Work-life Experiences, Policies, and Challenges in Singapore

Aliya Hamid RAO

I. Introduction
II. The Singapore context
III. The work-life interface in Singapore
IV. Imagining the "ideal Singaporean family": Work-life challenges, social policies, and privatized solutions
V. Directions for future research
VI. Conclusion

I. Introduction

The work-life interface impacts various aspects of our lives, including marital quality, job satisfaction, mental and physical well-being and, for women in particular the ability to remain in the labor force. In the country report below, I discuss recent research and findings on work-life issues in Singapore, examining how this intersects with the gendered responsibility for caregiving for children and the elderly. The report first describes the Singaporean context. In so doing, it highlights three aspects of Singapore which shape the particularities of the work-life interface. First is the demographic background of Singapore; next the state's strategic crafting of Singapore's economic development; and finally the significant role of social policies for alleviating work-life conflict in Singapore. Next, I dive into research in work-life challenges in Singapore. Following this I explain social policy responses to these challenges, highlighting the significance of the idealized Singaporean family in the kinds of policy solutions provided thus far. I close with some reflections on directions for future research.

II. The Singapore context

The population of Singapore is approximately 5.7 million. Work-life interface in Singapore occurs with a context characterized by: 1) specific demographic trends pertaining to marriage, fertility, and an ageing population; 2) a unique economy which has been driven by the impetus to serve as a "global node" for the knowledge economy, specifically in sectors such as finance and technology; 3) a strong state, driven by market logics, which applies these to social policy planning. Below, I sketch out these three characteristics of Singapore to deepen the understanding of the work-life interface in particular.

Demographic trends in Singapore

The Republic of Singapore was founded in 1965, with Lee Kuan Yew as its Prime Minister. Singapore is considered a racially diverse state, with a population that is majority ethnic Chinese (about 74%), followed by approximately 13% Malay, 9% Indian and a little over 3% characterized as "other." Generally, reports agree that almost two-thirds of married families in Singapore are dual-earner ("Social Statistics in Brief" 2017). That said, Singapore is experiencing some interesting demographic trends currently. Firstly, and of much concern to the Singaporean state, is the low fertility rate which has been declining since the 1980s. Prior to its founding in 1965, Singapore (then a part of modern-day Malaysia) gained independence from British colonization, followed soon after by independence from Malaysia. Initially, the state was worried by a potential population explosion. The Singaporean state thus followed anti-natalist policies, incentivizing citizens to restrict their fertility. Population control laws were enacted in 1973 (Anderson 2004), with an aggressive campaign called

"Stop at Two" (Teo 2010). These interventions were extremely successful, to the point that the birth-rate plummeted considerably. Indeed the fertility rates were 3.10 in 1970, dropping to 1.83 in 1990 and 1.20 in 2016 ("Social Statistics in Brief" 2017)—hovering around there since then. For several decades the fertility rate in Singapore has been well below the "replacement level" of 2.10 (Teo 2010).

With dropping fertility the Singaporean state has adopted a pro-natalist state policy toward the fertility of its citizens. These policies include a "Baby Bonus" scheme which gives cash incentives, with the amount of cash increasing with each child, and being highest for children 3–5. However, as scholars point out, these fertility incentives are deeply classed. Highly-educated (and ethnic Chinese) mothers are particularly privileged by the Baby Bonus scheme, since its highest rewards are when families can afford to put the maximum amount of cash into banks, which is then matched by the government (Teo 2010, 2013, 2015). Poor families have limited disposable income, and are typically unable to put high levels of the bonus into banks, which means that the government matches less. This scheme is most appealing to higher income families. Despite worries about low-fertility, lower-income families are dissuaded from higher levels of fertility. Specifically, as sociologist You Yenn Teo explains, low-income families are targeted by the HOPE (home ownership and education) scheme through which lower-income families get housing grants and educational subsidies contingent on limiting fertility to two children. Other incentives recognize the need for parents to work, and thus include policies aimed at providing flexible work hours, paid paternal and maternal leave, as well as unpaid maternal leave. Policies directly related to paid work have been formulated with the specific intention that the desire to participate in the labor force should not be an impediment to fertility. These policies have encountered some success, and research suggests that Singapore's fertility rates are now higher than in comparable East Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (Galovan et al. 2015).

