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CONTENTS

General Survey

- ▶ White Paper on National Life
- ▶ A New 6-year Economic Program Recommended

Working Conditions and the Labor Market

- ▶ Ministry of Labour Bares 1995 Report on Foreign Workers

Labor-Management Relations

- ▶ 1996 Shunto-Rengo Seeks 13,000yen Wage-Hike

International Relations

- ▶ EU-Japan Symposium Held

Public Policy

- ▶ Add 12 New Categories to List of Jobs, Panel Says

Special Topic

- ▶ Company Severance Payment

Statistical Aspects

- ▶ Recent Labor Economy Indices
- ▶ No. of Establishments Employing Foreigners and of Foreign Workers by Industrial Classification and Size of Establishment

General Survey

White Paper on National Life

A 1995 white paper on national life, released recently by the Economic Planning Agency, reflects on the 50-year period following World War II. The white paper reviews the economy and people's attitudes toward life and tries to clarify, from the standpoint of changes in the workplace and family life, why many people seem not to feel affluence despite the nation's economic success. The white paper, dubbed "Autobiography of the 50 Postwar Years," first points out that even though Japan has enjoyed remarkable economic growth in the postwar period many people remain less satisfied with their life than people in other countries. Postwar economic growth has allowed Japan to produce about 20 percent of the world's gross domestic product, and dollar-based per capita national income at the highest level among major industrialized countries. According to the Prime Minister's Office's Poll on National Life, since 1974 following the first oil-supply crunch, the percentage of those who replied that "their standard of living has improved over the preceding year" has dropped below that of those who answered that "their living conditions have deteriorated as compared with last year." Behind this lie long working hours, unsatisfactory improvement in social infrastructure, poor housing conditions and the big domestic-foreign price gap. In addition, the nation's social systems do not match the people's desired standards, the white paper points out.

Take the working environment, for example. "Japanese-style employment practices," as typified by long-term employment and the seniority-based pay scheme, which permeated Japan in the postwar high-growth period, now need to be overhauled amidst excess white-collar workers that have arisen since Japan has been faced with low growth in recent years. On the other hand, attitudes of workers are undergoing changes. The desire to "work for a good company" is fading among the young, while that of giving full play to special skills and knowledge is growing among those in their 20s. In view of such emerging attitudes towards work, the white paper notes the necessity of reviewing the current job-placement system and the need to institute a system under which job change does not work against workers.

Furthermore, family life and functions of the family have undergone dramatic change in the 50 postwar years. Women are making inroads into society at an accelerating speed based upon their higher educational attainment, changing social awareness and enforcement in 1986 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law. Responding to these changes in social conditions, functions of the "family" unit, such functions as providing an economic base, childbearing and childcare and care of elderly parents will become less significant. On the other hand, the functions of providing a place for rest and comfort will become more

important, the white paper points out.

■ In the ongoing diversification of working life and family life, we will henceforth be in an era in which individuals choose a variety of different ways of living based on their own values, and it will be necessary to build a social system which responds adequately to this, the white paper proposes.

A New 6-Year Economic Program Recommended

On November 29, 1995, the Economic Council, an advisory panel to the prime minister, headed by Mr. Gaishi Hiraiwa, presented recommendations to the prime minister for a 6-Year Economic Plan, titled "the Economic and Social Plan for Structural Reform-A Vital Economy and Stable Life." In the recommendation, which incorporates policies to be implemented in the period of fiscal 1995-2000, the Council stresses that in order to reactivate the stagnant Japanese economy following bursting of the "economic bubble," proceeding with deregulation and reform in order to move the nation toward an economic society in which corporations and individuals can be freely active while taking their own risks is an urgent priority.

In the field of labor economics, the Council calls for "consolidation of the job market to enable people to enter and leave employment with ease" through better adjustment of supply-demand conditions. The Council will study, in view of deliberations of the Central Employment Security Council, the scope and placement of jobs to be dealt with in paid job-placement agencies and the projected scope of job categories in the dispatched worker industry.

Furthermore, the Council calls for expansion and strengthening of the Business Career System as well as overhaul of when employees are hired. The intent is to assist those middle-aged and older white-collar workers who are the target of "corporate restructuring" and also to assist new school graduates and young persons who have a hard time finding work.

