Employment Discrimination Law in the United States: On the Road to Equality?

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I. Introduction

U.S. antidiscrimination law seeks to address a history of workplace exclusion of individuals and groups on the basis of race, sex, national origin, and religion. Added to the core protections against discrimination on these bases, more recent legislation has recognized the need to expand the law to include discrimination on the basis of age and disability. Yet, as significant as antidiscrimination law has been, the U.S. workforce continues to reflect occupational segregation on these bases. Added to these problems is the growing insecurity of workforce made up increasingly by contingent employees, who are often drawn from the same groups needing protection under employment discrimination laws.

The legislative and judicial agenda, thus, must remain focused on the same fundamental questions that led to initial passage of antidiscrimination laws. What goals should these laws seek to achieve? How should progress toward equality be measured? Should the law be concerned with equal treatment of individuals as well as equal results for protected groups? Can the law provide substantive equality in addition to formal equality?

This paper describes and analyzes U.S. antidiscrimination law. It begins by describing the legal context of labor and employment law in the U.S., set against the background of the doctrine of employment at will. The discussion then focuses on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,\(^1\) which has been central to developing discrimination theory that has been applied to subsequent antidiscrimination laws. In addressing Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),\(^2\) and the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),\(^3\) the paper presents an analysis of the progress achieved by these statutes. As importantly, the paper critiques the limits of the legislation, particularly as interpreted by the courts. Finally, the paper examines the growing contingent workforce and its need for legislative protection. Throughout the paper, the discussion will focus on recent developments in U.S. antidiscrimination law.

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which enforces these statutes, recently reported that employment discrimination charge filings increased dramatically in 2007, which is “the highest volume of incoming charges since 2002 and the largest annual increase (9%) since the early 1990s.”\(^4\) Race, retaliation, and sex-based

\(^2\) 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
\(^3\) 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
1. United States
discrimination charges made up the bulk of the charges, “continuing a long-term trend.”5 Of particular note, “nearly all major charge categories,” including race, retaliation, pregnancy, age, disability, national origin, and religion, grew by double digit percentages, which the EEOC calls “a rare occurrence.”6 As these statistics demonstrate, problems of discrimination still exist in the U.S., requiring continued legal attention and redress.

II. Common Law Background: Employment at Will

Any developments in U.S. labor and employment law must be understood against the legal background of the common law doctrine of “employment at will,” which has influenced the legislatures and courts since at least the 19th century.7 Under the familiar litany of employment at will doctrine, an employer may hire or discharge an individual for “a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all,” emphasizing employers’ unilateral power to decide whether to initially employ or continue to employ an individual. In other words, the employer has no obligation to make rational hiring decisions or to discharge employees only for “just cause.”8 Although most collective bargaining agreements include just cause provisions, less than 8% of the private sector workforce is unionized.9 Further, most employees do not have individual contracts on which to based “unjust dismissal” claims. Many public sector employees are protected by a just cause requirement under civil service statutes or collective bargaining agreements. Even in a unionized workforce, however, hiring decisions are usually outside the scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining.

Given the scope of employer power under the employment at will doctrine, statutory limitations on the common law doctrine have been especially important for restricting socially irresponsible employment decisions. These legal limitations have taken the form of federal and state labor and employment legislation prohibiting employers from basing employment decisions on an individual’s union activities, race, sex, national origin, religion, age, or disability. This legislation has its origins in the National Labor Relations Act of 193510 and subsequent laws resulting from the 1960s Civil Rights movement, including the federal Equal Pay Act of 1963,11 requiring employers to pay men and women equally for performing substantially similar work, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or religion. Congress has enacted additional anti-discrimination legislation, including the ADEA, prohibiting employment discrimination against individuals forty years of age or older, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991,12 which amended Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. State anti-

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5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding the Original Myth Regarding Employment-At-Will: The True Origins of the Doctrine, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 93-98 (1996) (arguing that the employment-at-will doctrine has been part of U.S. common law since the earlier colonial period).
10 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et. seq.
12 Pub. L. 102-166.
Employment Discrimination Law in the United States: On the Road to Equality?

Discrimination laws provide analogous prohibitions, with some state laws adding other grounds, such as employment decisions on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status. Since there is no federal preemption in anti-discrimination law, plaintiffs can file claims concurrently under federal and state laws. Unlike federal anti-discrimination law, state laws that do not cap compensatory and punitive damages open the potential for larger awards for plaintiffs in state court.

Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA regulate public and private employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies. Employers are covered if they have more than 15 employees for Title VII and the ADA, and more than 20 employees for the ADEA. An older federal statute with continued relevance for race discrimination claims is 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, which was enacted as part of he federal Civil Rights Act of 1866. Section 1981 prohibits race discrimination in the formation or enforcement of contracts, which includes public and private sector employment. The Equal Protection guarantees of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution apply only to public employers, given the requirement of “state action” to trigger these provisions.

As significant as anti-discrimination laws are, their scope is limited by the U.S. “negative rights” model, which works in tandem with employment at will doctrine. As a background legal condition, employment at will gives employers almost complete unilateral control over the employment relationship. A negative rights model of anti-discrimination leaves this employer power largely intact by creating discrete restrictions on employer conduct. For example, under Title VII, an employer is prohibited from refusing to hire a woman because of her gender. But Title VII does not require an employer to increase its hiring of women. Nor is the employer required to have just cause to discharge or discipline employees. Title VII and other employment discrimination laws define prohibited bases for employer action, but leave the employer otherwise free to take actions for good or bad, fair or unfair reasons.

In contrast, a positive rights model would make greater incursions on employer unilateral power. For example, “unjust discharge” claims by employees could include claims of sex, race, or other forms of discrimination, but would go beyond anti-discrimination by creating a positive right to fair treatment. A positive rights model could have a significant effect on the judicial interpretation of anti-discrimination laws, leading to greater substantive equality. A positive rights model would also create a stronger foundation for legislating benefits for all employees, including paid vacation, paid sick leave, and health insurance. With a weak

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14 See, e.g., Johnson-Klein v. California State Univ., 102 FEP Cases 1227 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2008) (State court finding excessive a jury award of over $3 million for past non-economic damages and $11 million for future non-economic losses for sex discrimination, and reducing the non-economic damages to a total of $1.5 million).
16 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (5).
17 29 U.S.C. § 630 (b).
18 See In re Civil Right Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
welfare state, the U.S. leaves such benefits to contract, whether through collective bargaining or individual agreements.19

III. Title VII Negative Rights Model: Formal Equality

The negative rights model has its strongest expression in disparate treatment theory, which is centered on intentional employment discrimination. Disparate treatment theory is most effective as a means of achieving formal equality for women, racial and ethnic minorities, disabled persons, and older people. Creating conditions of “formal equality” does further the legislative goal of expanding equal opportunity for women and minorities who meet the same employment criteria applied to majority group applicants.20 For example, an employer is prohibited from treating male and female applicants differently on the basis of sex in filling a position of engineer. The judicial focus on formal equality has resulted in an extensive body of disparate treatment cases defining the methods of proving intentional discrimination.

While it seems uncontroversial that intentional discrimination should be unlawful, Title VII’s actual language refers only to the broader concept of causation rather than intent.21 Nevertheless, the courts have developed a long history of cases defining disparate treatment in terms of intentional discrimination. Further, although “intent” is not the same as “motive,” the courts often use these terms interchangeably. While intent refers to a conscious state of mind, motive may include unconscious factors, such as stereotypes that cause bias in decision-making.22

Disparate treatment cases encompass all types of intentional discrimination under Title VII.23 Depending on the type of case – alleging discrimination against an individual, a group, or in a class action – the method of proving the employer’s intent or motive will vary. The Supreme Court’s development of disparate treatment theory under Title VII has created a template that has been used to interpret other employment discrimination laws. The judicial path in defining intentional discrimination under Title VII, however – particularly in cases of discrimination against an individual – has not been smooth. The current status of judicial doctrine of intent under Title VII is, in fact, in disarray. The co-existence of contradictory Supreme Court cases is responsible for this confusion. Prior to 1991, the Court created two different approaches for proving Title VII disparate treatment violations – a “pretext” approach and a “mixed motives” approach. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA of 1991),24 Congress amended Title VII to add Section 703(m), which explicitly incorporated the “mixed motives” approach for proving intentional discrimination. Although the Supreme Court has

24 Pub. L. 102-166.
interpreted this new provision, the Court still has not answered the question of whether the “pretext” approach has continued viability.

The Supreme Court developed the pretext approach in its 1973 decision of *McDonnell Douglas v. Green*, in which legal scholar Mack Player has called the “three step minuet.” In the first step, the plaintiff must prove that he or she was a member of a protected class under Title VII; applied for the position for which the employer was seeking applicants (or held a position with the employer); was qualified for the job in question; was denied the job (or was disciplined or discharged); and the employer continued to seek applicants for the job or filled the job with a person from a different class. The plaintiff who proves these elements by a preponderance of the evidence has successfully made a prima facie case for inferring the employer’s unlawful intent. As the second step of the “minuet,” the defendant may rebut the inference of illegal intent by “articulating” a non-discriminatory reason for his action. The defendant – most of the time, an employer – has only a burden of production of admissible evidence, not a burden of persuasion. Finally, in the third step of the dance, plaintiff must carry the burden of persuasion of the element of intent by proving that the defendant’s reason was pretextual – either false or a cover for the real unlawful discriminatory reason. Proving pretext, however, does not prove unlawful intent as a matter of law. The Supreme Court, in a closely divided decision, held that the judge or jury could still permissibly conclude that the pretext was a cover for some reason other than race, sex, national origin, or religion.

