areas of focus including activities for recruitment and employment. Specifically, they are intended for graduate students with the basic knowledge and ability to conduct research, are long-term (two months or more) and paid, and can be incorporated into the recruitment and selection process.

The type of internship (hereinafter referred to as "job-type internships") proposed by the MEXT and others above is expected to expand in the future. Meanwhile, the word "part-time job" is not included in the above proposal. However, a comparison of internship and part-time jobs shows that these internships can be seen as an intermediate format that combines the characteristics of both, in light of the objectives of students and enterprises, as shown in Figure 2. While part-time jobs for university students primarily provide inexpensive labor for enterprises and sources of income for students, as their effects are similar to those of internships, it is possible that they could be developed as an intermediate format between internships for educational purposes and part-time jobs.



Figure 2. Job-type internships in relation with part-time jobs and internships

	Paid	Unpaid
Educational purposes ⇕ Employment/recruitment purposes	Cooperative education (US), sandwich courses (UK) etc. Job-type internships (Japan) Internships (US), etc.	Internships (Japan), etc.
Source of income/Source of labor	Part-time jobs (Japan) etc.	

Figure 3. Positioning of job-type internships: international comparison

According to the Japan Student Services Organization (2020), 86.1% of (daytime) university students have part-time jobs, and these are clearly a part of student life for many university students. Yoshimoto (2015) states that, depending on the conditions, the possibility of part-time jobs fulfilling a function similar to that of an internship needs to be considered.

Some studies have pointed out negative aspects of part-time jobs, such as interference with academic work (e.g., Kidoguchi 2013; Watanabe 2015), while others have analyzed their positive effects on career attitudes (e.g., Sugiyama 2009; Sekiguchi 2010), on the improvement of generic skills (e.g., Mitate 2007; Ishiyama 2017), or their relationships with recruitment and hiring (Hirao, Umezaki and Tazawa 2018; Kameno 2020). However, there are no studies on intermediate formats between internships and part-time jobs.

In addition to this article's categorization according to "educational purposes" and "employment/recruitment purposes," if we also incorporate the question of paid vs. unpaid and draw comparisons with initiatives in other countries as described in Section IV, job-type internships can be called an intermediate form between cooperative education (US), sandwich courses (UK), and internships (US) (Figure 3).

The job-type internships advocated by the MEXT and others are intended for graduate students. It is expected that these internships will be expanded to include undergraduate students in the future.

VI. In closing

This article has examined the past policies, the current situation, comparisons with other countries, and recent trends with regard to internship programs for university students in Japan, from the perspective of whether the internships are conducted for "educational purposes" or "employment/recruitment purposes." It has reviewed the history of internships for Japanese university students, and clarified their characteristics using statistical data. These characteristics are: (1) while the number of participants is increasing, the duration of programs is growing shorter and shorter, and (2) universities and governments emphasize that the programs are for educational purposes, but in reality, they are conducted for employment/recruitment purposes. As for overseas trends, cooperative education in the US and sandwich courses in the UK play important roles as industry-academia cooperative education for educational purposes, but the study also showed that internships focused on employment and recruitment are expanding, and therefore, in examining industry-academia cooperative education from the perspective of international comparison, it is necessary to focus on relationships between industry-academia cooperative education and labor market characteristics. This article also described how recent notable developments in Japan have been characterized by a number of factors. First, three types of diversified internships were discussed, and second, the contents of internships for educational purposes and employment and recruitment purposes combined were compared with those in other countries to clarify related issues and the positioning of internships.

In Japan, the introduction of internships triggered by discussions on employment and recruitment of university students, but once internships as a means of career education was focused, educational purposes came to the fore. In reality, however, internships with a focus on employment and recruitment spread, reflecting the trend of a sellers' market for new graduates in the labor market. Meanwhile, the content of internships was meager compared to other countries, as exemplified by the ultra-short duration of many internships. In response to this trend, the importance of educational objectives for internships was frequently pointed out, and internships for longer periods of time and those in earlier grades of university became more widespread.

When discussing the future direction of Japanese internships positioned as being for employment and recruitment purposes, it is necessary to devise ways to link internships to enterprises' understanding of students' abilities and students' grasping of the corporate culture, rather than simply utilizing internship to form a pool of potential recruits though ultra-short-term programs such as "one-day internship." At the same time, internship programs should not be examined by itself, but rather their relationship to recruitment and job-hunting and the hiring en masse of new graduates should be discussed. In other countries, while internships for employment/recruitment purposes are spreading, as a rule these last at least one month to assess students' abilities. By contrast, the ultra-short-term internships common in Japan reflect the fact that the country's traditional practice of hiring new university graduates en masse requires a large pool of human resources to draw on in a short period of time. On the other hand, if internships are considered to be for educational purposes, the focus should not be solely on the motivational effects of internships on students, but rather on clarifying abilities to be developed. Also, the nature of internships should be discussed, including programs that can be expected to have similar effects, such as part-time work, intermediate formats between internships and part-time work, PBL (project-based learning), and field work.

However, the necessity of clearly dividing internships into two categories – for educational purposes, and for employment/recruitment purposes – should also be re-examined. It is natural to expect that internships will help students improve both specialized and general abilities and cultivate a professional mentality, and at the same time will help them understand the abilities and corporate culture required by the enterprises they hope to work for, which will in turn help them find future employment. On the other hand, if enterprises, as part of the world of industry, can not only contribute to improving the skills of young future members of the workforce but also accurately locate the human resources they seek through internship programs that enable assessment of students' skills, then it will be a win-win situation. It should be remembered that internships are not an end in themselves,

but a means of heightening skills for students, and facilitating smooth recruitment and hiring for enterprises.

A quarter of a century has passed since internships were first fully introduced in Japan, and amid changes in the socioeconomic structure, various experiments with the nature of internships themselves have been carried out. It is important to reconsider the definition if confusion arises from defining such diverse activities with the single word "internship." However, internships are only one means to an end, and there is scope for diversity of objectives. Indeed, in an increasingly diverse society, the fact that there are various objectives should be viewed in a positive light.