The Council also reports on the effects of economic structure reform on the labor market in a supplement to the Plan. In the document, it presents 7 fields which are expected to grow, computing on a trial basis the effects of job creation in these fields. If Japan implements structural reform, the Council predicts, the nation's economy will grow an average of 3 percent in real terms annually, while the jobless rate will stand at 2.75 percent and 4.21 million jobs will be created by the year 2000. Jobs will be generated in the field of information and telecommunications (600,000 jobs), in corporate support-related fields (660,000 jobs), in human resources-related fields (50,000 jobs), in medical and welfare services-related fields

(1.14 million jobs) in leisure and living-related fields (1.26 million jobs), in housing-related fields (390,000 jobs) and in environment-related businesses (110,000 jobs). On the other hand, Japan will slip into a period averaging only 1.75 percent growth per annum and 3.75 percent unemployment unless it carries out structural reform of the stagnant economy, the Council warns in its Plan.

Working Conditions and the Labor Market

Ministry of Labour Bares 1995 Report on Foreign Workers

The number of foreigners working in Japan rose by 7.6 percent or 9,831 in 1994 to total 139,861, according to a 1995 report on foreign employment released on November 22 by the Ministry of Labour. The "reporting system on foreign workers," which obligates establishments employing foreigners to report the number of workers from abroad to public employment security offices, has been implemented since 1993. According to the survey results, 14,663 establishments, up 2.7 percent over the year before, reported on foreign workers. Of the 14,663, 13,148, up 1.8 percent from a year earlier, have foreign workers on the payroll. Foreign workers employed by these establishments numbered 97,755, up 4.2 percent from the previous year. Those foreigners employed by establishments increased in the manufacturing, services and transportation and telecommunications sectors.

On the other hand, they decreased in such sectors as wholesale and retail trade and eating and drinking establishments and construction. By enterprise size, whereas the number of foreign employees grew at firms with 30-49 employees and those with 500-999 employees, it shrank as compared with the year before at small-sized firms with 29 employees or fewer and at large-sized firms with 1,000 employees or more (see below). By job type, the number of foreign workers increased in professional and technological as well as managerial jobs and also in production-process jobs. On the other hand, it dropped in sales, catering and entertainment jobs.

By geographic area, the largest number of foreign employees came from Central and South America, accounting for 60.9 percent of the total. They were followed by 18.1 percent who come from East Asia and 7.1 percent from North America. By prefecture, over half of foreign employees and an equal share of foreign workers on the payrolls are in 5 prefectures, Tokyo, Aichi, Osaka, Kanagawa and Shizuoka. The number of foreign workers rose in Aichi and Shizuoka, while it fell in Tokyo and Kanagawa.

Labor-Management Relations

1996 *Shunto*-Rengo Seeks 13,000yen Wage-Hike

In November 1995, Rengo (Japanese Trade Union Confederation) decided on its plan to set a wage-hike demand centering around 13,000yen, or 4.5 percent. More specifically, the 13,000yen, or 4.5 percent pay-raise demand incorporates a 5,700yen (2 %) regular annual pay increase plus a 7,300yen (2.5%) wage hike. The demand is down 1,000yen from a year earlier, due to stable prices.

In last year's *shunto* wage negotiations, Rengo members received a record-low wage increase due largely to the rapid rise of the yen and the January 17 Great Hanshin Earthquake. The economic climate surrounding this year's wage talks shows signs of recovery due to improving business performance in the electrical machinery sector which is experiencing a global PC boom. Labor says wage increases will stimulate personal spending which accounts for 60 percent of spending on gross domestic product and will further expand domestic demand.

Management through Nikkeiren, meanwhile, stresses that "the average salary of Japanese workers is already among the highest in the world," feeling a further wave of hikes will hurt Japan's international competitiveness. Nikkeiren insists that due to the worsening job situation, "the priority should be given to assurance of employment rather than to wage increases." Thus, this year's *shunto* will likely focus on how labor unions expect to draw a reply from management on the basis of recovery of business performance versus management's intention to seek zero wage hikes by pushing forward the issue of employment stability.

But what should more specifically be noted in considering *shunto* wage talks is the fact that the system of *shunto* negotiations per se is questioned by management.

In its May 1995 report titled "Japanese-style Management in a New Era," Nikkeiren set forth its intention to review the annual pay hike based on the length of service, which has long been considered "a sacred area," in addition to the zero wage increase which it has constantly insisted upon. The employers' organization stressed that the present automatic pay raise according to age should be shifted to pay increases with emphasis placed on ability and performance. It also proposed that the percentage of bonuses in annual wages be raised to 40 percent from the present 30 percent, as bonus payments reflect business performance. Overall, the organization is clearly taking a stance based on curbing total personnel expenses.