The Supreme Court’s “mixed motives” approach is more favorable to plaintiffs. Sixteen years after *McDonnell Douglas*, the Court held in *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins*, that “[i]f an employer allows gender to affect its decision-making process, then it must carry the burden of justifying its ultimate decision.” The plaintiff has the initial burden to prove that the employer was motivated, at least in part, by an unlawful basis under Title VII. Having established that the employer was a “wrongdoer,” the employer must carry the burden of persuasion of an affirmative defense that it would have made the same decision in the absence of such discrimination.

Most federal courts distinguished the two approaches by finding that *Price Waterhouse* required the plaintiff to present “direct evidence” of the employer’s illegitimate motive. Where the plaintiff’s case relied only on circumstantial evidence, the employer had the low burden of “articulating” its defense under *McDonnell Douglas*, leaving it to the plaintiff to meet the difficult burden of proving pretext. Given the hazy line between direct and circumstantial evidence, lower federal courts reached inconsistent and surprising conclusions.

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26 PLAYER, supra note 8, at 85-95.
27 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Proof of other allegations of disparate treatment in employment conditions – such as wage discrimination or layoffs – would entail evidence that the plaintiff was treated differently from other similarly situated employees. PLAYER, supra note 8, at 85-91.
29 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
30 Id. at 804-05.
33 Id. at 249.
about whether evidence such as racist or sexist statements were simply “stray remarks,” but not direct evidence of unlawful intent.\textsuperscript{35}

Congress re-entered this terrain through the CRA of 1991, by adding Section 703(m) to Title VII, which explicitly recognizes the existence of mixed motive disparate treatment cases.\textsuperscript{36} Shortly thereafter, in 2003, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 703(m) in \textit{Desert Palace v. Costa}.\textsuperscript{37} The Court held that a plaintiff may prove an employer’s illegal intent through direct and/or circumstantial evidence.\textsuperscript{38} This approach comports more with the reality that intentional discrimination will likely be evidenced through a pattern of treatment and conduct rather than through direct statements of animus toward the plaintiff based on her protected class status.

Since the \textit{Desert Palace} Court did not even mention \textit{McDonnell Douglas}, this leaves lower courts uncertain about which approach to apply in disparate treatment cases. Further, the Supreme Court has continued to cite \textit{McDonnell Douglas} after deciding \textit{Desert Palace}.\textsuperscript{39} Most courts continue to apply both \textit{McDonnell Douglas} and \textit{Desert Palace}.\textsuperscript{40} The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals uses \textit{McDonnell Douglas} analysis in “single motive” or “pretext” cases and has also tried “merging” the two cases.\textsuperscript{41} A district court in the Eighth Circuit found that all disparate treatment cases should be analyzed only under the \textit{Desert Palace} mixed-motives approach.\textsuperscript{42} Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that \textit{McDonnell Douglas} remains relevant at the summary judgment stage. Many legal commentators, in contrast, find nothing more than “nostalgia”\textsuperscript{43} to support the continued use of \textit{McDonnell Douglas}.\textsuperscript{44}

The choice between \textit{McDonnell Douglas} or \textit{Desert Palace} is more than “academic.” In applying \textit{McDonnell Douglas}, federal district court judges raised the bar on plaintiffs by either discounting the power of circumstantial evidence or deferring to the employer’s “honest belief” in its reason for hiring, discharge, or discipline.\textsuperscript{45} This made it very difficult for plaintiffs to prove that the employer’s reasons were pretextual.\textsuperscript{46} Federal judges, under a


\textsuperscript{36} 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(m).

\textsuperscript{37} 539 U.S. 90 (2003).

\textsuperscript{38} Id. at 2153-55.


\textsuperscript{40} See, e.g., McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2004); Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005); Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2004). See also Corbett, supra note 34, at n.71.

\textsuperscript{41} Rachid v. Jack in the Box, 376 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 2004). See Corbett, supra note 34, at 1565.

\textsuperscript{42} Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp.2d 987 (D. Minn. 2003); Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2004) See Corbett, supra note 34, at n.72.

\textsuperscript{43} Corbett, supra note 34, at 1551.


\textsuperscript{46} Id.
**Employment Discrimination Law in the United States:**

**On the Road to Equality?**

*McDonnell Douglas* analysis, granted summary judgments at a high rate to employers,47 “transform[ing] the circumstantial evidence case into a ‘toothless tiger.’”48

If a plaintiff succeeds in getting to a jury trial, the application of either the *McDonnell Douglas* or *Desert Palace* allocation of burdens of proof can have a significant impact on the outcome. Prior to 1991, all Title VII cases were heard only in bench trials. The 1991 CRA made a major change by compensatory and punitive damages49 to the already existing back pay and reinstatement remedies for intentional discrimination. The 1991 Act also created the right to a jury trial in cases where a plaintiff seeks compensatory or punitive damages – in other words, in disparate treatment cases.50 The judge could create an advantage for the employer by instructing the jury based on the burdens of proof under *McDonnell Douglas*.51 Given the low burden of production on the employer, it will be difficult for the plaintiff to win and to receive damages. Instructing the jury under a *Desert Palace* mixed motives approach, by contrast, describes a more evenly distributed allocation of burdens of persuasion.52 Even more beneficial to the plaintiff, according to Section 703(m) of the CRA of 1991, once the plaintiff proves that the employer was motivated by an unlawful reason, the plaintiff has established employer liability. The employer’s affirmative defense – that it would have taken the same action anyway – is relevant only to the appropriate remedies awarded to the plaintiff. An employer that successfully proves an affirmative defense will be subject to a cease and desist order and will be obligated to pay the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.53 If the employer is unsuccessful in its defense, the plaintiff may be awarded the full scope of remedies for intentional discrimination.54 The 1991 CRA caps compensatory plus punitive damages at maximums determined by the size of the employer, setting a range that extends from $50,000 for employers under 101 employees to $300,000 for employers with more than 500 employees.55

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47 *Id.*
48 *Id.* at 661.
49 The new 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981a, created by Section 102 of the CRA of 1991, provides for recovery of “punitive damages” (except against a governmental employer), where the plaintiff proves that the defendant’s actions were made “with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.”
50 CRA of 1991, Section 102 creates the right to a jury trial, in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981a (c).
51 Corbett, *supra* note 34, at 1571-74.
52 *Id.*
53 The CRA of 1991 amended Title VII to add Section 706(g)(2)(B), providing that if a plaintiff proves that the defendant was unlawfully motivated under Section 703(m), and if the defendant “demonstrates that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor,” the court “may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief…and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under [Section 703(m)].” The provision also instructs that a court “shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or [back pay].”
55 Section 102 of the CRA of 1991 provides that the award of compensatory and punitive damages is made in addition to any back pay or front pay. The cap on compensatory and punitive damage amounts, therefore, does not affect the separate award of back pay or front pay.
IV. Sexual Harassment: Defined as Disparate Treatment

The U.S. courts have been active, if not always clear, in interpreting sexual harassment claims under Title VII. In *quid pro quo* cases, a supervisor or manager makes sex a condition of employment, for example, by threatening an employee with discharge or other negative consequences for refusing to comply with sexual demands. Or the supervisor might promise to reward the employee for sexual favors. While the plaintiff must prove that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, a “voluntary” relationship could still be sexual harassment.

Prior to developing case law on hostile environment sexual harassment, the courts had found that creation of racial and national origin hostile environments violated Title VII. A “hostile environment” sexual harassment claim consists of “unwelcome sexual advances” or “other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature” that were “sufficiently severe or pervasive” as to unreasonably interfere with the employee’s work or create “an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” The determination of “severe or pervasive” conduct depends on a two-part test. First, under an objective test, the plaintiff must prove that a "reasonable person in [her] position" would find the conduct severe or pervasive. Secondly, under a subjective test, the plaintiff must show that she, personally, found that the conduct created an abusive working environment. The plaintiff need not prove that “tangible psychological injury” resulted. The Supreme Court has emphasized, though, that “merely offensive comments” or even “sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing” will not create a hostile environment.