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Notes

1. For example, according to Tanaka (2007), there were provisions for student teaching (for teachers in training) in the regulations for teachers' universities promulgated in 1907, which included the phrase "student teaching," and student teaching programs were subsequently offered at teachers' universities nationwide. Also, industrial training was conducted at the Imperial College of Engineering, the predecessor of the University of Tokyo, Faculty of Engineering, in the 1870s and at Tokyo Vocational School, the predecessor of Tokyo Institute of Technology, in the 1890s.
2. For details, see the Japan Society of Internship and Work Integrated Learning 10th Anniversary Working Group (2011).
3. In the appended "Approach to Enterprises' Use of Student Information Obtained through Internships in Public Relations, Recruitment and Hiring," the "Basic Handling" section states that "student information may not be used for public relations, recruitment and hiring," which can be seen as quite a stringent restriction. However, the notes in the document state that "If entry sheets, transcripts, etc. submitted by students to enterprises contain information on internship participation, feedback results and so forth, they may be used for public relations, recruitment and hiring in the same manner as other academic performance records."
4. In France, long-term work experience programs known as *stage en entreprice* are carried out, and while they continue to have educational significance, they have come to be considered part of the job-hunting process and an indispensable prerequisite for students to find work (Isohata 2020). In China as well, amid a worsening employment environment, internships have become an indispensable means of successfully advancing in the job hunting process, and internships for university students in China today are strongly characterized by job-hunting, rather than education, as a basic element (Fu 2014).
5. The initiatives of commended universities are introduced on the MEXT website. For AY2018, see https://www.mext.go.jp/content/1411892_02_1.pdf. For AY2019, see https://www.mext.go.jp/content/20200309-mxt_senmon01-100003720_4.pdf.
6. For information on the activities of the Advanced Internship Institute of Doyukai, see the website: https://www.doyukai-internship.or.jp/internship/.

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Research notes

Findings from the Results of the "NHK/JILPT Joint Survey on Lifestyles and Attitudes"

The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training (JILPT) conducted a joint survey with Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) on lifestyles and attitudes to grasp the state of peoples' lives, their image of the "middle-class," and attitudes to society. High percentages of respondents, with or without a spouse, set the necessary annual income for what they consider a "middle-class life" as "more than 6 million yen." When asked about their actual standard of living, more than half of the respondents answered that they are "living lower than a middle-class life." Less than 40% of respondents indicated "I cannot be more financially affluent than my parents" and indicated a negative response to the idea of "anyone can become affluent as long as they work hard." The survey was conducted among registered monitors of a survey company targeting men and women between the ages of 20 and 69, with a total of 5,370 valid responses. For details, see "Outline of the survey" at the end of this report. The following is the key findings from the first aggregation of the survey.

1. Image of "middle-class life"
2. Class identification in relation to living standards
3. Current standard of living
4. Prospects for future living conditions
5. The ideal way of working and earning a living, and conditions to realize it
6. Perceptions of equal opportunity
7. Most important condition for living a better life
8. Whether or not they think they can be more affluent than their parents

1. Image of "middle-class life"

Different people have different definitions of what "middle class" means. This survey aims to grasp people's perceptions of "middle class" and how they live by asking respondents about the necessary annual income and conditions required for living an imaged "middle-class life" and whether they think they are living an imaged "middle-class life."

(1) Annual income required for an imaged "middle-class life"

To live an imaged "middle-class life," how much annual income would be needed at least? The survey asked those with a spouse about their combined annual income, and those without a spouse about their individual annual income, in seven ranges from "more than 2 million yen" to "more than 20 million yen" (Figure 1). The responses by those with a spouse were concentrated between the options of "more than 6 million yen" and "more than 8 million yen," while the responses by those without a spouse were concentrated between "more than 4 million yen" and "more than 6 million yen." The percentage of responses of "more than 6 million yen" was the highest in both groups. There was a trend for females to choose a lower annual group for class, and the higher the educational attainment was, the higher the necessary annual income they set. There was also a trend for those with a spouse to set the required annual income as higher as the age group increased. In contrast, no trend in age group was seen in respondents without a spouse.



Figure 1. Annual income required to live an imagined “middle-class life” by gender and marital status (with or without a spouse)

(%)

	Gender		Educational attainment		
	Female	Male	High school graduates or below	Vocational technical school/Junior college graduates	University/ Graduate school graduates
Head of household is working as a regular employee	66.2	59.7	58.2	64.0	66.9
Living in your own house	64.8	57.5	63.2	61.6	59.3
Having your own car	62.8	56.0	59.1	61.1	58.8
Married and having a child	47.4	48.1	44.1	46.7	52.3
Able to go on a trip to your favorite place more than once a year	54.5	42.7	44.8	49.9	51.5
Can let your child get the higher education	50.7	41.1	37.2	45.7	54.7
Have a good prospect of funding your retirement	52.1	42.3	45.1	48.0	48.8
Can afford to spend money for your hobby	55.9	49.7	49.8	54.9	54.4
No need to worry about monthly living expenses in detail	46.8	36.7	39.8	43.6	42.6
Can eat out when I want to	47.7	35.9	38.2	44.7	43.0
Others	1.1	1.4	1.6	1.3	0.9
Sample size	2,718	2,652	1,808	1,548	1,977

Figure 2. Conditions for an imagined “middle-class life” by gender and educational attainment (multiple answers)

(2) Conditions for an imaged “middle-class life” (multiple answers)

When asked about the conditions for an imagined “middle-class life” by using 11 options shown in Figure 2 with multiple choices. Among 11 options, “the head of household is working as a regular employee” (63.0%) was the most frequent response, followed by “living one’s own house” (61.2%), and “having one’s own car” (59.5%). In comparison to males, females chose a higher percentage for most options. With higher educational attainment, the options that they chose became higher, for example,

"the head of household is a regular employee," "married and raising children," and "able to provide higher education for children," while the percentage who selected "living in one's own house" decreased. Respondents in their 20s chose "living in one's own house" and "having one's own car" as conditions less frequently in comparison to other age groups.

(3) Living an imagined "middle-class life" or not

When asked whether they live an imagined "middle-class life," more than half (55.7%) responded that they were "living below a middle-class life," while 5.9% responded that they were "living above a middle-class life" (Figure 3). The percentage of respondents without a spouse who chose "living above a middle-class life" was lower than that with a spouse, and the percentage of respondents without a spouse who chose "living below a middle-class life" was higher than that with a spouse. As the educational attainment increased, the percentage of respondents who chose "living above a middle-class life" increased, and a low percentage responded that they were "living below a middle-class life" (Figure 4).