However, other impediments to attempts to increase fertility in Singapore have been demographic trends like age at first marriage, decline in marriage as well as less fertile marriages and rise of divorces (Ibid). Age at first marriage, for example, is 28 for women in Singapore and 30 for Singaporean men ("Social Statistics in Brief" 2017). That Singaporeans—especially highly-educated and ethnic Chinese Singaporeans—will increase their fertility to replacement levels has been a driving factor in how the Singaporean state conceptualizes the work-life interface.

Finally, while fertility has declined in Singapore, the ageing population has increased considerably. The "pioneer" generation that was young at the establishment of the Republic of Singapore is now getting old. In recent years, those 65 and older have tripled in proportion from being 7% of the Singaporean population to being 20% of it. In 2010, close to 36% of elderly in Singapore lived with their working children (Yeoh and Huang 2014). The current working population of Singaporeans is often considered a "sandwich" generation which cares both for children and elderly parents simultaneously. This is particularly because the idea of "filial piety" allocates care of elderly parents to their adult children (Ibid).

Singaporean economy as a global node

The Singaporean story has been one where the state has actively promoted policies that enable it to realize its goal as a key player in the global economy. To that end, and concerned with the demographic backgrounds of a low fertility and ageing population, Singapore has actively sought out "foreign talent"—that is, essentially, highly skilled workers who can "contribute to Singapore" (Yeoh and Lam 2016). As Brenda Yeoh and co-authors (2016) write, the past 15 years have been especially crucial in the development of Singapore as a global hub for the knowledge economy. Currently, almost a quarter of the Singaporean population is immigrant. This is particularly prevalent in knowledge sectors. For example almost 40% of the workforce in banking finance is foreign. This becomes even more acute as we move up the organizational hierarchy. One study estimates that foreigners and PRs (permanent residents) occupy 30% of mid-level and 60–70% of senior-level positions within these industries.

While historically expats came from Australia, the United States, Japan, France, and South Korea, that has been changing. Foreign talent in Singapore is now more likely to come from India and China. The Singapore state has typically sought to attract this "foreign talent" including through incentives such as low tax-rates, and until about 2010, ease of gaining status as a PR, although that has now been tightened. Key to attracting foreign talent was the ease, affordability, and convenience of hiring domestic workers. This has included the second main stream of migrants into Singapore: low-skilled female domestic workers typically coming from nearby countries like Indonesia and the Philippines. The migration of foreign domestic workers (FDWs) was initiated in the 1980s, when the Singaporean state legislated that FDWs could ease the burdens placed on working families—especially women— in Singapore in a bid to encourage women to both work and have children.

The Singaporean economy is a unique one that has been actively shaped by the state.

The role of the state and social policies for the work-life interface

This brings us to the role of the state. The Singaporean state includes a variety of policies intended to ameliorate work-life challenges. These policies, as Singaporean scholars explain, are framed as intrinsically anti-welfare. Access to these policies is mediated by a market-based logic, which requires that Singaporean citizens prove their eligibility to receive the highest levels of subsidy through their employment. That is: any state-led schemes should not be seen as entitlements by citizens and rather families should be self-reliant (Teo and Piper 2009). The schemes are often directed at providing privatized solutions to issues of work-life conflict—most commonly in the sphere of caregiving—rather than providing public, systemic solutions to these concerns. Later, I discuss how these policies imagine an "ideal Singaporean family" and the implications of this for the provision of support for work-life challenges. For the time being, I sketch out some of the characteristics of the policies aimed at tackling work-life conflict.

A recent report (An AWARE [Association of Women for Action and Research] Report 2018) outlines these policies. They include provisions like childcare subsidies to working mothers of Singaporean citizens; these subsidies can be topped up depending on number of hours that working mothers work per month. These subsidies come under three main categories, "basic childcare subsidies," "additional childcare subsidies," and "ComCare Child Care subsidies." The state also funds support to childcare providers, to make formal, institutionalized childcare more widely available. These are termed as "partner operator scheme" and "anchor operator scheme." Through these schemes, childcare providers are encouraged to cap their monthly fees. In 2017, 1,419 childcare centers had spaces for almost 150,000 children. The government has pledged to increase the number of childcare spaces by 40,000 by 2022. These schemes particularly target low-income mothers.