In some enterprises, management has actually proposed to labor that wage increases be

abolished. President Shinpei Miyamura at Mitsui Mining and Smelting Co., Ltd., a major nonferrous metal firm, said at a meeting of the labor-management council last year that he wants to abolish the wage increase. He thus proposed that the company change in future years the system of wage determination to one that allows corporate performance to be reflected in wages.

International Relations

EU-Japan Symposium Held

On December 6-7, 1995, an international symposium aimed at deepening mutual understanding of labor issues of both Japan and the European Union (EU) met in Brussels, Belgium. The 5th EU-Japan Conference-Structural Change and Employment was jointly sponsored by the EU Commission, the Japanese Ministry of Labour and the Japan Institute of Labour (JIL).

In the EU-member nations, with about 18 million jobless, unemployment is the most fundamental and underlying issue. Many jobless persons there are characteristically long-term and young. In view of this, the EU stressed the importance of job creation. Dr. Guenther Schmid, Director of the Research Department for Labour Market Policy and Employment at the Social Science Research Center Berlin(WZB), noted "The government should seek transitional forms of employment to create jobs by implementing shorter working hours which come together with wage cuts in response to business trends." Mr. Peter Coldrick, Confederation Secretary, European Trade Union Confederation, said, "We need to implement proper macroeconomic policy. Joblessness will not decline without economic growth."

Meanwhile, the unemployment rate in Japan remains at a lower level than in Western countries, even though it climbed to a record 3.2 percent and stayed at that level for the 5th straight month through October 1995. The yen's rise pushed up the nation's relative wage levels and weakened its international competitiveness. Worse still, higher prices of non-traded goods resulting from the domestic-foreign price gap have caused the shift in production facilities overseas to progress rapidly. Japan too is undergoing industrial structure change. In relation to this, the Japanese side reported on the conditions steelmakers and electric-machinery makers are currently facing. Mr. Isao Aoki, Chief of Employment Policy Section, the Ministry of Labour, remarked that "We are reaching agreement within the nation to narrow the internal-external price gap, but we don't find it desirable to take drastic action to rectify price differentials between domestic and overseas goods as it will leave large numbers of people jobless."

Summing up, Akira Takanashi, JIL's Research Director General, noted "Unemployment destroys workers' life as well as impairs their human dignity," thus stressing the need to take support measures to deal with inevitable unemployment. He also pointed out that "the issue of jobs creation involves macroeconomic policy and goes hand in hand with the new technology of the information revolution to achieve substantial fruitful results."

Public Policy

Add 12 New Categories to List of Jobs, Panel Says

The Central Employment Security Council (Head: Akira Takanashi, JIL's Research Director General), an advisory panel to the minister of labour, proposed in a report on November 18, 1995 that the Manpower Dispatching Business should be improved. In its report submitted to Minister of Labour, the Council decided to add 12 new categories of jobs eligible for dispatching, including book making, editing, announcing and nursing care. Also, it decided to allow dispatched workers to replace workers on maternity leave or leave to care for elderly relatives under certain circumstances, excluding some job categories.

The Council considers it adequate to keep the present "positive-list system" and to add 12 new categories, and will not adopt the "negative-list system" under which dispatching is freely allowed in all fields excluding some. On the issue of allowing the workers to replace workers on childcare or elderly-care leave, the Council decided to allow dispatched workers to be sent in other jobs than port transport services, construction work and security guards, as an exception. But the period for worker dispatching will be restricted to one year, or the maximum length of time for those on childcare leave. Furthermore, the worker dispatch contract will not be renewed. In addition, the employer conducting worker dispatching services and the employer utilizing them will clearly state names of workers on childcare or elderly-care leave and other matters in their record of management so that they may return properly to work after they take their leave.

Concerning protection of dispatched workers, such as unilateral cancellation of the worker dispatching contract by the employer receiving the services, the report incorporates the following views. First, the government will draw up a model written notice of employment and a model notice clearly stating working conditions and will give guidance to and enlighten the company regarding dispatched workers, so as to clarify working conditions for the workers. Second, the government will establish measures to ensure stable employment of dispatched workers. For example, the employer utilizing worker dispatching services will notify the real employer of dispatched workers of the cancellation of a worker dispatching contract with "a certain grace period". Also measures will be taken so that both sides will take

adequate action concerning composition for damages. Third, the system of dealing with complaints from dispatched workers will be improved, together with a counseling system at administrative organs. On the basis of the report, the government will present a bill revising the Worker Dispatching Law to the Diet in fiscal 1996.