Figure 3. Whether they are living an imagined "middle-class life"



Figure 4. Whether they are living an imagined "middle-class life" by gender, marital status (with or without a spouse), and educational attainment

2. Class identification in relation to living standards

The survey asked the targets about their class identification in relation to living standards.[1] When asked which of tiers their standard of living should be categorized as from six options ("upper," "upper-middle," "lower-middle," "upper-lower," "lower-lower" classes, and "do not know"), 53.4% of males, 57.0% of females, and 55.3% of the total indicated that they were in the middle-class group ("upper-middle" and "lower-middle") (Figures 5 and 6). A higher percentage of respondents with a spouse indicated that they were in the middle-class group, and a low percentage of respondents with a spouse indicated that they were in the lower-class group ("upper-lower" and "lower-lower"). As the educational attainment increased, the percentage of respondents who indicated that they were in the middle-class group increased and the percentage of respondents who indicated that they were in the lower-class group decreased. As for respondents in their 20s and 40s, a lower percentage indicated that they were in the middle-class group in comparison to other age groups, and a higher percentage indicated they were in the lower-class group (figure omitted).



Figure 5. Distribution of class identification in relation to living standards



Figure 6. Distribution of class identification in relation to living standards by gender, marital status (with or without a spouse), and educational attainment

3. Current standard of living

When the survey targets were asked how they feel about their current standard of living, 3.1% responded "I can afford to live quite well," and 40.2% responded "I can afford to live well to some extent." On the other hand, 41.8% responded "I cannot afford to live well to some extent," and 14.9% responded "I cannot afford to live well at all." Accordingly, more than half (56.7%) of the total respondents answered they cannot afford to live well (total of "to some extent" and "at all") (Figure 7). As the educational attainment decreased, the percentage of respondents who indicated that they cannot afford to live well increased (figures omitted for the results by attribute in Figures 7 through 14). The percentage of respondents who indicated that they cannot afford to live well was 61.5% in the 40-49 age group and 60.7% in the 50–59 age group, which were higher in comparison to other age groups. Regarding the type of employment, the percentage of respondents who indicated that they cannot afford to live well was highest among non-regular employee/freelance (64.2%), and the lowest among managers and executives of companies (36.1%). With regard to the annual income group, as the annual income decreased, the percentage of respondents who indicated that they cannot afford to live well increased.

4. Prospects for future living conditions

When asked about the prospects for their own living conditions in the future, 9.6% responded "life will be better than now," 53.2% responded "I can maintain my current lifestyle," and 37.2% responded "life will be worse than now" (Figure 8). By type of employment, the percentage who indicated "life will be better than now" was the lowest among the non-regular employee/freelance group, followed by the jobless. The percentage who indicated "life will be worse than now" was the highest among the jobless, followed by non-regular employee/freelance. By annual income group, as the annual income decreased, the percentage who indicated "life will be worse than now" increased.

5. The ideal way of working and earning a living, and conditions to realize it

When asked how they think they ideally work and earn a living, the highest percentage (50.5%) indicated "continue working at the same company for a long time (lifetime employment)" (Figure 9). The percentage tended to increase in higher age groups. On the other hand, the percentages who indicated "continue choosing a light burden job regardless of income" and "living on unearned income from investments, etc., while working as



Figure 7. The way they feel about their current standard of living



Figure 8. Prospects for future living conditions



Figure 9. The ideal way of working and earning a living



Figure 10. Most necessary thing they think to realize an ideal way of working

little as possible" tended to be higher in the lower age group. The most necessary thing to realize an ideal way of working was "support for balancing work and life" (29.4%), followed by "stability of corporate management" (19.7%) and "sufficient social security system" (17.4%) (Figure 10).

6. Perceptions of equal opportunity

The survey asked if they think "anyone can become affluent in Japan as long as they worked hard" to grasp their perceptions of equal opportunity. The responses, in order of frequency, were "somewhat disagree" (47.7%), "somewhat agree" (31.5%), "strongly disagree" (17.9%) and "strongly agree" (3.0%). The percentage who indicated that they disagreed (total of "somewhat disagree" and "strongly disagree") was 65.6%, indicating that two-thirds of respondents did not think that they could become affluent even if they worked hard (Figure 11). The total number of respondents who indicated that they disagreed was higher among those in their late 40s and among the lower annual income group.

7. Most important condition for living a better life

When asked about the most important condition for living a better life, the responses were "work hard" (46.1%), "getting a good education" (16.7%),



Figure 11. Whether they think that anyone can become affluent in Japan as long as they work hard (perceptions of equal opportunity)



Figure 12. Most important condition for living a better life

"blessed with contacts and connections" (15.5%), "born and raised in a time with a good economy" (14.8%), and "having parents with higher income or educational attainment" (6.9%) (Figure 12). In the higher age groups, the percentage who indicated "work hard" increased and the percentage who indicated "blessed with contacts and connections" decreased.

8. Whether or not they think they can be more affluent than their parents

(1) The responses

When asked if they think they can be more affluent than their parents, the responses, in order of



Figure 13. Whether they think that they can be more financially affluent than their parents



Note: Respondents who answered "I do not think I can be more financially affluent than my parents" (N=1,944).

Figure 14. Reasons why they do not think they can be more financially affluent than their parents (multiple answers)

frequency, were as follows: “I do not think I can” (36.2%), “I think I can be as affluent as my parents” (27.7%), and “I think I can” (18.6%) (Figure 13). By age group, the percentage of respondents who indicated “I do not think I can” increased at ages 20 to 49 (20–29 [31.3%], 30–39 [41.3%], and 40–49 [42.5%]). By type of employment, the percentage of respondents who indicated “I do not think I can” was higher among non-regular employees/freelance (41.8%) than among regular employees (34.1%).

(2) Reasons for denying

The reasons for answering the above question as “I do not think I can” were, in order of frequency, as follows: “the economy is different from the time of my parents” (60.9%), “the pay scale at the company I work for is different from that of my parents” (41.9%), “the cost of living is higher than during my parents’ time” (39.1%), and “my type of employment is different from that of my parents” (30.3%) (Figure 14). By age group, for “the economy is different from the time of my parents,” the percentages were comparatively high in the 40–49 (66.7%), 50–59 (63.5%), and 30–39 (58.5%) age groups, while for “the pay scale at the company I work for is different from that of my parents” the percentages were comparatively high in the 30–39 (53.7%) and 20–29 (50.2%) age groups.

(3) Influences by the pessimistic view of future life

How is the sense of whether “they think they can be more affluent than their parents financially” related to other social sense. Looking at the trends in responses to the question of “do you think anyone can become affluent in Japan as long as they work hard,” among those responded that they think they can be more affluent than their parents, 5.4% answered that they “strongly agree” and 37.8% answered that they “somewhat agree.”

Among those who responded that they do not think they can be more affluent than their parents, while the percentages of respondents who indicated “strongly agree” (1.6%) and “somewhat agree” (24.4%) were relatively low, the percentages of respondents who indicated “somewhat disagree” (48.9%) and “strongly disagree” (25.3%) were



Figure 15. Whether they think that anyone can become affluent in Japan as long as they work hard (perceptions of equal opportunity) by responses to the question whether they think they can be more financially affluent than their parents

relatively high (Figure 15).