Judicial development of sexual harassment law has led to mixed results for plaintiffs. Feminist scholars have criticized federal courts for raising the evidentiary bar so high as to make claims of sexual harassment difficult to prove. Legal scholar Judith Johnson concludes that many judges are defining “severe or pervasive” hostile environment as if it means “severe and pervasive” harassment. Professor Theresa Beiner’s empirical study of hostile environment cases over an 11-year period, from 1987 to 1998, reveals that the federal courts

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58 *Id.* at 68.
59 *Id.* at 61-62.
60 See *Meritor*, 477 U.S. at 65-66 (discussing lower federal court decisions).
63 *Id.* at 22.
64 *Id.* at 21. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), 788 (quoting BARBARA LINDEMANN AND DAVID D. KADUE, *SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW* 175 (1992)).
granted summary judgment in more than half of all cases because of inadequate evidence of severe or pervasive conduct.66

A recent positive development in sexual harassment law is the Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale v. Offshore Services, expanding sexual harassment claims to include same-sex harassment.67 The case has also been criticized, however, for emphasizing that sexual harassment is based on disparate treatment theory, which requires evidence of discriminatory treatment. The Oncale Court, reiterating analysis from earlier cases, stated: “The critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.”68 Judicial insistence on proving that men and women are treated differently, however, seems irrelevant to addressing the harm of sexual harassment.69 Such inquiries can lead, as well, to an intrusive and offensive focus on the sexual orientation of the alleged harasser and victim.70

The Supreme Court has also been criticized for its recent creation of a unique affirmative defense in hostile environment cases. In its 1998 decisions in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton71 and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,72 the Supreme Court held that an employer could defend against hostile environment claims by fulfilling a two-prong test: first, that the employer took reasonable care to prevent or remedy the hostile environment; and second, that the employee claiming harassment was unreasonable in not taking full advantage of employer measures, such as internal complaint processes.73 This affirmative defense is not available, however, where the sexual harassment produces a “tangible employment action,” such as a discharge or demotion. An employer remains strictly liable if a sexual harassment victim proves that s/he faced “a significant change in employment status.”74

In 2004, the Court further defined the affirmative defense in cases where an employee resigns from her job due to sexual harassment. In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders,75 the plaintiff alleged that she was the victim of a tangible employment action, consisting of a “constructive discharge”; that is, the sexual harassment was so intolerable that she felt forced to resign. The Court held that a constructive discharge is a tangible employment action only where the employee’s resignation results from harassment involving “official action,” such as

68 Id. at 80, quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. at 25-26 (Justice Ginsburg, concurring).
70 The Supreme Court does not find it as “easy to draw” an inference that the same-sex harasser’s conduct was discriminatory as it does in other cases of sexual harassment. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
73 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 765.
74 Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
an employee’s resignation in response to a humiliating demotion.\textsuperscript{76} If the alleged constructive discharge does not involve official action, the employer may attempt to prove its affirmative defense to a hostile environment claim.\textsuperscript{77}

The sexual harassment affirmative defense could encourage employers to take positive measures, such as adopting educational programs and internal complaint processes to investigate and remedy sexual harassment problems. However, the defense may also give employers an easy way to avoid meritorious claims. Empirical studies have found that many employers use these processes as “window dressing”\textsuperscript{78} or “file cabinet compliance.”\textsuperscript{79} Further, the affirmative defense in combination with the severe or pervasive standard place employees in a difficult position.\textsuperscript{80} To comply with \textit{Faragher}, an employee may file an internal grievance immediately after an incident of harassment. If she then files a Title VII lawsuit, a judge may conclude that the alleged conduct is too isolated to create a hostile environment. But if she waits too long to file an internal complaint, a judge could later dismiss her lawsuit based on the employer’s affirmative defense that the plaintiff did not adequately take advantage of internal complaint processes.\textsuperscript{81}

\textbf{V. Further Recent Developments in Disparate Treatment Theory}

The Supreme Court decided two recent intentional discrimination cases; one hurts plaintiffs and the other helps.\textsuperscript{82} The first case, \textit{Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.},\textsuperscript{83} was decided on procedural grounds with the result of limiting individual plaintiffs’ ability to bring Title VII wage discrimination claims. Plaintiff Ledbetter alleged wage discrimination based on evidence that over many years she was paid less than men in similar jobs. The Supreme Court held, however, that Ledbetter’s claim was untimely, as it was filed outside the EEOC’s 180 day limitations period. The Court concluded that Ledbetter was required to file her claim within 180 days from her employer’s initial decision to pay her less than the men.\textsuperscript{84} The Court rejected plaintiff’s argument and the EEOC’s position that her claim was timely because each paycheck perpetuated her employer’s earlier discriminatory actions in setting her salary. A plaintiff filing outside the limitations period must show that the employer’s wage system is discriminatory, which would prove a continuing violation of Title VII. Each time the employer applies its discriminatory system, it would engage in a new

\textsuperscript{76} 524 U.S. at 148-49.
\textsuperscript{77} Id.
\textsuperscript{79} Lawton, supra note 78, at 213-16.
\textsuperscript{81} White, supra note 80, at 857-63; Johnson, supra note 65, at 134.
\textsuperscript{82} See Lieberwitz, supra note 23.
\textsuperscript{83} 550 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
\textsuperscript{84} Id. In states that have state enforcement agencies for state anti-discrimination laws, the limitations period under Title VII is extended to 300 days.
Employment Discrimination Law in the United States: On the Road to Equality?

Since Ledbetter relied on evidence of the “discrete act” of her employer’s discrimination in setting her initial wage level, she could not prove systemic discrimination.\(^{85}\)

Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, objected to the unreasonable nature of the Court’s holding. In the realities of the workplace, it may take years before an employee learns of discriminatory wage disparities. Employers usually keep wage information secret and employees often hesitate to share such information with each other. Even where employees have access to information about other employees’ wages and raises, the cumulative effect of compensation differences may not be apparent immediately. Ginsburg called for Congress to “correct [the] Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.” \(^{86}\) A bill has already been introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives to amend Title VII to legislatively overrule Ledbetter.\(^{87}\)

In *Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White*,\(^{88}\) a unanimous Supreme Court recently expanded the scope of plaintiffs’ claims under Section 704(a),\(^{89}\) the “anti-retaliation provision” of Title VII. While Section 703(a)\(^{90}\) protects employees against prohibited discrimination in employment decisions, Section 704(a) prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for participating in proceedings to enforce Title VII or for opposing employer conduct that the employee reasonably and in good faith believes violates Title VII. Protected employee actions under Section 704(a) encompass employee informal complaints at the workplace and formal employee charges or testimony in the legal realm. Retaliation claims have grown in importance, increasing from 15 percent of all claims filed with the EEOC in 1993 to 29.5 percent in 2006.\(^{91}\) In *Burlington Northern*, the Court held that prohibited employer conduct under Section 704(a) is not confined to “actions and harms…related to employment or [that] occur at the workplace.”\(^{92}\) For example, unlawful retaliation under Section 704(a) might consist of an employer filing false criminal charges against a former employee who complained about discrimination.\(^{93}\) The Court held, further, that employer actions will be found to be unlawful retaliation only if they “would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant,” meaning that “they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”\(^{94}\)

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\(^{85}\) See Michael Selmi, *The Supreme Court’s 2006-2007 Term Employment Law Cases: A Quiet But Revealing Term*, 11 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’LY J. 219, 230-32 (2007) (discussing the Ledbetter Court’s reasoning distinguishing *National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan*, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), which had found hostile environment racial harassment to be a continuing violation, timely filed as long as one of the hostile environment incidents occurred within the limitations period).

\(^{86}\) *Id.* at 2188. Justice Ginsburg was joined in her dissenting opinion by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer.


\(^{88}\) *Id.* at 2188. Justice Ginsburg was joined in her dissenting opinion by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer.

\(^{89}\) *Id.* at 2188. Justice Ginsburg was joined in her dissenting opinion by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer.

\(^{90}\) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The ADEA has a similar provision in Sec. 4(d) (29 U.S.C. § 623(d)), as does the ADA in Sec. 503 (42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)).

\(^{91}\) Lawrence E. Dube, *Employee Retaliation Claims are on the Rise, But Rules are in Flux, NYU Conference Told*, 108 DAILY LAB. REP. B-1, Jun. 6, 2007.


\(^{93}\) *Id.* at 2409, citing with approval, Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984 (10th Cir. 1996).

\(^{94}\) *Id.* at 2409. The evidence in this case proved that the plaintiff suffered “material adverse employment actions” of work transfer and suspension.
VI. Moving Beyond the Limits of “Formal Equality”

While opening opportunities, the formal equality model of individual disparate treatment claims restricts the potential of anti-discrimination law, as it defines white men as “the norm.” That is, formal equality extends equal rights only where plaintiffs can prove that they are “the same” as the norm – white men – and that the employer intentionally excluded plaintiffs due to their protected group status. This definition envisions equality in a “formal” sense, seeking to eliminate intentional discrimination against “similarly situated” groups. Formal equality, however, fails to fully counter the historical and social conditions that have caused women and minorities to be “differently situated” from white men. Although some sex-based biological differences exist in reproduction, these physical differences create differences in employment status because gender roles have been socially assigned in the workplace and family. Women’s gender role of primary caretaking in the family has created obstacles to their achievements in education and employment. Women and minority groups are different, as well, because they are disproportionately poor, which limits their ability to gain higher education and employment skills. Under these social conditions, white men have monopolized the best paying and highest status jobs in the workplace, with women and minorities disproportionately represented in part-time, low-paid, and low-status jobs. Redressing these social and economic inequalities takes more than extending formal equality to women and minorities who manage to meet the “white male” norm.

Formal equality is certainly important. But can the law extend beyond comparisons of similarly situated groups? Some judicial interpretation has opened disparate treatment to consider social conditions, gender roles, and unconscious discrimination. In so doing, the courts have added greater substantive equality to Title VII.

A. Required Gender Conformity as Disparate Treatment

Expanding disparate treatment theory beyond formal equality goes hand in hand with recognizing that discrimination results from both conscious and unconscious motivations. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court made important progress by finding that an employer engages in intentional sex discrimination by relying on gender role stereotypes in its employment decisions. Despite Hopkins’ impressive work record, the Price Waterhouse partners turned down her bid for promotion based on her poor “interpersonal skills.” Several of the male partners also criticized her for being “too macho,” for “overcompensating for being a woman,” and for being “a lady using foul language.” They counseled her to “walk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.” The Court concluded that the employer’s reliance on stereotypes about femininity blocked Hopkins from being promoted. From the employer’s viewpoint, Hopkins would never be the same as men. As Justice Brennan explained, an “employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible Catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they

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97 490 U.S. at 235.
do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.”