The Singaporean state provides parental leave. Married mothers of Singaporean citizens who have been continuously employed by the same employer for at least three months prior to seeking leave are entitled to 16 weeks of paid leave. For the first two children, the first 8 weeks of leave are typically paid by the employer, and the last 8 by the government. For three or more children, the entirety of 16 weeks is paid by the government. Married fathers of Singaporean citizens are entitled to two weeks of government-paid parental leave, capped at S$2,500 per week. Married couples can also avail of government-paid "shared parental leave" capped at S$2,500 ("Statistics and Publications" 2019).

Singapore's migration policies too can be seen as a way of minimizing work-life conflict, especially for married mothers. The migration of foreign domestic workers from countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines has been encouraged and allowed precisely to minimize work-life conflict, especially for married, working mothers. The 1988 press release from the government announcing the "foreign maid levy" for example stated the following motivation: "The Government recognizes that domestic maids fulfil a social need in Singapore. They make it easier for married women to work, look after their households, and bring up more children" (Singapore Government Press Release 1988). Of course, these levies are directed primarily at middle-class women with children in Singapore; they do not solve the childcare issues of low-income women.

III. The work-life interface in Singapore

Given Singapore's self-conscious positioning as a global economy and the state's emphasis on employment for access to public benefits, it is not surprising that long work hours and widespread participation in the labor force prevail. Of the working-age population, 67.7% were in the labor force in 2017. Almost 60% of women and 76% of men participate in the labor force ("Social Statistics in Brief" 2017). A recent report showed that of the working-age population out of the workforce, almost two-thirds were women. Women were far more likely to cite family responsibilities as a reason for being out of the workforce. Professionals, Managers, Executives and Technicians (PMET) comprise 56.1% of the Singaporean workforce (Ibid). The resident unemployment rate averaged 2.2% in 2017. The median income from work for full-time workers was S$4,437 in 2018 ("Statistics and Publications" 2019).

Combined, these figures illuminate that Singapore is a developed nation. Singapore's economic policy has actively sought to develop Singapore as a knowledge hub in Asia. Singapore continues to have some of the longest work hours the world over, averaging 45 hours per week (Ibid). The priority given to developing Singapore's knowledge economy encompassing occupations such as finance and banking which generally tend to have exceptionally long work-hours (Michel 2011) suggests that work-life issues may be particularly salient in the Singapore context.

Two common ways of conceptualizing work-life interface is to examine the family-to-work (FTW) spillover or the work-to-family (WTF) spillover. FTW encapsulates family responsibilities that shape, often preventing, workplace demands; while WTF encapsulates the spillover of workplace demands into the family. As a society where ostensibly traditional Eastern values—such as filial piety—have been emphasized, it stands to reason the family obligations will particularly spillover into work.

Psychologists have been at the forefront of studying the work-life interface in the Singaporean context. Indeed, one study (Galovan et al. 2010) using nationally representative samples explains that FTW is more common in Singapore when compared to the United States. In Singapore FTW is also more linked to depression, whereas in the United States WTF is linked to depression. Another study, using nationally representative data from dual-earner, married Singaporean couples focused on *family formation-work fit*. The study found that when family formation-work fit was low; that is when individuals believed that their work demands were not conducive to the size of families they desired, they were less likely to achieve the family size they desired. Essentially, the study suggests that couples curtailed their fertility when they saw it as being in conflict with their workplace demands. This study also pointed out that workplace flexibility and lower WTF or FTW conflict was linked to a greater family formation-work fit (Galovan et al. 2015). Extending the FTW spillover by using marital quality as a predictor variable, one study found that marital satisfaction is an important predictor for work satisfaction and depressive symptoms for men and women (Sandberg et al. 2012). The authors recommend that workplaces should incorporate programmes and policies to address marital conflict since marital conflict can be costly for governments, organizations, and of course, families.