Let us see the trend of responses to the question, "what role do you want to play in the society?" by the response to the question "do you think you can be more affluent than your parents financially." Among respondents who indicated that they think they can be more affluent than their parents," the percentage of respondents who indicated "I want to perform an activity if it is for the sake of society" was relatively high (54.1%). As for those who indicated that they do not think they can be more affluent than their parents, the percentage who chose the same response was relatively low (35.3%), and similarly, the percentages who chose "my action alone will not change the society" (46.1%) or "I am not interested in changing society" (18.6%) were relatively high (Figure 16).



Figure 16. What role they want to play in the society by responses to the question whether they think they can be more financially affluent than their parents

Outline of the Survey

1. Purpose and objective

In Japan, wage growth has remained low for a long time along with the long-term economic stagnation.[2] In addition, there are concerns about a decrease in the middle-income group (middle-class group) and an increase in the low-income group in the shape of a decline of the median income level in household income distribution.[3]

The reduction of the middle-class group, as measured by income indicators, was confirmed by any of analyses using *Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions* (by Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) and *National Survey of Family Income* as well as *Consumption and Wealth* and *National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure* (both by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications). A comparison of household distribution by income group conducted by the Cabinet Office in 1994 and 2019 using *National Survey of Family Income* and *Consumption and Wealth* and *National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure*[4] confirmed the decline of middle-income households and an increase in the percentage of lower income household groups over the past 25 years.[5] In a study using individual data from *Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions*, Tanaka (2020) also reported the shrinking of the middle-class group from 1985 to 2015 by setting the income group area of each year as well as by fixing the income group area of the middle-class group in 1985.

While the income environment of Japan is in this situation, Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) and the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training (JILPT) conducted the "NHK/JILPT Joint Survey on Lifestyles and Attitudes" to grasp the state of peoples' lives and an image of the middle class and attitudes to society. Through the survey, we examined the following: 1) whether the younger generation is more likely to be less financially affluent than their parents; 2) the negative influence on society if people cannot become more financially affluent than their parents; 3) how people define a "middle-class life"; 4) how personal attributes such as age, education, and gender influence the gap between the imagined "middle-class life" and the actual life; and 5) where people consider themselves if their standard of living is set as an indicator. Note that the percentages shown in this report are all rounded to one decimal place; thus, in some cases, the total breakdown may not always equal 100% or the total of the breakdown may not always equal the sum of the breakdown percentages.

2. How the survey was conducted

Extraction of survey targets

This survey targeted males and females of 20 to 69 years of age in Japan. Sample extraction was performed to be proportional to the structure of gender, age, employment status, and residence area of the "Population Census" (2020). Specifically, the sample was assigned to 320 cells, consisting of gender × age group (5 classes) × employment status (4 categories: regular, non-regular, self-employed, and jobless) × residential area (8 blocks).

Survey method

The web survey targeting the registered monitors of the survey company

Survey period

July 29 to August 1, 2022 (examined the situation as of August 1, 2022).

Number of valid responses

5,370 people

Survey items (general items)

Gender, age, residence area, marital status (with or without a spouse), education status and educational attainment, graduation year, employment status, job, type of employment, thoughts on the current job, annual income (respondent, their spouse, the household), willingness for marriage, number of children, ideal number of children, imagined "middle-class life," necessary annual income to realize an imagined "middle-class life," living situation, household situation at 15 years of age, financial affluence in comparison to that of their parents, class identification, consumption style, prospects for future living, conditions for living a better life, ideal way of working, perceptions of equal opportunity, feeling toward people who succeed in the socially, and attitude to involvement in the society.

Notes

1. Regarding the class identification, this survey referred to the survey items of the SSM survey, one of the most traditional large-scale social surveys in Japan conducted every ten years since 1955 (by the Japan Sociological Society when started). The descriptions and options are arranged from those in the SSM survey according to the objectives of this study. Regarding the survey method, this is a web-based survey of registered monitors of a survey company while the SSM survey uses both the interview and leaving methods.
2. According to *Grand Design and Action Plan for a New Form of Capitalism: Realization of Investment in People, Technology, and Start-ups* (approved by the Cabinet Office on June 7, 2022), the real wages per capita in developed countries increased 1.48 times in UK, 1.41 times in US, and 1.34 times in France and Germany from 1991 to 2019, it remained at 1.05 times in Japan. See its basic materials at https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/atarashii_sihonsyugi/pdf/ap2022.pdf (p.2, in Japanese).
3. In *Grand Design and Action Plan for a New Form of Capitalism* (see note 2 above), "II. Idea to realize a new form of capitalism," the government says that "to formulate a thick middle-class is important for the healthy development of democracy, and that by enriching the middle class which is a major player in the economic society in a new form of capitalism, a sustainable economic society can be realized while avoiding the social fragmentation resulting from an widening of fixation of disparity."
4. Source: The material 4-1 of the second meeting on 2022 for the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy by Cabinet Office, https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai-shimon/kaigi/minutes/2022/0303/agenda.html (in Japanese).
5. In detail, the median income before all household redistribution fell from 5.5 million yen in 1994 to 3.72 million yen in 2019. The median income after redistribution fell from 5.09 million yen to 3.74 million yen. The structural changes in income distribution over the past 25 years—which are considered to be possibly influenced by the increase of the older age households (20% to 36%) and the increase of single households (26% to 38%)—confirmed the decrease in the median income of all age groups as well as the increase of lower income households in each age group except those of the 55 to 64 age group before redistribution.

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Commentary

Employers' Duty for Safety of Multiple Job Holder Who Worked Excessively Long Hours

The *Daiki Career-Casting and One Other Defendant Company* Case
Osaka District Court (Oct. 28, 2021) 1257 *Rodo Hanrei* 17

IKEZOE Hirokuni

I. Facts

The plaintiff, X, worked the late night to early morning shift at a 24-hour gas station under a labor contract concluded with Y1, one of the defendants. Y1 was responsible for the day-to-day running of the gas station, which had been contracted out by A (the gas station's operating enterprise, which was not a party to this case) to B (understood to be the parent company of Y1 and also not a party to the case), and in turn subcontracted to Y1. X requested a colleague to give up shifts to X, and consulted with the colleague and their supervisor, which resulted in the colleague partially accepting X's request (and thereby led to an increase in X's shifts). Directly after, X concluded a labor contract with A as well, such that X worked shifts other than the late night to early morning shift once or twice a week at the gas station for A, in addition to the shifts worked for Y1. As a result, the number of hours worked by X—who subsequently ceased to attend work—for Y1 and A totaled 303 hours and 45 minutes in the month prior to becoming absent, 270 hours and 15 minutes in the second month prior, 271 hours in the third month prior, 268 hours and 30 minutes in the fourth month prior, 256 hours and 45 minutes in the fifth month prior, and 244 hours in the sixth month prior. It should also be noted that in a subsequent merger by absorption, Y1 and A were absorbed into the enterprise Y2, the other defendant in this case.