Thus, the Court recognized that disparate treatment includes an employer’s evaluation of job performance and qualifications through the lens of socially constructed stereotypes.

The Price Waterhouse analysis of the impact of gender role stereotypes on women should logically apply to employment discrimination against men who do not conform to stereotypes about masculinity. Analogous to Hopkins’ claim, a male plaintiff could argue that the employer refused him a promotion for being too “feminine.” This application is especially important to expand Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, which the lower federal courts have held is not covered by Title VII. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of sexual orientation as a protected class, its Price Waterhouse gender analysis has been applied by some federal courts to find unlawful discrimination on the basis of nonconformity to gender stereotypes. This approach is bolstered, as well, by the Supreme Court’s 1998 decision of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, where the Court opened the door to broader consideration of gender stereotypes by analyzing same-sex harassment under Title VII. In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the male plaintiff was the target of unlawful hostile environment harassment by co-workers and a supervisor, based on their perception of his conduct as overly feminine. Some federal courts have used similar analysis about gender nonconformity to find discrimination against transgendered individuals. This legal protection of individuals based on their gender identity could also apply to individuals who do not conform to stereotypes through their dress or make up.

Despite the theoretical fit between Price Waterhouse and other sorts of gender stereotyping, most courts are reluctant to apply the analysis broadly. For example, in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc, the Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim based on the employer’s policy that required women beverage servers and bartenders to wear make up, but that prohibited men from wearing it. The employer required male bartenders, but not female bartenders, to have hair above collar length. The court concluded that the grooming policy imposed “equal burdens” on both men and women. In cases raising gender nonconformity discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, courts often reject claims by finding that the plaintiffs are trying to expand Title VII beyond Congress’ meaning of sex discrimination. As legal scholar Arthur Leonard notes, in these cases “judges walk a fine line” between finding sexual harassment due

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98 Id. at 251.
99 See Lieberwitz, supra note 23.
100 See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
103 256 F.3d 864.
104 See, e.g. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding evidence of discrimination on the basis of nonconformity with gender norms against plaintiff who was a pre-operative transsexual). See, discussion in Friedman, supra note 102, at 222-23.
105 Laura D. Francis, Attorneys Discuss ‘Rapidly Developing’ Law on Gender Identity Discrimination, 119 DAILY LAB. REP. C-1 (Jun. 21, 2007); Friedman, supra note 102, at 209-11, 216-20.
106 Friedman, supra note 102, at 205-06, 209-11, 218-22, 225-27.
107 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
108 Id. at 1110. See, Friedman, supra note 102, at 209-11.
109 Friedman, supra note 102, at 221-22.
1. United States

to their non-conforming appearance and behavior\textsuperscript{110} and finding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.\textsuperscript{111} Ultimately, legislative reform will be needed to broaden Title VII protection. The proposed federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act should amend Title VII to add prohibitions against sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination.\textsuperscript{112} State laws increasingly prohibit discrimination on these bases.\textsuperscript{113}

B. Intersectional Claims of Discrimination

Courts deepen their consideration of social conditions by allowing plaintiffs to bring claims based on the interactive effects of race, sex, national origin, age, and other unlawful bases of discrimination. The courts are divided in their views on the validity of intersectional claims. Some courts use a formalistic interpretation that maintains divisions among categories of discrimination. A federal district court in Missouri held that the plaintiffs could prove a claim that the employer laid them off because they were women or because they were black, or both, but not because they were Black women.\textsuperscript{114} Other courts have recognized that an intersectional claim alleges a unique form of discrimination. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff could claim that she was denied a promotion and discharged because of the intersection of race and sex. The court concluded that “discrimination against black females [could] exist even in the absence of discrimination against black men or white women.”\textsuperscript{115} The Tenth Circuit agreed in a case involving racial and sexual hostile environment.\textsuperscript{116} The Ninth Circuit has recognized an intersectional race and gender claim in a case alleging discrimination against an Asian woman.\textsuperscript{117} A federal district court in Pennsylvania permitted a plaintiff to claim discrimination against older women, an intersection of two federal statutes.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{110} For cases applying this theory, see e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 922 (2003); Centola v. Potter, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1504 (D. Mass. 2002).

\textsuperscript{111} For cases rejecting claims because they were based on sexual orientation discrimination, see e.g., King v. Super Service, Inc., 68 Fed. Appx. 659 (6th Cir. 2003); Mims v. Carrier Corporation, 88 F.Supp.2d 706 (E.D. Tex. 2000). See Leonard, supra note 55, at 279; Leonard, supra note 13, at 152-58.


\textsuperscript{113} See Francis, supra note 105 (describing prohibitions against sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination under New Jersey and New York state laws); Arash Jahanian and Alan K. Tannenwald, supra note 13, at 515-17 (2007) (describing laws in 18 states and D.C., prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination).


\textsuperscript{115} Jeffries v. Harris Co. Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980).

\textsuperscript{116} Hicks v. The Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1991).

\textsuperscript{117} Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994).

C. Group-Based Claims of Intentional Discrimination

1. Explicit Exclusion of a Protected Group

Group-based disparate treatment cases move intentional discrimination beyond formal equality by shifting the focus from comparing individuals to analyzing systemic discrimination. The most straightforward case of group-based intentional discrimination is an employer’s explicit exclusion of a protected group from a particular job. In such cases, the only defense available to employers is proof that the exclusion is a “bona fide occupational qualification” (BFOQ) “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business.”

While the BFOQ applies to exclusions based on sex, national origin, religion, and age, Title VII does not permit the BFOQ defense for explicit group-based exclusions on the basis of race.

To guard against broad exclusions based on stereotypes and unsubstantiated generalizations, the Supreme Court has placed a heavy burden of proof on the employer to establish a BFOQ. For example, in *UAW v. Johnson Controls*, the Supreme Court held that a battery manufacturer violated Title VII by excluding women of child bearing capacity from jobs with lead exposure or that were on the job ladder to such positions. The Court rejected Johnson Controls’ BFOQ argument that lead exposure could endanger fetuses. This evidence did not prove “that all or substantially all [pregnant or potentially pregnant women] would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved.” As the Court observed, “Concern for a woman’s existing or potential offspring has historically been the excuse for denying women equal employment opportunities.”

2. Pattern or Practice of Group-based Exclusion

Like explicit exclusions of a protected group, pattern or practice cases are group-based claims of intentional discrimination. Unlike explicit exclusion cases, however, pattern or practice claims are difficult for plaintiffs to prove. Based primarily on statistical evidence, the pattern or practice case is brought by the EEOC or Department of Justice, or as a private class action alleging long-term discrimination. A successful claim takes intentional discrimination beyond formal equality by inferring intent on the basis of historical patterns of hiring and promotions that result in occupational segregation. This evidence of exclusion reveals discrimination as a systemic problem rather than simply a series of individual discriminatory employment decisions.

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119 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (permitting job qualifications on the basis of “religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”)

120 *Id.*


122 *Id.* at 216.

123 *Id.* at 211. In contrast, in *Dothard v. Rawlinson*, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the Supreme Court upheld the state of Alabama’s exclusion of all women from guard positions in state maximum security prisons. The Court concluded that women’s “very womanhood” endangered themselves and others in those prisons. Justice Marshall, in dissent, castigated the Court for treating women unequally based on “old canards” of gentility. *Id.* at 343.


125 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (ADA). *See also*, BELTON ET AL., *supra* note 35, at 170, 175-77 (discussing pattern or practice cases under the ADEA, and private class action employment discrimination suits under Title VII, ADA, and ADEA).
Key to proving a pattern or practice case is demonstrating that the employer disproportionately excluded a protected group as its standard operating procedure. While the proof is, primarily, based on statistical evidence of discriminatory patterns of hiring, promotions, wages, and job assignments, plaintiffs usually bolster statistics with “anecdotal” evidence of individual instances of discrimination.

Since the mid-1990s, there has been a “sharp rise” in class action suits alleging system-wide race and sex discrimination. Class actions focused on the low percentage of women in management have been brought against employers in industries as different as securities and grocery store chains. Despite settlements in some cases for millions of dollars, women’s representation in management has not significantly increased. The recent well publicized class action against Wal-Mart alleges system-wide sex discrimination in wages and promotions to management positions. As a class action of 1.6 million women suing the largest employer in the world, it has been described as “the largest Title VII sex discrimination class action ever and the largest civil rights class action in U.S. history.”

Plaintiffs in class action and pattern or practice sex discrimination cases have encountered employer defenses that women are not interested in management positions. This “lack of interest” defense argues that women’s roles as spouse and mother motivate them to choose jobs that enable them to fulfill their family responsibilities. From this perspective, women prefer jobs that leave time for caretaking and allow them to move easily in and out of the workforce; that is, part-time positions, jobs with regular day time hours, and non-managerial positions. Legal scholar Vicki Schultz’s study demonstrated that employers made this argument successfully in almost half of the 54 sex discrimination cases between 1972 and 1989 raising the “lack of interest” defense. Most of these cases alleged class-wide discrimination.