Another study finds that perception of workplace flexibility—that there are flexibility policies that can be utilized should the need arise—are very important in shaping work-family fit, perhaps even more than the usage of such policies (Jones et al. 2008). The authors explain this somewhat counterintuitive finding—unique to the Singaporean context—by suggesting that given Singapore's work culture of long hours, and the limited offering of schedule flexibility, most people are only likely to avail of schedule flexibility when they experience tremendous stress.

Given Singapore's focus on catalysing an increase in the rates of fertility among its citizens, these are important findings. They highlight how workplace demands are suppressing the actualization of ideal family sizes, and suggest that even small tweaks to policies—such as encouraging flexible schedules—could be important steps to take.

IV. Imagining the "ideal Singaporean family": Work-life challenges, social policies, and privatized solutions

At the heart of Singapore's state policies on work-life issues is a very clearly and specifically imagined "ideal Singaporean family." This ideal family forms the basis in helping the state to conceive of the challenges, and potential solutions, of juggling work and life that family members here may face. The Singaporean state has devised a set of subsidies, schemes, and migration-led solutions to help improve the challenges faced by specifically this vision of working families. As sociologist You Yenn Teo explains, the imagined ideal Singaporean family is seen as having the following characteristics:

> The idealized family, promoted through campaigns, policies and everyday statements by national leaders, comes across as such: at its core, a relatively young—under 50—heterosexual, married couple. Both man and woman are educated and formally employed. The couple should have children—three, or more, if they can afford it. This nuclear family lives harmoniously under one roof; in most cases, home is a modest but comfortable public flat purchased from the Housing & Development Board (HDB). The couple have parents of their own. These are ageing Singaporeans—pioneers of contemporary Singapore—who will eventually live with them (or their siblings) when they become too old to care for themselves. While they are still healthy and fit, they play key roles as grandparents. Grandmothers, in particular, are portrayed as the best primary caregivers for Singapore's children (Teo 2010: 338).

This image is important: it encourages dual-earner families. Indeed, this has been a longstanding preference in Singapore, on the basis of which foreign maids are allowed a separate employment category in Singapore. The images also makes clear a middle-class bias in Singapore's work-life policies. This preference for dual-earner families means that the state recognizes that work-life challenges will be a part and parcel of family life. Social policies are aimed to target this; however the anti-welfare stance of the Singaporean government means that policies are designed to provide privatized solutions to the widespread concern for managing care provision for children and the elderly.

Additionally, the limitation of such a clear image of an ideal family to whom social policies are targeted is that those who stray from this ideal are penalized. This occurs through lack of access to social policies and provisions that can ameliorate work-life conflict, but also through a social sense of shame in deviating from the norm at all. The people who are most likely to deviate from the norm are also most likely to be groups most in need of support, for example low-income families with children. These policies most impact working mothers, since the provision of care remains extremely gendered, and is framed in Singapore as belonging within the home—for example through help with kin (grandmothers) or foreign maids. While women's participation in the labor force is integral—indeed, it is encouraged by the state which emphasizes economy activity by all adults as a way of strengthening national development—women's roles as mothers and caregivers are also valorized (Teo and Piper 2009).

Childcare in Singapore

Childcare in Singapore is relegated primarily to women; if married mothers are not providing the caregiving themselves (discouraged, given the state's preference for dual-earner families), the kin (such as grandmothers) and foreign maids are seen as the appropriate solutions to childcare issues. One report ("Fatherhood Public Perception Survey" 2009) shows that on the weekends fathers spend 8.4 hours with children, of which they spend 2.8 hours alone with their children. Mothers in contrast spend 10.5 hours on the weekend with children, of which they spend 4.6 hours alone. The difference is significant. Singaporeans overwhelmingly (99%) believe that mothers and fathers should both share in bringing up their children and 77% agree that fathers are as good as mothers in caring for children. However, the largest share (46%) agree with the idea that the way fathers share in bringing up children is by being breadwinners. This relegates father's role in childcare to being primarily economic, leaving the affective aspects of childcare to mothers.