In this case, X claimed damages from Y1 and Y2 on the grounds that Y1 and Y2 had, among other acts, neglected their duty to reduce X's working hours after having ascertained or being able to ascertain X's working hours, and thereby breached their duty of care (*chūi gimu*) under tort law, and breached their duty to consider to ensure a worker's safety (*anzen hairyo gimu*; "duty for safety") under the labor contract.

II. Judgment

X's claim was dismissed.

1. For several months, X, under the employment of Y1 and A, worked long hours totaling around 270 hours or more per month. This state of affairs was problematic in light of the purpose of Article 32 of the Labor Standards Act (LSA), which prescribes upper limits on working hours (author's note: namely, a weekly limit of 40 hours and a daily limit of 8 hours), to prevent the impairment of workers' health due to long working hours. However, said state of affairs was the result of X making efforts to secure more work opportunities with long working hours and thereby successfully increasing X's own working hours, because X had actively requested a colleague, K, to give up K's scheduled work shift to X and secured K's partial concession.

2. Moreover, X, on X's own request, concluded a labor contract with A to increase X's working

hours by working for days in succession with no days off. X was working for A on days prescribed as days off under X's labor contract with Y1, as X had intentionally continued to work on successive days by arranging to work on said days on X's own active request. The fact that X came to be working for days in succession and for long hours was therefore the result of an active choice by X. Furthermore, Y1's status did not allow it to directly intervene in the labor contract-based relationship between X and A to reduce X's working days.

3. It cannot be recognized that Y1 breached Y1's duty of care toward X under tort law or breached Y1's duty for X's safety under the labor contract. This is based on several factors, including the fact that the tasks assigned to X entailed a considerably low intensity of labor, the fact that Y1 had, under its labor contract with X, allocated Sunday as a day off, and the fact that X's supervisor had pointed out to X that X's way of working presented an issue in light of the laws regarding labor and informed X that X should take time off in consideration of X's own physical health.

4. Given that, as stated above, it was determined that Y1 had not breached their duty of care under tort law or their duty for safety under the labor contract, the court did not recognize the claim that A, by cooperating with the tort of Y1, was liable for a tort. Therefore, as A was not liable for a tort, Y2, the enterprise which inherited A's business, was not subject to such liability and therefore not subject to liability for damages. Having formed no contract with Y1, A also held no authority to directly intervene in the labor contract-based relationship between X and Y1 to allocate days off to X. Therefore, the court did not recognize that A had breached their duty of care toward X under tort law or breached their duty for X's safety under the labor contract and, in turn, Y2, which had inherited A's business, did not inherit the liability for damages.

III. Commentary

1. Work Style Reform and working hours of multiple job holders

Deliberations aimed at developing policy to support new and diverse work styles—known as Work Style Reform (*hatarakikata kaikaku*)—commenced in 2016 and culminated in the revision of key laws and regulations such as the LSA and the Industrial Safety and Health Act, which resulted in the introduction of an upper legal limit on overtime working hours and various measures aimed at protecting workers' health. While such steps meant the introduction of stricter provisions, the government's Work Style Reform, as measures to facilitate diverse working styles, sought to provide policy to foster the practices of teleworking (working from home or remotely) and of pursuing multiple jobs.[1]

One of the contentious aspects of this case was whether the employer should bear the legal liability for long working hours arising from working multiple jobs. Concerning this point, the provisions of Article 38 of the LSA address the calculation of hours worked. Paragraph 1 of said Article prescribes that "[t]o apply the provisions on working hours, hours worked are aggregated, even if the hours worked were at different workplaces." "At different workplaces" has typically been interpreted as covering not only work conducted at different workplaces under the same employer, but also work conducted at different workplaces under multiple different employers (May 14, 1948, *Kihatsu* [administrative notification related to labor standards] No.769). (Moreover, this case can be interpreted as a precedent involving multiple jobs, given that while working at the same workplace, X was working under labor contracts concluded with two different employers.)

The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare has recently issued a set of guidelines aimed at fostering the practice of workers pursuing multiple jobs, entitled "Guidelines for Multiple Jobs" (revised in July 2022). A key point of the Guidelines is that employers are responsible for controlling the

aggregate total of hours worked by a worker (the hours worked under their employment and that of other employers) based on self-reported information and other such input from the worker. On the other hand, it also states the necessity for workers to check the working hours and other such employment conditions at the different workplaces and manage one's own working hours and health when working multiple jobs.

2. Significance

Amid such developments in policy, this case was the first judicial precedent in which a judgment was passed on the employer's legal liability concerning long working hours in multiple jobs (it should, however, be noted that the suit was filed in 2017). This case is also distinctive because it entailed a judgment on multiple employers' respective duties of care under tort law and duties for safety under the labor contracts, as opposed to being an issue of an employer or business operator's nonperformance of duty under the LSA or Industrial Safety and Health Act.

It should be noted that the Guidelines also address the employer's duty for safety, listing as one of the examples of breach of duty: "the event that an employer, despite ascertaining that a worker's overall workload and working hours are excessive, takes no consideration of that in any way, to such an extent that the worker's health becomes impeded." According to the facts found, this case is a precedent that does not involve damage to health due to long working hours and working for days in succession and therefore may be significant as a precedent that does not fall under a breach of duty as described in the Guidelines.

3. Legal theory, scope and pending issues

It is important to note here that both duty of care under tort law and duty for safety under the labor contract are obligations of conduct (*nasu saimu*) rather than obligations to achieve a result (*kekka saimu*), and therefore by taking care, or by giving consideration, the employer can be seen to have performed their duty. The specific conduct required to do so also differs from case to case. With regard to cases of long working hours such as this one, the specific conduct required to be recognized to have taken care or given consideration may include measures such as reducing working hours by not allowing the worker to work overtime, ensuring the worker has days off, ensuring that the worker takes their annual paid leave, or reassigning or sending the worker on leave of absence (*kyūshoku*) in the event that said worker is recognized to be experiencing physical or mental health difficulties.