Wal-Mart officials have asserted women’s lack of interest in relation to the

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127 Id. at 338-39.
129 For example, a class action against Publix grocery stores settled for $81.5 million, and the class action against Lucky’s grocery stores settled for $107 million. Id. at 15-16. Yet, as Selmi concludes: “Despite the bevy of lawsuits, it is equally clear that the pattern of discrimination with the grocery industry remains entrenched today, some twenty years after the initial suits were filed.” Id. 18. In the securities industry, Selmi describes the situation: “As of 1996 when many of the cases were filed, approximately 15 percent of the more than 100,000 brokers nationwide were women, and women held fewer than 10 percent of the senior management positions. By 2003, the figures were nearly the same.” Id. at 6.
131 Chau, supra note 130, at 987, n. 108.
132 Id. at 986.
134 Schultz, supra note 133, at 1776-77.
135 Plaintiffs “prevailed on the interest issue in 57.4% of the claims” where the employer asserted this defense. Id. at 1776-77.
pending class action suit alleging systemic sex discrimination. With the addition of jury trials under the CRA of 1991, perhaps juries will less readily accept the lack of interest defense.

**VII. Disparate Impact Theory: Moving Toward Substantive Equality**

U.S. anti-discrimination law makes progress toward substantive equality through the “disparate impact” theory of discrimination, which is often referred to as “indirect discrimination” in legal systems outside the U.S. Disparate impact is a judicially created theory that did not appear in the words of Title VII. In its landmark 1971 decision of *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*, the Supreme Court read disparate impact into the statute. The Court concluded that this theory met the “objective of Congress...to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.” Under disparate impact theory, neutrally stated employment practices that, in application, have a disproportionately negative effect on a statutorily protected group are unlawful, unless the employer can prove that the practice is job-related and a business necessity.

Like pattern or practice cases, disparate impact theory is essential for addressing the systemic nature of discrimination. Further, similar to pattern or practice cases, disparate impact theory is based primarily on statistical evidence. Disparate impact, though, is potentially a more revolutionary method of analysis because the evidence is not used to infer intentional discrimination. Rather, disparate impact is concerned with the effect of employer practices that exclude protected groups, regardless of intent. In the words of the Supreme Court, “good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.” Eliminating the relevance of intent moves the analysis closer to the original Title VII statutory language of causation. It also moves closer to a goal of equality of results rather than simply equal opportunity.

Under disparate impact theory, the plaintiff must prove that an employment practice, “neutral on its face,” has a disproportionately negative impact on a statutorily protected group. In some cases, like *Griggs*, the effects are so great that the disproportionate impact is obvious. In less clear cases, most courts have applied a “rule of thumb” developed by the EEOC to determine whether the plaintiff’s group has at least an 80 percent success rate of the

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137 401 U.S. 424 (1971). This was the Supreme Court’s second decision interpreting Title VII. Michael Selmi, *Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?* 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 707-16 (2006) (discussing the lower court decisions, legal scholarship, and EEOC positions that influenced the *Griggs* Court).


139 The Court held that employment practices “fair in form, but discriminatory in operation,” violated Title VII. *Id.* at 431. Here, the “neutral” requirements of a high school degree and passing the two written tests froze the status quo of Duke Power’s prior race discrimination.


141 *Id.* at 432.

142 See Krieger and Fiske, supra note 21, at 1038.
comparison group. For example, in a Title VII sex discrimination case, if women’s success rate on a required test is lower than 80 percent than men’s pass rate, the courts will generally find that the employment practice has a disproportionately negative impact on women.\(^{143}\)

Next, the employer may defend by proving that the employment practice was both job-related and necessary to the business. If an employer carries its burden of proof, the plaintiff may rebut by demonstrating that there is an alternative practice that would fulfill the employer’s business needs without the negative impact on the protected group.\(^{144}\) Disparate impact theory and this allocation of proof were explicitly included in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.\(^{145}\)

Disparate impact theory opens a wide range of employment practices to judicial scrutiny, from objective requirements of educational degrees and written or physical tests to subjective hiring criteria determined through interviews. Its potential has not been realized, however, due to limited legislative and judicial interpretations.

### A. Problems of Proving Disparate Impact Claims

*Griggs* raised expectations for the potential of disparate impact claims, followed by a Supreme Court decision setting a high bar for the employer’s burden of proof of job relatedness. In *Albemarle v. Moody*,\(^{146}\) the Court described the employer’s burden as including three important elements. First, the employer must use objectively recognized methods to validate a discriminatory test, which often requires a professional job evaluation study. Secondly, this study must evaluate the actual duties that are important to the job at issue. Third, the employer must show that success on the test is correlated with success in performing these job duties.\(^{147}\)

Later judicial decisions dashed the hope created by these early cases, as the Supreme Court steadily raised the evidentiary burden on the plaintiff, while lowering it on the defense. While expanding disparate impact theory to apply to subjective employment practices, such as interviews,\(^{148}\) the Court also made it more difficult to prove a *prima facie* case. In *Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio*,\(^{149}\) the Court held that plaintiffs must identify “the specific employment practice that is challenged” and prove that it caused a disparate impact on a protected group.”\(^{150}\) Further, the Court held that the employer has only a burden of production of a “business justification.”\(^{151}\) This decision was a primary reason for enacting the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which reinstated the employer’s burden to prove under Title VII, by a preponderance of the evidence, both the job relatedness and business necessity of a challenged practice.\(^{152}\) Under the 1991 Act, the plaintiff can avoid the requirement to identify a specific employment practice with a disproportionate impact by proving that “the elements

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143 See [PLAYER](#), supra note 8, at 110-18; [EEOC Guidelines](#), 29 CFR 1607.3D.


145 [42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(c)](#).

146 [422 U.S. 405 (1975)](#).

147 Id. at 431. The [EEOC Guidelines](#) provide detailed descriptions of the methods for proving job relatedness through professional validation studies. See 29 CFR Secs. 1607.5(b)(3)(4), which are discussed in [Albemarle](#), 422 U.S. at 432-33, n.30.


149 [490 U.S. 642 (1989)](#).

150 Ibid. at 656, quoting [Watson](#), 487 U.S. at 994.

151 [Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659](#).

152 [42 USC 2000e(k)(1)(B)(i)](#).
of [an employer’s] decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis. 153

Although the CRA of 1991 restored the pre- Wards Cove interpretation of disparate impact, plaintiffs continue to face an uphill battle. 154  Michael Selmi’s recent study demonstrates its steady decline. Analyzing 130 federal circuit court of appeals and 171 federal district court disparate impact cases in six years between 1983 and 2002, Selmi finds a low success rate for plaintiffs, who won only 19.2 percent of their cases in the appellate courts and only 25.1 percent of their cases in the district courts. 155  As Selmi notes, even these low success rates may be too high, as they include remands and plaintiffs survivals of employer summary judgment motions. 156 These rates are even lower than the 35 percent success rate for plaintiffs, overall, in employment discrimination cases in federal court. In contrast, defendants won 59 percent of the time in appellate courts’ decisions affirming the trial courts’ grant of summary judgment motions. 157

Selmi concludes that the more stringent proof requirements for plaintiffs, combined with the greater willingness of courts to defer to employer business necessity defenses, have increased the difficulty of winning disparate impact cases. 158 His study also reports “the waning importance of disparate impact theory after the Civil Rights Act of 1991,” demonstrated by the existence of fewer than twelve cases with “any substantial doctrinal discussion.” 159 Unlike advocates and commentators calling for broadened use of disparate impact theory, Selmi proposes renewed attention to using statistical evidence to bring pattern or practice disparate treatment cases. 160 Legal scholar Elaine Shoben, on the other hand, calls for more active litigation under disparate impact theory. 161 In her view, disparate impact is “underutilized” due to the unavailability of compensatory or punitive damages for disparate impact claims, the difficulty of bringing class-based lawsuits, and employer replacement of clearly discriminatory selection devices with ones that are less easily proven to have a disproportionately negative impact on protected groups. 162

B. The Limited Scope of Disparate Impact Claims

The potential of disparate impact theory to achieve greater substantive equality has been best realized in cases of clearly defined objective requirements, such as height and weight requirements that have a negative impact on women. 163 Women plaintiffs have faced an

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153 Id.
155 Selmi, supra note 137, at 735-38.
156 Id. at 738.
157 Id. at 738-39.
158 Id. at 742-44.
159 Selmi, supra note 112, at 735.
160 Id. at 779-80.
162 Id. at 977-99.
163 See e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-32 (1977) (minimum 5’2” height and 120 pound weight requirements for state prison guard positions had a disproportionately negative impact on women. The qualification of height and weight was neither job related nor a business necessity to determine applicants’ strength, which could be measured directly.)
uphill battle, though, in challenging physical ability tests for jobs such as firefighter or police officer.\footnote{See, Berkman v. City of New York, 536 F.Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Berkman v. City of New York, 705 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1982) (women plaintiffs won a class action suit against the city of New York, challenging the physical test portion of the exam for entry level firefighter positions. In a second disparate impact claim challenging the new firefighter physical exam, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals deferred to the city’s validation of business need argument for the test as administered.).} Feminist legal scholars have been particularly interested in the potential of disparate impact theory to challenge the discriminatory effects on women of such “normal” practices as leave policies, work day scheduling, and job evaluation systems.\footnote{See Selmi, supra note 137, at 704-05, n.12 (discussing the broad range of issues proposed for disparate impact analysis); Lieberwitz, supra note 140.} The courts, however, have not interpreted disparate impact doctrine to apply to such accepted practices as inflexible work schedules, long work days, or extensive travel,\footnote{Id. at 750.} which disadvantage women due to their gender role as primary caretakers in the family.\footnote{See Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 BOSTON U. L. REV. 55 (1979).} This burden has a particularly negative impact on women in the United States, given the absence of publicly funded childcare programs. Further, the federal Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) does not provide significant relief, as it provides the right to only unpaid leave of twelve weeks per year for childbirth or serious illness of immediate family members. The FMLA covers only employers with at least 50 employees.\footnote{29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654.} The EEOC’s recently issued a guidance on disparate treatment of employees – particularly women – with caregiving responsibilities.\footnote{EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities (2007), available at, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html} The EEOC recognized the problem of “family responsibility discrimination” due to negative attitudes and stereotypes about mothers in the workplace.\footnote{Id. at n.36.} However, the EEOC guidance did not address disparate impact of employer policies that negatively affect women with children.\footnote{42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).}