Special Topic

Company Severance Payment

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(1) Introduction

The company severance payment is a payment from the company to the employee at separation, and is a very widely spread practice in Japanese firms. Although separations occur for different reasons, i.e. either due to the employee quitting or through company discharge, severance payments are paid in both types of cases. The payment is usually more generous in the case of discharges than when the employee chooses to leave.

**Table 1 The Trend of the Proportion of Firms with
Severance Payments (%)**

year	Industries covered	1,000 employees and over	300 - 999 employees	100 - 299 employees	30 - 99 employees
1975	90.7	99.8	99.4	96.6	87.7
1978	92.2	99.9	99.9	97.3	89.6
1981	92.1	99.6	99.4	95.9	90.0
1985	89.0	99.9	98.5	94.9	86.1
1989	88.9	99.5	98.6	94.1	86.1
1993	92.0	99.7	98.7	95.2	90.1

Source: Ministry of Labour, *Retirement Allowance Survey, 1993*

Table 1 shows the trend in proportion of firms with severance payments among firms with 30 employees or more. As shown in Table 1, almost 100 percent of large firms (1,000 employees or more) and medium-large sized firms (300-999 employees) have severance payments. Even among small-medium firms (100-299 employees) and small firms (30-99 employees), more than 90 percent of all surveyed have severance payments.

The separation payment at the time of mandatory retirement, which is regarded as discharge or as termination of the employment contract due to the employee's age, is the most

generously paid and is called the retirement allowance. According to the *Retirement Allowance Survey* in 1993 by the Ministry of Labour, workers with college degrees and with more than 35 years of service received an average of 28 million yen at the time of mandatory retirement. This amount is equivalent to 48 months of monthly salary at the age of 60. Production workers with high school degrees who have more than 35 years of service received an average of 22 million yen at the mandatory retirement and this is equivalent to 46 months of monthly salary at the age of 60.

(2) The Company Severance Payment Scheme

Company severance payments, particularly the retirement allowance, have been regarded as important for encouraging employees to stay longer with the firms where they are currently employed (Note#1). Recent literature by American economists, however, describes the conspicuous tendency among American employers to design company pension plans to encourage employees to leave the firms at the age which employers designate as the normal retirement age (Note#2). In contrast, Japanese employers who are legally able to have the mandatory retirement practice do not seem to have built such incentives into the company pension scheme as American employers have.

Table 2 The Amount of Retirement Allowance by Length of Service

Age and Length of Service	The Amount of Severance Payment (A)	The Equivalent months of Wages Paid as the Amount of Severance Payment (B=A/monthly wage)
23 years old. one year	31	0.2
25 years old. 3 years	174	0.8
27 years old. 5 years	377	1.6
32 years old. 10 years	1,254	4.2
37 years old. 15 years	3,020	8.2
42 years old. 20 years	6,372	14.1
47 years old. 25 years	11,485	21.3
52 years old. 30 years	18,414	30.7
55 years old. 33 years	21,981	33.3

Source: Secretariat of Central Labor Arbitration Board, *Severance Payment, Pensions and Mandatory Retirement, 1992*

Table 2 shows company severance payments by age for regular workers with college degrees who have quit their company. Regular workers are defined here as workers who join the firm immediately upon graduation from school (in this case college) and have been working for the same firm ever since. Thus, regular workers as defined here of the same age will have the same length of service. For example, regular workers who have college degrees

and are 27 years old will always have 5 years of service, and those aged 55 will always have 33 years of service. Here we observe company severance payments only in the case of employees who have quit because we are interested in the effect of the incentive scheme of severance payments to maintain the loyalty of employees. No cases therefore of separation by discharge are shown.

As shown in Table 2, the amount of company severance payments increases as the employee ages within the same firm, that is the longer the employee stays with the firm the greater his severance pay becomes. Thus the employee is rewarded by staying longer with the firm. Company severance payments certainly seem to be designed to promote strong attachment to the company by the employees.