According to the facts found in this case, X requested a colleague to give up shifts to X, and actively sought opportunities to work by forming a labor contract with A in addition to Y1, and therefore consecutive days of long working hours were brought about by X's own choice and on X's own decision. X's supervisor, on the other hand, informed X that a large number of hours worked by X conflicted with the LSA, and also warned X that X should take time off in consideration of X's own health (the supervisor had also ordered X to cease working for A, and X had promised to do so but not fulfilled said promise). Thus, it can thereby be interpreted that Y1 did not breach its duty of care or duty for safety. Therefore, as determined by the court, Y1 cannot be said to have breached its duties. (Moreover, given that despite working long hours and successive days, X had not suffered health damage as a result, the case could not entail a breach of duty for safety or duty of care by Y1 or Y2 in the first place.)

On this basis, it can be surmised that while the government may be pursuing efforts to foster the practice of working multiple jobs, such workers are expected to be self-reliant and self-selecting and bear individual accountability behind the scenes, while employers' legal liability is limited. This corresponds with the stance set out in the Guidelines, which establish that working hours and other such employment conditions should be ascertained on the basis of self-reporting by the worker to the employer, and that workers should be self-organized with regard to working hours and health.

At the same time, as stated in the Guidelines, an employer is theoretically unable to avoid the duty for

safety under the labor contract (or duty of care under tort law) that they bear toward the worker. If a worker working multiple jobs has been self-reporting their state of work to their employer, such as their own working hours and days off, and the employer has recognized the worker's excessive burdens and fulfilled their duty of care and duty for safety, the employer cannot be regarded to have breached their duty (the specific ways in which they fulfilled that duty, however, could be called into question). However, the way in which the employer, upon receiving the worker's self-report, recognized the excessive burden on the worker and the kinds of measures that the employer took, upon having recognized the burden, may become the points of contention in judicial precedents in the future. In that sense, this case implies the issues of future deliberation regarding legal judgments on cases that fall in a grey zone. This is also a precedent in which it was determined that there had been no breach of duty for safety under the labor contract or duty of care under tort law and that, despite working long hours and successive days, the worker had not damaged their health as a result. It therefore has little significance as a precedent for cases recognizing the legal liability of each employer of a worker working multiple jobs.

As one of the points for contention in this case was the duty of care under tort law and duty for safety under the labor contract, the case was not judged to be a precedent of a violation of the upper legal limit on overtime working hours as prescribed under the LSA (100 or more hours of legally prescribed overtime working hours per month, or a monthly average of more than 80 hours of legally prescribed overtime working hours for six months), where, in anticipation of applying penal provisions, work at multiple workplaces (under multiple employers) must be aggregated. Therefore if a judgment on such a case was passed in the court, it would not also entail a judgment as to how the legal liability would be shared between the multiple employers. This is another issue and remains to be addressed.

1. Furthermore, as part of the Work Style Reform, the Industrial Safety and Health Act prescribes that an employer must assess the situation of working hours of workers (Industrial Safety and Health Act, Article 66-8-3). The eligibility criteria for receiving insurance benefits (for cerebrovascular disease or heart disease and mental disorders) under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act also prescribe that in the event of work at multiple workplaces, the decision on eligibility should take into consideration the aggregate working hours (Sept. 14, 2021, *Kihatsu* No.1, and Aug. 21, 2020, *Kihatsu* No.0821). Therefore, in accordance with laws and regulations regarding workers' health, legal violations are generally assessed on the basis of the aggregate hours worked.

The *Daiki Career-Casting and One Other Defendant Company* case, *Rodo Hanrei* (*Rohan*, Sanno Research Institute) 1257, pp.17–51. *Rodo Keizai Hanrei Sokuho* (*Rokeisoku*, Keidanren Business Services) 2471, pp.3–34.

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Series: Japan's Employment System and Public Policy
This series systematically outlines the basis of labor situations and analysis in Japan.

Youth Employment and Employment Policies in Japan

HORI Yukie

I. Overview of youth employment

In Japan, the youth unemployment rate remained consistently low from the 1960s, a period of rapid economic growth, through the early 1990s. During this period, young people were able to obtain stable and indefinite-term (as opposed to fixed-term) contract employment immediately after they graduated from school. However, since the bursting of the economic bubble in the early 1990s, it has become increasingly difficult for young people to achieve job security. Those who graduated between 1993 and 2004, when the school-to-work transition was particularly difficult, are described as the *shushoku hyogaki sedai* (employment ice-age generation: high school graduates born between 1975 and 1985 and university graduates born between 1970 and 1980). Subsequent economic recovery enabled young people to obtain stable jobs, but the global financial crisis originating in the US and Europe caused the employment situation to worsen once again. The economy began to expand under the easy money policy that formed part of the economic strategy spearheaded by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, known as Abenomics, which was launched around 2015, and despite the temporary impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, youth employment remains strong as of autumn 2022. Under Japanese labor policy, "youth" is defined as the 15–34 age group, and that definition is used in this article.

Let us take a look at young people's educational circumstances, first. The high school enrollment rate exceeded 90% in 1997, and today 98% of junior high school graduates go on to high school, with about 3% withdrawing from high school each year in Japan. Approximately 70% of high school students are enrolled in academic programs, and the percentage enrolled in vocational programs is low.

Among high school students graduating in the spring of 2022, about 17% were employed immediately, 56% went on to tertiary education (university or other higher education), 22% enrolled in vocational school, and 5% fit into none of these categories (all percentages approximate). The number of new university graduates entering employment first surpassed the number of new high school graduates entering employment in 1997, and they became the majority in the new-graduate labor market. Nonetheless, even as Japan's populace has become more highly educated, labor market demand for high school graduates remains high, and Japan has maintained a system that enables high school graduates to find secure employment immediately after graduating from high school.

II. Systems relating to the school-to-work transition

As in other countries, youth employment in Japan is directly affected by the economy, but one reason the impact tends to be particularly significant in Japan is the system of "simultaneous mass recruiting of new graduates." This is an employment practice in which companies hire students with no work experience immediately after graduation, with the premise of indefinite-term employment, and young people are expected to develop their skills through in-house education and training, job rotation and so forth. Public vocational training is not very

widespread in Japan, and as a result, young people tend to lose opportunities to develop vocational skills if they are not hired as part of the new batch of graduates, regardless of whether they are university or high school graduates. For example, members of the generation that graduated during the "employment ice age" are already over 40 years old, but many have never been able to establish stable careers.