But foreign maids play a key role in the "reproductive" labor of the home. A non-random survey-based study of women entrepreneurs in Singapore found that 82.4% of these middle-class women entrepreneurs used the services of maids to help with household chores; and that 66.7% primarily used the services of maids for childcare (Kim and Ling 2001). Although the state encourages Singaporean families not to become dependent on maids, available data suggests that maids are a key solution enabling middle-class and affluent women in Singapore manage work and life.

The case for low-income Singaporean women is different. As the report from AWARE explains, low-income mothers often have difficulty accessing public subsidies. These schemes offer the most when low-income mothers work at least 56 hours a month in a stable-job. However, the kinds of jobs that low-income mothers have tend to be irregular and erratic—a product of the insecurity of work which is most acute at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. Piecing together 56 hours in a month is a challenge for these mothers. This is particularly because higher rates of childcare subsidies are contingent on employment. Because mothers are responsible for their children's caregiving, they are unable to expend time in finding employment.

In their report, AWARE recommends making higher subsidies of childcare available so that low-income women can find appropriate employment. Other problems of accessing include issues such as: high compliance cost (particularly related to the issue of proving adequate levels of employment); extensive paperwork; multiple gatekeepers; poor quality of available childcare centers (including alleged abuse).

Eldercare

Singapore's ageing population raises issues of how care for the elderly will be managed. Like childcare, this care is expected to be managed within the home. The state and private expectation is that of "filial piety"—that adult children will take care of their elderly parents out of a sense of respect. As mentioned above, the Singaporean state discourages a maid dependency, but it has recognized the growing need for eldercare provision. As such, the state provides a maid levy for families with a person aged 65 and older. 86% of the elderly in Singapore live with their spouse or children, with close to 36% of the elderly population living with working children in the household (Yeoh and Huang 2014). Of those aged 60 and above, 55% have a family member as a primary caregiver, with the remainder having a foreign domestic worker as the primary caregiver.

Like childcare, eldercare is also seen primarily as the responsibility of women. Singaporean women thus often have multiple obligations: paid work; childcare; eldercare (for parents and in-laws); and of course the usual upkeep of the home. As with childcare, middle-class Singaporean families also outsource eldercare to foreign domestic workers. This practice is called "liberal familialism" (Ochiai and Hosoya 2014) whereby the practical and mundane activities of caregiving are outsourced but the ultimate responsibility for it is not. The state also introduced a provision where the adult and working children of the elderly are tasked with the financial responsibility of working parents. Children who do not do so are seen as being unloving and ungrateful. As Yeoh and Huang (2014) report, for these adult children, their low-income status becomes immoral; although their inability to provide for their elderly parents has less to do with a lack of filial piety and more with financial unfeasibility. The privatisation of eldercare does not acknowledge that adult children are of varied means, with some being less equipped to fulfil this social gap.

One recent study finds that Indian-Singaporean single women often depend on circles of friends and families as they seek to provide support for their elderly parents. While these women may live apart from their parents (in separate homes, or overseas), their interaction with parents is quite frequent. While it can be a source of joy and support at times, it can also be emotionally draining. However, since the women in this study were childless, they were contending with only one kind of caregiving (Ramdas 2015).

V. Directions for future research

The research on the work-life interface in Singapore can be broadly categorized as falling into one of three categories: 1) research on work-life social policies and their impacts on low-income women; 2) comparative transnational, primarily quantitative, research on work-life challenges in Singapore and other countries; 3) emerging research on how eldercare does and can be expected to impact the work-life interface. There have been numerous important studies by social scientists and by organizations such as AWARE. However, there is scope for developing rich lines of inquiry. Below, I outline some of these.

How mothers and fathers think of their parenting responsibilities is key for work-life challenges. Research from the United States and elsewhere has shown that intensive parenting (Blair-Loy 2003; Collins 2019; Stone 2007) ideals tend to be prevalent in countries with high income inequality (Doepke and Zilibotti 2019) intersect with an absence of public provided childcare systems to exacerbate work-life conflicts. Intensive parenting is the notion that children should be the primary recipient of parents—and especially mothers'—time, emotions, and energy. These contemporary high expectations for hands-on parenting on the part of mothers is seen as a key reason why contemporary working American mothers spend as much time with their children as stay-at-home mothers did several decades ago. The parental ideals shaping the practices of Singaporean mothers and fathers are less clear. While we know how the state conceptualizes ideal mothers, a deeper understanding how Singaporeans themselves conceptualize motherhood and fatherhood would propel the research on work-life conflict further. This will require cross-class in-depth interviews by trained researchers.