Two categories of employment practices are virtually off limits to disparate impact challenges, despite their negative impact on women and minorities. Plaintiffs can bring Title VII challenges to seniority systems only by proving that they were created with the intent to discriminate.\footnote{See, Symposium, The Gender Gap in Compensation: The Theory of Comparable Worth as a Remedy for Discrimination, 82 GEO. L. J. 139 (1993).} The second category consists of Title VII challenges to compensation systems. The federal courts have rejected Title VII “pay equity” or “comparable worth” claims, which would go beyond the formal equality of the Equal Pay Act.\footnote{See, e.g., AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985); American Nurses Ass’n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986). Even with the Equal Pay Act, women currently earn 77 percent of the rate of pay for men. Amy Joyce, Wal-Mart Suit May Force Wider Look at Pay Gap Between Sexes, WASH. POST, Jun. 24, 2004, sec. E, at 1.} A comparable worth claim is based on gender or racial disparities resulting from the use of job evaluation systems that place a higher value on occupations held predominately by white men.\footnote{See, Symposium, The Gender Gap in Compensation: The Theory of Comparable Worth as a Remedy for Discrimination, 82 GEO. L. J. 139 (1993).} For sex-based wage discrimination claims under Title VII, it is unclear whether disparate impact theory even applies. Under the “Bennett Amendment” to Title VII, employers may raise the
Equal Pay Act defense in such claims that argue the pay difference was based on “a factor other than sex.” This defense may restrict sex-based wage discrimination theory to disparate treatment.  

With the growth in immigration in the U.S. and the increased political attention, in particular, to immigrants from non-English speaking countries, employer “English-only” rules have become more prevalent. The EEOC has taken the position that “a rule requiring employees to speak only English at all times in the workplace is a burdensome term and condition of employment,” but that an employer might be able to prove business necessity for a rule requiring only English to be spoken some of the time. Plaintiffs bringing disparate impact claims based on English-only rules have had difficulty winning their cases.

VIII. Further Legal Issues of Substantive Equality

A. Affirmative Action

Affirmative action plans also have significant potential for achieving substantive equality, as positive measures for increasing the inclusion of women and minorities in occupations in which they are under-represented. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII provides only partial progress toward this goal. The Court has held that employers may voluntarily adopt temporary affirmative action plans that seek to correct a “manifest imbalance” in the representation of women and minorities, but the plans must not “unduly trammel” the rights of white men by excluding them from consideration for the jobs in question. The courts will not mandate that an employer adopt an affirmative action plan, given the Title VII prohibition of required preferential treatment on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or religion. Voluntary affirmative action plans adopted by public employers are particularly difficult to justify under the Supreme Court’s constitutional equal protection strict scrutiny standard that requires the state or federal employer to prove that the plan is a narrowly tailored means to fulfill a compelling state interest of remedying prior discrimination.

B. Mandatory Pre-Employment Arbitration Agreements

In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of mandatory pre-employment agreements to arbitrate employment-related disputes in non-union

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175 See Shoben, supra note 161, at 599, citing, Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696 (1st Cir. 1999).
176 EEOC, Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a)(b) (2006), available at, http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jul20061500/edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2006/julqtr/29cfr1606.7.htm English-only rules may also be challenged under disparate treatment, depending on the evidence of intentional discrimination.
180 City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989). The Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny standard to state action based on racial classifications, but a lower intermediate standard for sex-based classifications.
workplaces. The broad agreement in that case provided that the employee will submit to final and binding arbitration all employment-related disputes arising under statutory or common law in all jurisdictions, including breaches of contract, torts, and anti-discrimination laws such as Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA.\textsuperscript{182} Under such an agreement, therefore, the employee waives, as a condition of employment, his right to bring employment disputes in court.\textsuperscript{183} In \textit{EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.},\textsuperscript{184} however, the Supreme Court held that the EEOC has independent government enforcement power to sue an employer for violations of the ADA, even if an employee has agreed to resolve all employment-related disputes through private arbitration. The EEOC could pursue full remedies against the employer, including enjoining the employer from violating the ADA, as well as reinstatement, backpay, and damages for the individual employees. The EEOC, though, files suit in less than one percent of the employment discrimination charges filed with the EEOC each year.\textsuperscript{185}

In \textit{Circuit City}, the Court sang the praises of private arbitration as an “alternative dispute procedure[ ] adopted by many of the Nation’s employers” that could enforce statutory rights equivalent to a judicial forum.\textsuperscript{186} With the greater use of mandatory arbitration agreements, courts have policed them to ensure due process, including the employee’s right to participate in choosing the arbitrator, to have an attorney, and to have a full hearing where the arbitrator can award full remedies.\textsuperscript{187} Some courts also require that the employer pay the arbitrator’s fee.\textsuperscript{188} Faced with these developments, some employers have abandoned mandatory arbitration agreements, opting instead to require employees to agree to waive their right to a jury trial.\textsuperscript{189}

\section*{IX. The ADEA and the ADA: Formal Equality or Substantive Equality?}

Given the central role of Title VII in U.S. employment discrimination law, judicial interpretation of subsequent legislation has relied heavily on Title VII theories of discrimination. As importantly, the case law has distinguished the ADEA and the ADA from Title VII, either because of explicit statutory differences or based on judicial interpretations of distinctive legislative goals of the statutes.

\textsuperscript{182} 532 U.S. at 109-10. The Court interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. Secs. 1-16, a 1925 federal statute compelling judicial enforcement of written arbitration agreements. Although the FAA was enacted to overcome judicial hostility to enforcing arbitration agreements in commercial cases, the Court held that the FAA also covers employment contracts, except for transportation workers.

\textsuperscript{183} See also, \textit{Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.}, 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (enforcing a mandatory arbitration agreement in the securities industry, while avoiding the need to interpret the FAA’s exclusion provision, due to the unusual facts of the case).

\textsuperscript{184} 534 U.S. 279 (2002).

\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Id.} at n.7.

\textsuperscript{186} 532 U.S. at 123-24.


\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Id.} at 874-75. See \textit{Cole v. Burns Int’l Security Services}, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

\textsuperscript{189} See \textit{Dianne LaRocca, The Bench Trial: A More Beneficial Alternative to Arbitration of Title VII Claims}, 80 \textit{CHI.-KENT L. REV.} 933, 945-50 (2005); Chester S. Chuang, \textit{Assigning the Burden of Proof in Contractual Jury Waiver Challenges: How Valuable is Your Right to a Jury Trial?}, \textit{EMP. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’y J.} 10 (2006): 211-23. The few courts that have examined the validity of such pre-dispute jury waivers have evaluated whether they were entered with “knowing and voluntary consent.”
A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act

A significant difference between the ADEA and Title VII concerns the definition of protected groups. Under Title VII, individuals may bring claims regardless of whether they are in a group that has historically been subject to discrimination. Thus, men as well as women, whites as well as Blacks or other racial groups, and individuals of any national origin or religion are protected under Title VII. Congress, the Supreme Court has held, intended to achieve equality through a society that is “blind” to race, sex, or other Title VII category. The ADEA, in contrast, explicitly limits the protection against age discrimination to employees who are aged 40 or older.

Further, in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, the Supreme Court clarified that the ADEA only prohibits discrimination against older workers, but not age discrimination that favors older workers. The Court has also held that the prohibition on age discrimination is evidenced by the fact that a plaintiff was replaced by a “substantially younger” individual, even if the replacement is aged 40 or older.