The details of employment practices for new graduates vary depending on level of educational attainment. In order to prevent recruiting of new university graduates earlier than the officially agreed date, (*aotagai* in Japanese which originally means "reaping rice before the harvest") agreements have been in place since 1953 between universities and industry associations regarding outreach on the part of enterprises and the timing of the start of recruitment. However, these agreements have repeatedly been abrogated by business organizations at times when labor market demand for new university graduates is rising, and then reinstated when demand decreases. In 2021, Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), the country's most influential business organization, withdrew from the agreement then in place, and rules for the start of the hiring process are now set by the government. Meanwhile, in Japan the use of internship programs for purposes of job selection and recruitment has been discouraged since the original purposes of internships are considered for education, where students complete the programs during long vacations and so forth. Recently, guidelines have been eased with some conditions for the extended purpose of using internships as a means of industry-academia collaboration. However, depending on how internships are used, internships could disrupt the conventional framework for new graduate recruitment. It is necessary to keep a close eye on this issue.

For new high school graduates who find jobs, there are regional practices regarding the timing of job hunting activities and submission of applications. New high school graduates in Japan often find jobs through the guidance departments of the schools they attend. In order to protect high school students, who are still minors, and maintain order in the high school graduate labor market, each prefecture has made agreements regarding high school graduate employment practices. 2021 saw the revision of high school graduate employment practices, making it clearer that students have the right to seek employment through channels other than those offered by schools. As a general rule, applicants are required to apply to only one company at a time for a certain period of time, but in many prefectures that period has been shortened to about two weeks after the start of the application period.

On the other hand, those who attempt to find jobs after withdrawing from high school or university have difficulty in obtaining permanent work as regular employees, and this challenge has persisted for many years.

III. Changes in youth employment

This section of the article outlines changes in recent years with regard to youth labor in Japan. First, there has been a sharp decline in the number of young workers, from 20.35 million in 1997 to 17.11 million in 2017, and assuming the same labor force participation rate as in 2017, the number is expected to drop to 13.64 million in 2040 (MHLW 2021).

Second, Japan's youth unemployment rate has remained low compared to those of other developed countries. Although it worsened during the "employment ice-age" of the 1990s and the global financial crisis, recently it has stayed at a consistently low level. The impact of the pandemic on the youth unemployment rate has been relatively minor compared to older age groups (Figure 1).

Third, the number of "freeters" peaked at over two million in 2003, but by 2021 the number had declined considerably to 1.37 million. This is interpreted as a result of the decline in the number of young people in the labor force, and of a favorable labor market. Freeters refer to school graduates (and the unmarried in the case of female) who are currently employed and referred to as "parttime workers or arbeit (temporary workers)" at their workplace, or who are currently not engaged in work and neither



Source: https://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/statistics/timeseries/html/g0303_03.html. Created by JILPT based on *Labour Force Survey* (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications).

Figure 1. Change in unemployment rate in Japan (by age group)

doing housework nor attending school but wish to be employed as part-time workers or arbeit.

The traditional image of freeters, perceived as having that employment format due to a lack of full-time jobs, is diversifying. According to the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training (JILPT 2022), among Tokyo residents aged 25-34 who had experienced being freeters, the percentage who did so because they were unable to find work as regular employees is the lowest in the past twenty years. On the other hand, compared to those who have never experienced being freeters, a certain percentage of those who have experienced it reported that they have felt difficulty working due to depression or disability, and a certain number of them have temporarily earned wages as freeters so as to advance their careers. During the pandemic, when many enterprises reduced or suspended activities, the presence of freeters who are not eligible for allowances for absence from work became increasingly evident.

A fourth trend is that while the number of young people has declined, the number of those who are not in employment, education or training (NEETs) remains high (Figure 2). The number of young people unable to go to school or work increased temporarily in 2020 due to the state of emergency during the pandemic, but returned to its previous level in 2021.

While the number of freeters grows and shrinks along with ups and downs in the economy, the number of NEETs is less affected by economic factors. The reasons for becoming NEETs are complex and composite, but prolonged NEET status tends to make participation in society difficult.



Source: *Labour Force Survey* (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications).
Note: Unemployed persons refer to those in the non-working population who are neither engaged in housework nor attending school.

Figure 2. Change in number of unemployed persons (15-49 years old)

IV. Youth employment policies

As mentioned above, when youth unemployment and the number of freeters began to increase, these phenomena were perceived as young people's own responsibility, since systems enabling young people to obtain stable employment were in place. However, since the "employment ice age," understanding of the plight of youth has gradually become more widespread. In 2003, the government formulated the Plan to Encourage Youth's Independence and Challenges, acknowledging for the first time that young people's lack of job security was not a personal responsibility but a structural problem. Subsequently, career education was expanded, and based on a German model, a Japanese "dual system" that integrates vocational training at schools with corporate internships was developed, along with live-in vocational training facilities that promote young people's independence (not currently existent). In 2006, Regional Youth Support Stations (RYSS) were opened to provide assistance to NEETs, and *Hello Work for the youth* and *Hello Work for new graduates* were also established as specialist branches of *Hello Work*, the public employment security offices located in all prefectures.

However, these were temporary policies and there was always concern that they would be terminated. Thus, a permanent policy to support youth (the Youth Employment Promotion Act) was formulated in 2015. In addition to providing for the establishment of youth support organizations such as RYSS, the following three measures were added based on the Youth Employment Promotion Act.

1. Active provision of information about workplaces

In order to alleviate employees' early job turnover due to mismatches at the new graduate stage and to help young people lead fulfilling professional lives, a system was established to provide accurate information on terms and conditions of employment, as well as workplace information such as average length of service, availability and content of training programs and so on.

2. Non-acceptance of job offers by certain business establishments at *Hello Work*

In order to ensure that *Hello Work* does not introduce new graduates to business establishments

that have violated certain labor-related laws and regulations, a system was put in place under which new graduate job offers by such establishments are not accepted for a certain period of time.

3. Youth Yell Certification System

The Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare has established a system to certify small and medium-sized enterprises that proactively recruit and train young people, and have excellent employment management conditions, as *Youth Yell* certified enterprises. (In Japan, the English word "yell" is used to mean "give encouragement.")

The Youth Employment Promotion Act has already been in effect for five years. Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the overall youth employment situation during this period has been positive, and youth unemployment and job insecurity have not become major issues.

The current key challenge is the increasingly composite nature of youth employment issues. During the "employment ice age," employment support was provided exclusively to young people who could not find jobs, but today reasons for needing support are becoming more diverse, including housing insecurity, health concerns, disabilities, and young carers' need to provide nursing care to relatives and so forth. Thus far Regional Youth Support Stations have endeavored to respond to these diverse needs, but in the future, cooperation within communities will become even more essential. However, as the population shrinks, both the number of young people to be supported and the number of support providers will decline. As a result, there is a concern that RYSS will be called on to support wider target regions, and that the original concept of support within communities will fade.