As noted above, over 50% of the Singaporean workers are involved in PMET occupations. These occupations are especially likely to have characteristics of "extreme jobs" (Hewlett and Luce 2006) such as long work hours and extensive travel for work. Understanding how the various workers involved in this work—Singaporean and expat—contend with work-life challenges is important. This is particularly because Singapore has sought to attract foreign talent based precisely on the availability of knowledge sector jobs. In recent years, expats in Singapore are coming from India and China where the norm of filial piety is also strong. Yet, the parents of these expat workers may reside in their country of origin. How do these families contend with eldercare? Research needs to understand how expat families in Singapore strive to meet obligations of childcare and eldercare with paid work.

Finally, another area of research is better understanding the gendered, labor-market implications of caregiving in Singapore. Data here suggests that family responsibilities are a key reason when women abstain from labor-market participation. But how does the gendered responsibility for caregiving shape the types of occupations women enter, and their advancement within their occupations? Research from other national contexts has shown bias against mothers—the "motherhood penalty"—often based on employers' conviction that mothers are less productive workers (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007; Weisshaar 2018). The most lucrative occupations, including those in PMET, continue to be populated by men; a trend that social scientists often attribute to women's caregiving responsibilities and the employer-biases that arise from this. How does this manifest in the Singaporean context? While we may see similar trends in Singapore as in western, developed countries it is also possible that factors unique to Singapore, such as FDWs could mean that women in Singapore are more competitively able to participate in the labor force.

Singapore is a unique economy tying together specific aspects of work cultures and practices with private caregiving solutions more affordably available. How this shapes the work-life interface of Singaporean families, and specifically working mothers who shoulder the brunt of caregiving remains a rich topic for further investigation.

VI. Conclusion

In this report, I have presented an overview of the Singaporean context, explaining how work-life issues manifest, the challenges they pose, and directions for future research. The Singaporean economy which has invested heavily in building itself as a knowledge economy brings with it some unique issues. Many of these are being studied by scholars and addressed by social policy initiatives. However, there is tremendous scope to develop more sophisticated research designs to better understand how work-life challenges are experienced. This is especially important given the demographic background of Singapore which includes a significant proportion of the elderly. The time is ripe to discuss how to prevent caregiving needs from manifesting more deeply in gendered labor market inequalities.

References

AWARE Singapore. 2018. *An AWARE Report, 2018: "'Why Are You Not Working?' Low-Income Mothers Explain Challenges with Work and Care."* https://d2t1lspzrjtif2.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/Advocacy-report-why-are-you-not-working-updated-2-April-2019.pdf.

Anderson, Barbara A. 2004. "Unintended Population Consequences of Policies." *Population and Environment* 25(4): 377–390.

Blair-Loy, Mary. 2003. *Competing Devotions: Career and Family among Women Executives*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674018167&content=reviews.

Collins, Caitlyn. 2019. *Making Motherhood Work: How Women Manage Careers and Caregiving*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Correll, Shelley J., Stephen Benard, and In Paik. 2007. "Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?" *American Journal of Sociology* 112(5): 1297–1338, https://doi.org/10.1086/511799.

Doepke, Matthias, and Fabrizio Zilibotti. 2019. *Love, Money, and Parenting: How Economics Explains the Way We Raise Our Kids*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, https://press.princeton.edu/titles/13326.html.

Galovan, Adam M., Tamara Fackrell, Lydia Buswell, Blake L. Jones, E. Jeffrey Hill, and Sarah June Carroll. 2010. "The Work-Family Interface in the United States and Singapore: Conflict across Cultures." *Journal of Family Psychology* 24(5): 646–656, https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020832.