Disparate treatment theory under the ADEA has been interpreted similarly to Title VII, defining intentional discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas steps of analysis in “pretext” cases and using the Price Waterhouse approach in mixed motives cases. Conversely, judicial interpretations of the ADEA have been applied to Title VII cases. Notably, the Supreme Court first interpreted the BFOQ in an ADEA case. More recently, the Supreme Court limited an employer’s ability to defend against an ADEA disparate treatment claim by using evidence the employer acquired after discharging the employee. The enactment of the CRA of 1991, however, may have opened significant gaps between Title VII and the ADEA. The CRA of 1991 did not extend to the ADEA important amendments made to Title VII, including imposing liability in mixed motive cases after the plaintiff successfully proves a prima facie case; the defendant’s affirmative defense goes only to remedies. Thus, it is unclear whether all lower federal courts will apply the Supreme Court’s Desert Palace decision, interpreting the 1991 CRA, to the ADEA. This issue will affect the federal courts’ use of circumstantial and direct evidence in disparate treatment cases. The 1991 CRA also creates a right to jury trials and additional damage remedies in intentional discrimination cases under Title VII and the ADA. However, Congress had already amended

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191 29 U.S.C. Sec. 623. The ADEA covers public and private employers. The Supreme Court has held, however, that state employers are immune from private ADEA damage claims, under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The EEOC may bring ADEA claims for injunctive relief against state employers. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
193 540 U.S. at 590-92.
194 O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996) (56 year old plaintiff was replaced by a 40 year old person).
195 See cases discussed in BELTON, et al., supra note 35, at 669-70.
196 Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 US 400 (1985). Mandatory retirement is now prohibited under the ADEA, unless the employer can prove a BFOQ. Exceptions for state and local government retirement age for police and firefighters were reinstated by legislation in 1996. See BELTON, et al., supra note 24, at 689.
198 See Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004) (applying Desert Palace in an ADEA case and discussing other federal courts’ positions on the issue).
the ADEA to provide the right to a jury trial. Further, the ADEA provides for compensatory damages, as well as liquidated damages in cases of willful violations.

Another important difference concerns disparate impact theory. It was not until 2005, in *Smith v. City of Jackson*, that the Supreme Court extended the disparate impact theory to the ADEA. An earlier decision, in *Hazen Paper v. Biggins*, had cast doubt on whether the Court would apply Griggs to the ADEA. In *Smith v. City of Jackson*, the municipal employer issued a wage increase to all police officers and dispatchers to bring their salaries up to the regional average of police salaries. Police officers and dispatchers older than 40 and with greater seniority in the department alleged that the city’s salary increase plan had a disproportionately negative impact on the basis of age. The wage increases for police officers with less than five years seniority were proportionally larger than for officers with greater seniority. The Supreme Court held that the disparate impact theory does apply to the ADEA, but that the scope of the theory’s application is narrower than under Title VII, given the provision in Section 4(f)(1) of the ADEA permitting any “otherwise prohibited” action “where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age” (RFOA). Under this defense, the City of Jackson had acted lawfully, as the wage increase was designed to create parity with the average regional salary, which was a reasonable goal other than age, even though older employees may have received a relatively lower pay increase. Thus, in contrast to the “business necessity” defense under Title VII, the ADEA defense to disparate impact requires proof only that the employer’s action was reasonable.

Yet another difference in disparate impact theory under the ADEA concerns the allocation of burdens of proof. The 1991 CRA was passed, in part, to legislatively overrule the Supreme Court’s *Wards Cove* decision, which had held that the employer had only a burden of production in disparate impact cases. Under Title VII, as amended, the employer has the burden of persuasion of job relatedness and business necessity. Under the ADEA, the employer only has a burden of production of a RFOA.

An employer violates the ADEA by providing lower benefits to older workers, unless the employer can fulfill an “equal cost” defense. The employer must prove that the costs of the benefit increase with age, such as the costs of life insurance, health insurance, and long-term disability benefits; that the benefit is part of a *bona fide* employee benefit plan that requires the lower benefits; that the employer’s payment or cost on behalf of an older worker is no less than for a younger worker; and that the benefit levels for older workers are reduced only as necessary to equalize the cost for older and younger workers. Although the ADEA prohibits an employer from imposing a mandatory retirement age, the employer may offer

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199 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2).
201 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
203 544 U.S. at 231.
204 Id.
206 544 U.S. at 242-43.
207 Id. at 243. Further, apart from the RFOA defense, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ *prima facie* case had not been adequately supported, as the plaintiffs’ challenge to the salary increase was not directed at a specific employment practice.
208 Id. at 267(O’Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, concurring).
Employment Discrimination Law in the United States: On the Road to Equality?

early retirement incentive plans (ERIs), as long as the ERI is voluntary and provides equal ERI benefits to older employees as it does to similarly situated younger employees.\textsuperscript{210} The ERI can provide lower benefits to older employees if the employer can meet the equal cost defense or another justification for lower benefits.\textsuperscript{211}

B. The Americans with Disabilities Act

The ADA covers public and private employers, prohibiting “discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability...in regard to” employment conditions, including job applications, hiring, promotion, discharge, and compensation.\textsuperscript{212} In \textit{Raytheon Company v. Hernandez},\textsuperscript{213} the Court reiterated the viability of both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories under the ADA, while also emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between the elements required to prove each theory.

The ADA defines a “qualified individual with a disability” as “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”\textsuperscript{214} The scope of discrimination under the ADA includes an employer’s failure to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of a qualified...applicant or employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business...”\textsuperscript{215} In setting “qualification standards” for a job, an employer “may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”\textsuperscript{216}

Federal law prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of disability has not lived up to its promise of changing the workplace to accommodate the needs of individuals with disabilities. In interpreting key ADA provisions, the Supreme Court has applied a theory of formal equality in a particularly wooden manner. The Court has defined an “individual with a disability” so narrowly as to exclude large groups of disabled persons from statutory coverage. In several cases, the Court held that individuals whose medication or corrective devices mitigate their physical impairment may be excluded from the definition of individuals with a disability.\textsuperscript{217} A disabled person may be denied a job if he/she is unable to fulfill its


\textsuperscript{211} Id.

\textsuperscript{212} 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA was preceded by the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797(b), which prohibits disability-based discrimination by the federal government (in Section 501), federal contractors (Section 503), and entities receiving federal funds (Section 504). Sections 501 and 503 require federal agencies and federal contractors to develop affirmative action plans to increase employment of individuals with disabilities. The Supreme Court has held that the states are immune, under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, from private suits for money damages brought by state employees under the ADA. The EEOC may bring ADA claims for injunctive relief against state employers. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).

\textsuperscript{213} 540 U.S. 44 (2003).

\textsuperscript{214} 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).

\textsuperscript{215} 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1), (3), (5).

\textsuperscript{216} 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).

essential requirements. However, a disabled individual who is able to perform the job due to medication or other corrective devices may be found not disabled enough to be protected under the ADA.

The Supreme Court has also defined the term “disability” in a way that creates problems for plaintiffs. The ADA defines a “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual,” or as having “a record of” or “being regarded as having” such an impairment.\(^\text{218}\) EEOC regulations define “major life activities” to include activities “such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, breathing, learning and working.”\(^\text{219}\) In *Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams*,\(^\text{220}\) the lower court had found that plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis substantially limited her performance of manual tasks on the job. The Court held, though, that the limits on manual tasks must “prevent[ ] or severely restrict[ ] the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives,” such as brushing her teeth and doing laundry. Further, the impact of the impairment must be “permanent or long-term.”\(^\text{221}\)

The Court, in *Toyota*, did not define other major life activities, such as lifting or working. Significantly, the Court has yet to hold that “working” is a major life activity under the ADA. In an earlier case, *Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.*, the Court had held that, assuming that “working” is a major life activity, “a claimant would be required to show an inability to work in a ‘broad range of jobs,’ rather than a specific job.”\(^\text{222}\)

The greatest potential for implementing a model of substantive equality is found in the ADA’s requirement that employers provide reasonable accommodations to enable individuals with disabilities to meet job requirements. An employer must make a reasonable and good faith effort to find an appropriate accommodation, such as a job reassignment or a job modification. This process contemplates an interactive process between the employer and employee.\(^\text{223}\) The employer has the burden of proving that the accommodation would be an “undue hardship,” which is defined as an action requiring “significant difficulty or expense.”\(^\text{224}\) An employer is not required, however, to accommodate a disability by eliminating an essential function of the position or by reallocating essential functions to other workers.\(^\text{225}\)

In *US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett*,\(^\text{226}\) the Supreme Court held that seniority systems generally override a disabled employee’s claim for “reasonable accommodation,” such as job assignments.\(^\text{227}\) This holding applies to seniority systems that are part of an enforceable collective bargaining agreement in a unionized workplace, as well as to seniority systems that are unilaterally adopted and controlled by non-union employers, as in *US Airways*. Where a

\(^{218}\) 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (B) (C).

\(^{219}\) 29 CFR 1630.2(I).

\(^{220}\) 534 U.S. 184 (2002).

\(^{221}\) Id. at 198.


\(^{223}\) See, EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (including discussions of federal court decisions), available at, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html#N_16

\(^{224}\) Id.

\(^{225}\) Id.


\(^{227}\) When plaintiff’s mailroom job became open to bidding by more senior employees, the employer refused plaintiff’s request to retain the job, as an exception to the seniority rules, in order to accommodate his disability.
workplace seniority system exists, the plaintiff may show that the requested accommodation is “reasonable” by proving “special circumstances,” such as an employer’s regular practice of unilaterally changing the seniority system.

An employer is prohibited from providing unequal benefits to employees based on their disability, unless the employer can prove that it has a bona fide benefit plan and that the disability-based distinction in the plan is “not a subterfuge to evade the purposes” of the ADA.228 For example, an employer could rely on the increased insurance cost of coverage related to a particular disability based on legitimate actuarial data, although the employer must also show its equal treatment of other disabilities or conditions.229

X. Employees Left Out in the Cold: The Contingent Workforce

The term “contingent employee” has been used to identify a variety of employment arrangements, including part-time employees, temporary employees, and employees hired as independent contractors.230 Although there is no agreed upon definition of the scope of employees within the category of contingent employees, there is consensus that the rate of contingent employment increased dramatically since the 1990’s.231 Given the continued force of the employment at will doctrine in the U.S., most employees are vulnerable to being discharged at any moment. Therefore, the term “contingent employee” signifies an even greater degree of employment instability than the “regular” workforce. Further, contingent employees often have lower wage rates and lack benefits given to regular employees.232 The growth in the temporary workforce has taken place most significantly through contracts between a “user” employer and a third party temporary employment agency (TEA) that acts as the “supplier” of temporary employees.