In the future, Japan's population will continue to age and youth will become a minority in numerical terms. In order to maintain Japanese society and pass it on to the next generation, it is more important than ever to provide employment support to increasingly rare young people. At the same time, it is also essential to provide support to the "ice age" generation, the youth of the past who still have unstable careers today, as part of our responsibility to future generations.

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MHLW (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare). 2021. "Kongo no jyakunensha koyo ni kansuru kenkyukai hokokusho: Korona-ka o ukete shakai/sangyo kozo ga henka suru naka deno jyakunensha koyo no tomen no arikata ni tsuite" [Report of Study Group on Future Employment of Young People: The immediate state of employment of young people amidst changes in social and industrial structure in the wake of the COVID-19]. Press release. October 23, 2020. https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/newpage_14309.html.

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I. Main Labor Economic Indicators

1. Economy

The Japanese economy is picking up moderately. Concerning short-term prospects, the economy is expected to show movements of picking up, supported by the effects of the policies as the transition to a new phase of the "new normal" is underway. However, slowing down of overseas economies is downside risk of the Japanese economy, amid ongoing global monetary tightening and other factors. Also, full attention should be given to price increases, supply-side constraints and fluctuations in the financial and capital markets. (*Monthly Economic Report*,[1] October 2022).

2. Employment and unemployment

The number of employees in September increased by 510 thousand over the previous year. The unemployment rate, seasonally adjusted, was 2.6%.[2] Active job openings-to-applicants ratio in September, seasonally adjusted, was 1.34.[3] (Figure 1)

3. Wages and working hours

In September, total cash earnings increased by 2.2% year-on-year and real wages (total cash earnings) decreased by 1.2%. Total hours worked increased by 1.6% year-on-year, while scheduled hours worked increased by 1.1%.[4] (Figures 2 and 6)

4. Consumer price index

In September, the consumer price index for all items increased by 3.0% year-on-year, the consumer price index for all items less fresh food increased by 3.0%, and the consumer price index for all items less fresh food and energy increased by 1.8%.[5]

5. Workers' household economy

In September, consumption expenditures by workers' households increased by 6.2% year-on-year nominally and increased by 2.6% in real terms.[6]



Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), *Labour Force Survey*; Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), *Employment Referrals for General Workers*.
Note: Active job openings-to-applicants ratio indicates the number of job openings per job applicant at public employment security. It shows the tightness of labor supply and demand.

Figure 1. Unemployment rate and active job openings-to-applicants ratio (seasonally adjusted)



Source: MHLW, *Monthly Labour Survey*; MIC, *Consumer Price Index*.

Figure 2. Total cash earnings / real wages annual percent change

1. Cabinet Office, *Monthly Economic Report* analyzes trends in the Japanese and world economies and indicates the assessment by the Japanese government. Published once a month. https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/getsurei-e/index-e.html
2. https://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/roudou/results/month/index.html
3. https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-l/general_workers.html
4. For establishments with 5 or more employees. https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-l/monthly-labour.html
5. https://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/index.html
6. MIC, *Family Income and Expenditure Survey*. https://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/kakei/index.html

II. Impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on employment and unemployment

The following outlines the recent trends shown in statistical indicators relating to employment. See JILPT website *Novel Coronavirus* (*COVID-19*) for the latest information (https://www.jil.go.jp/english/special/covid-19/index.html).

1. Employment and unemployment

(1) Definitions of *Labour Force Survey*[7]



(2) Labor force

Table 1. Labor force

(10,000 persons)

		Labor force			
		Total	Employed person		Unemployed person
				Not at work	
2019		6,912	6,750	177	162
2020		6,902	6,710	258	192
2021		6,907	6,713	208	195
	September	6,920	6,726	210	194
	October	6,889	6,705	166	184
	November	6,879	6,696	167	183
	December	6,879	6,706	190	173
2022	January	6,830	6,646	249	185
	February	6,838	6,658	242	180
	March	6,864	6,684	243	180
	April	6,915	6,727	190	188
	May	6,921	6,730	164	191
	June	6,945	6,759	157	186
	July	6,931	6,755	258	176
	August	6,929	6,751	268	177
	September	6,953	6,766	194	187

Source: Compiled by JILPT based on Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), *Labour Force Survey* (Basic Tabulation) (unadjusted values).[8]
Note: Figures in the past have been changed according to revisions of the switch in the bench mark population in the *Labor Force Survey*. The same applies to Figure 1 and Figures 3 to 5.

7. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), *Labour Force Survey*, Concepts and Definitions. https://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/roudou/pdf/definite.pdf
8. For up-to-date information, see https://www.jil.go.jp/english/estatis/eshuyo/index.html (in English), for "employed person not at work" https://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/statistics/covid-19/c23.html#c23-1 (in Japanese).



Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), *Labour Force Survey* (Basic Tabulation).[9]

Figure 3. Number of employed persons by main industry (unadjusted values, year-on-year change) (January 2017 to September 2022)

9. For up-to-date information and further details, see https://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/statistics/covid-19/c01.html#c01-7 (in Japanese).



Source: MIC, *Labour Force Survey* (Basic Tabulation).[10]

Figure 4. Number of employed persons not at work (unadjusted values, by sex) (January 2018 to September 2022)



Source: MIC, *Labour Force Survey* (Basic Tabulation).[11]

Figure 5. Number of unemployed persons (unadjusted values, by sex) (January 2017 to September 2022)

10. For up-to-date information and further details, see https://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/statistics/covid-19/c23.html (in Japanese).
11. For up-to-date information and further details, see https://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/statistics/covid-19/c03.html#c03-1 (in Japanese).

2. Working hours



Source: Compiled by JILPT based on MHLW, "Monthly Labour Survey."[12]
Notes: 1. Beginning in June 2019, values are based on a complete survey of "business establishments with 500 or more employees."
2. "Business establishments with 500 or more employees" for the Tokyo metropolitan area are re-aggregated beginning in 2012.

Figure 6. Total hours worked, scheduled hours worked, and non-scheduled hours worked (year-on-year change, total of full-time employees and part-time workers) (January 2017 to September 2022)

For details for the above, see JILPT *Main Labor Economic Indicators* at https://www.jil.go.jp/english/estatis/eshuyo/index.html

12. MHLW, *Monthly Labour Survey*. https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-l/monthly-labour.html. For up-to-date information and further details, see https://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/statistics/covid-19/c11.html#c11-1 (in Japanese).

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