Galovan, Adam M., Richard E. Feistman, James D. Stowe, and E. Jeffrey Hill. 2015. "Achieving Desired Family Size in Dual-Working Households: Work and Family Influences among Singaporean Couples." *Journal of Family Issues* 36(10): 1377–1401, https://doi.org/10.1177/0192513X13516765.

Hewlett, Sylvia Ann, and Carolyn Buck Luce. 2006. "Extreme Jobs: The Dangerous Allure of the 70-Hour Workweek." *Harvard Business Review*, https://hbr.org/2006/12/extreme-jobs-the-dangerous-allure-of-the-70-hour-workweek.

Jones, Blake L., D. Phillip Scoville, E. Jeffrey Hill, Geniel Childs, Joan M. Leishman, and Kathryn S. Nally. 2008. "Perceived versus Used Workplace Flexibility in Singapore: Predicting Work-Family Fit." *Journal of Family Psychology* 22(5): 774–783, https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013181.

Kim, Jean Lee Siew, and Choo Seow Ling. 2001. "Work-family Conflict of Women Entrepreneurs in Singapore." *Women in Management Review* 16(5): 204–221, https://doi.org/10.1108/09649420110395692.

Michel, Alexandra. 2011. "Transcending Socialization: A Nine-Year Ethnography of the Body's Role in Organizational Control and Knowledge Workers' Transformation." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 56(3): 325–368.

Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports. 2009. *Fatherhood Public Perception Survey 2009*.

Ministry of Manpower. 2019. *Statistics and Publications 2019*, https://stats.mom.gov.sg/Pages/ExploreStatisticsPublications.aspx#PublicationSearch.

Ministry of Social and Family Development. 1988. "Increase in Foreign Maid Levy," Singapore Government Press Release, December 20, 1988.

———. 2017. *Social Statistics in Brief 2017*.

Ochiai, Emiko, and Leo Aoi Hosoya. 2014. *Transformation of the Intimate and the Public in Asian Modernity*. Leiden: Brill, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/smu/detail.action?docID=1786613.

Ramdas, Kamalini. 2015. "Is Blood Thicker than Water? Single Indian Singaporean Women and the Geographies of 'Being' Family." *Gender, Place and Culture* 22(2): 255–270, https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2013.879098.

Sandberg, Jonathan G., Jeremy B. Yorgason, Richard B. Miller, and E. Jeffrey Hill. 2012. "Family-to-Work Spillover in Singapore: Marital Distress, Physical and Mental Health, and Work Satisfaction." *Family Relations* 61(1): 1–15.

Stone, Pamela. 2007. *Opting Out? Why Women Really Quit Careers and Head Home*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Teo, You Yenn. 2010. "Shaping the Singapore Family, Producing the State and Society." *Economy and Society* 39(3): 337–359, https://doi.org/10.1080/03085147.2010.486215.

———. 2013. "Support for Deserving Families: Inventing the Anti-Welfare Familialist State in Singapore." *Social Politics: International*

Studies in Gender, *State, and Society* 20(3): 387–406, https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxt004.

———. 2015. "Differentiated Deservedness: Governance through Familialist Social Policies in Singapore." *TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia* 3(01): 73–93, https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2014.16.

Teo, You Yenn, and Nicola Piper. 2009. "Foreigners in Our Homes: Linking Migration and Family Policies in Singapore." *Population*, *Space and Place* 15(2): 147–159, https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.545.

Weisshaar, Katherine. 2018. "From Opt Out to Blocked Out: The Challenges for Labor Market Re-Entry after Family-Related Employment Lapses." *American Sociological Review* 83(1): 34–60.

Yeoh, Brenda S.A., and Shirlena Huang. 2014. "Singapore's Changing Demography, the Eldercare Predicament and Transnational 'Care' Migration." *TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia* 2(2): 247–269, https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2014.6.

Yeoh, Brenda S. A., and Theodora Lam. 2016. "Immigration and Its (Dis) Contents: The Challenges of Highly Skilled Migration in Globalizing Singapore." *American Behavioral Scientist* 60(5–6): 637–658, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764216632831.

AUTHOR

Aliya Hamid RAO

Assistant Professor of Sociology, School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University.