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229 Id.


through the TEA.\textsuperscript{233} In addition creating a “second tier” of wages and benefits for temporary employees,\textsuperscript{234} the user employer also shifts the costs of employer statutory obligations, such as paying workers’ compensation premiums, to the TEA as the direct employer.\textsuperscript{235} Similarly, employers may hire employees as independent contractors to save costs of paying benefits and of fulfilling statutory obligations such as paying workers’ compensation premiums, payroll taxes, or Fair Labor Standards Act overtime premiums.\textsuperscript{236}

The growth of the contingent workforce has affected a broad spectrum of employees, ranging from low-wage workers to higher-paid professional and technical employees.\textsuperscript{237} Generally, stratifications exist along gender and racial lines, with women and minorities heavily represented in the temporary employee category and white men represented more predominant in the independent contractor category.\textsuperscript{238} There are some exceptions. Although independent contractor status has gained the most recent attention in the high technology industry, employers have also attempted to classify low-wage workers as independent contractors. One well-publicized example comes from the poultry processing industry, with Perdue Farms’ denial of overtime pay to “chicken catchers,” arguing that they were exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act as independent contractors. In February 2000, a federal district court rejected Perdue’s argument and held that the chicken catchers and their crew leaders came within the common law definition of employees, given Perdue’s control over their work.\textsuperscript{239} Other trends in labeling low-wage employees as independent contractors include the increase in home work, performed primarily by women paid on an hourly or piece-rate basis.\textsuperscript{240}

The growth of the contingent workforce can also be analyzed as an employer union-avoidance tactic. Independent contractors are excluded from the protection of the NLRA. Although temporary employees are covered by the NLRA, unionization is difficult, given the multiple employment relationships and the inherent instability of the user employer’s contract with the TEA.\textsuperscript{241} Another roadblock that particularly affects organizing efforts immigrant workers, who often have low-wage precarious employment, is the Supreme Court’s recent decision holding that undocumented workers are ineligible for awards of remedies under the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[233] Fahlbeck, supra note 231, at 524, stating that “the single biggest - or one of the biggest - employer in many countries in terms of the number of employees is the leading temporary work agency, Manpower. Significant is also that the number of temporary work firms has mushroomed in recent years.”
\item[235] The Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO released a report alleging that Labor Ready, a major temporary employment agency, has been “systemically misclassifying” employees’ work to lower workers’ compensation premiums. See, “Temporary Agencies: Union Report Asks Whether Labor Ready Is Purposely Misclassifying Temp Workers,” ISSN 1521-4680, Vol. 11, No. 22, p. 583 (Nov. 6, 2000).
\item[236] Childs, supra note 232, at n.124.
\item[237] Id. at n. 141; Fahlbeck, supra note 231, at 523, 537.
\item[239] See Elizabeth Walpole-Hofmeister, Court Finds Chicken Catchers Are Employees Covered by FLSA for Overtime, 41 DAILY LAB. REP. A-5 (Mar. 1, 2000); de Haas, supra note 191, at 490-493 (discussing cases from other industries). In May 2001, Perdue Farms entered into a $2.4 million settlement of the suit, which covered 100 chicken catchers at three Perdue poultry processing plants. Elizabeth Walpole-Hofmeister, FLSA: Perdue Farms Settles Overtime Suit, Will Pay Chicken Catchers $1.7 Million, 92 DAILY LAB. REP. A-1 (May 11, 2001).
\item[240] Childs, supra note 232, at 414-415.
\item[241] Id. at 416, 418-420 (employers use leased workers to undermine the position of unionized employees).
\end{footnotes}
Although undocumented workers are “employees” with rights to unionize, their immigration status makes them ineligible for reinstatement or back pay if the employer discriminates against them for their union activities.  

The U.S. lacks effective regulations of contingent employment. Thus far, such questions have been addressed primarily through administrative and judicial interpretations of existing legislation, such as decisions defining whether employees are actually independent contractors or fit a common law definition of employee. Contingent employees, with the exception of independent contractors, are protected under anti-discrimination laws. The U.S., however, lags far behind other countries that have legislative protections of contingent employees. Various countries are at different starting points in creating restrictions on contingent employment, with a spectrum including: prohibitions on temporary employment beyond a defined time period; requirements of equal wages and benefits to be paid to regular employees and contingent employees performing similar work; regulating both the supplier and user employers to ensure health and safety protections and payment of social security contributions; and limits on contract labor that undermines the status and conditions of unionized employees. While providing protections, such legislation does accept the legitimacy of the triangular employment relationship.

Given the lack of protective legislation for contingent employees, unionization and collective bargaining are especially important as a means to resist employer tactics to increase contingent work. For example, the Service Employees International Union’s (SEIU), in its Justice for Janitors organizational campaign, targeted the creation of more full-time jobs, with

243 Id.
244 See e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996), modified en banc, Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 899 (1998), enf’d by mandamus, Vizcaino v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 173 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1999) The federal circuit court held that Microsoft’s “permatemps,” hired in technical employee positions, met a “common law” definition of employee in relation to Microsoft and were, therefore, entitled to a stock purchase plan offered to the regular Microsoft employees. Microsoft agreed to a $96.9 million settlement agreement in this litigation, which was been given approval by a federal district court. See, Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002); Mark Cutler, “Microsoft to Pay $97 Million to Settle Temporary Workers’ Class Action Lawsuits,” 240 Daily Labor Report AA-1 (Dec. 13, 2000).
245 See Tarantolo, supra note 231, at 174 (discussing the fact that “contingent workers have the demographic characteristics of those who most need antidiscrimination protection,” and the exclusion of independent contractors from antidiscrimination statutes, with the exception of 42 U.S.C. § 1981); EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Application of EEO Laws to Contingent Workers Placed by Temporary Employment Agencies and Other Staffing Firms, available at, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/conting.html
246 Raday, supra note 232, at 423 (citing legislation in the Philippines, India, Malaysia, Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, France, Germany, and Italy regarding the use of temporary labor-only contracting).
247 Id. at 424-425 (citing legislation in Belgium, France, Austria, Denmark, Portugal, Mexico, Italy, and the Netherlands).
249 See, Raday, supra note 232, at 425-426 (citing legislation and interpretation of legislation in the United States, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Finland, and Sweden).
250 See, Vosko, supra note 230, at 70-73; Raday, supra note 232, at 420-422 (both sources criticizing the ILO’s change in policy, shifting from a policy against labor-only contracts to the 1997 adoption of Convention 181, the “Private Employment Agencies Convention,” which accepts the role of employment agencies. Convention 181 provides some protections of employees, but does not have a provision for equal treatment of the agency employees and the user’s regular employees doing similar work. The ILO Draft Convention on Contract Labor does include such an equality provision, but the Draft Convention excludes private employment agency employees.).
corresponding benefits, as one of its current goals in collective bargaining.\textsuperscript{251} In 1999, the SEIU won a union organizational campaign among 75,000 home health care workers in Los Angeles County.\textsuperscript{252} The home health care workers would have been virtually impossible to organize if the workers, who were usually paid directly by the State, were defined as independent contractors. SEIU became actively involved in changing California state legislation to make it possible for the workers to organize. This legislative campaign resulted in a California statute requiring counties to designate an employer of record, such as a public authority or a contracting provider agency, for home health care employees working in the state’s program.\textsuperscript{253} Following their win in federal district court, the “chicken catchers” who brought the overtime pay lawsuit against Perdue Farms unionized in all three poultry processing plants involved in the litigation.\textsuperscript{254}

It is particularly difficult to unionize temporary employees hired by a “user employer” through a temporary employment agency (TEA). The NLRB has decided that unions must obtain the consent of the user employer and TEA to a mixed bargaining unit of temporary employees (supplied by a TEA) and regular employees of a business (the “user employer”). If the user employer and TEA refuse to consent to a mixed bargaining unit, the union is left to organize the temporary employees in a separate unit, with the TEA as the employer.\textsuperscript{255} These options, however, fail to recognize the economic realities of the user employer’s control over the temporary employees and the common interests of the temporary and regular employees.

\section*{XI. Conclusion}

U.S. antidiscrimination law is a complex body of statutes, which becomes increasingly vast and complicated with each legislative amendment and with ongoing judicial interpretations. From the standpoint of “formal equality,” this body of law has contributed to the goal of inclusion of women and minorities in the workplace. As this paper has discussed, however, there is still much ground to cover to achieve “substantive equality.” As has always been the case, the law evolves and responds to social movements – like the Civil Rights Movement that won this legislation. And so, in the future, social movements will continue to hold a central place in the ongoing struggle for equality.


\bibitem{252} Los Angeles Home Care Workers Vote to Organize by Huge Majority, 39 \textit{DAILY LAB. REP.} A-4 (Mar. 1, 1999).


\bibitem{254} Walpole-Hofmeister, \textit{supra} note 239.