Theoretically however, employers whose firms have age and tenure related wage scales may have an incentive to encourage their employees to leave the firm when the wages of the employee exceeds his or her marginal productivity (Note#3). In fact, in the current recession, there are many interesting casual observations that suggest that Japanese employers are willing to let middle-aged and older managers leave their firms before the mandatory retirement age.




Figure 1 shows the ratio of company severance payments by age for regular workers who have quit, compared to those who have been discharged. This ratio should always be smaller than 1 and the gap between severance payments for workers who have quit and workers who have been discharged can be regarded as the penalty for quitting (Note#4). The company severance payment in discharge cases is severance payment paid when the employer wishes to let the employee leave. If the ratio between severance payments for workers who quit versus workers who are discharged equals one, we believe that there is no motivation for employers to keep their employees or to penalize those who quit. In other words, the penalty

for quitting should be zero when the ratio between firm severance payments for workers who have quit and those who have been discharged is one. As the employers' motivation to keep employees increases, the penalty becomes larger and the proportion becomes smaller. Figure 1 clearly shows that the proportion increases with the age of regular workers, i.e. as their length of service to the companies, increases. The proportion goes up to 0.95 for the regular employee aged 55 years.

This relationship trend means that the employers' motivation to encourage their employees to stay longer weakens as the employees get older. When the regular workers reach age 55, the employers have almost the same degree of motivation to let the employees leave the firms voluntarily as to discharge them. It seems that company severance payments in Japan encourage as policy employees to stay longer, but also to leave their company when they get old. This hypothesis is examined more numerically in the next section.

(3) Net Severance Payment Wealth

Kotlikoff and Wise (1985) calculated vested pension benefit wealth for U.S. company pensions. Although the same kind of calculation is not available in Japan because of the limitation of data and also because most Japanese firms do not pay retirement allowances to employees who quit before the mandatory retirement age (Note#5). Instead, as we wrote in the previous section, Japanese firms usually pay severance payments to employees, who quit, and we can calculate the "net severance payment wealth" by using the figures for these payments. There is a net gain in the amount of company severance payment created by postponing quitting for one year (Note#6).

Net severance payment wealth for regular workers is defined as following:

$$NSPW(a) = SP(a+1) - SP(a) \times (1+r) \quad \dots (1)$$

where $NSPW(a)$ is net severance payment at age a , $SP(a)$ is severance payment at age a , r is market interest rate (Note#7). If the principal and interest of severance payment at age a is smaller than severance payment at age $a+1$, namely if $SP(a+1) > SP(a) \times (1+r)$, the employee gains positive net severance payment wealth by postponing quitting for a year.

The data we use for calculating net severance payment wealth is from the study, *Severance Payment, Pensions and Mandatory Retirement* conducted in 1985 and 1987 by the Secretariat of the Central Labor Arbitration Board. This data is the most detailed currently available on company severance payments in Japan. One noteworthy limitation of this data is that it is a survey only of large firms with 1,000 or more employees.

The observed company severance payment here, called "model severance payment", shows severance payments for workers who have quit. These are regular workers who joined

the firm right after graduation from school and stay with the same firm until each reached the age and length of service category shown. The age and length of service categories are observed as a pair. For example, they are age of 25 and 3 years length of service, age 27 and 5 years of length of service, - - - age 55 and 33 years of length of service, etc. for regular workers with college degrees. Therefore, both age and length of service are identical time variables, and here we just use age as the time variable.

Although age is categorized at 2 or 5 year intervals as shown above in this data, we need severance payments for each age in order to calculate the equation (1). To obtain that age through the age figures of firm severance payments, we must interpolate the age from the age severance payments. We estimate the shape of severance payments to be in accordance with the following quadratic +u equation and this is assumed to be the firm severance payment function.


$$SP(a) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 a + \alpha_2 a^2 + u$$

where $SP(a)$ is the firm severance payment at age a and $\alpha_0 - \alpha_2$ are parameters and u is a normally distributed random term. We estimated the equation for regular workers in manufacturing.

By using these equations, we can interpolate firm severance payments for each age. Although equation (1) is the net severance payment wealth for one year, the interval of the surveyed years of data is 2 years. Therefore we have to calculate net severance payment wealth as following.

$$NSPW(a) = SP(a+2) - SP(a) \times (1+r)^2$$

Thus $NSPW(a)$ actually calculated here is net severance payment wealth by postponing quitting for two years.



(4) Empirical Results

Figure 2 shows the calculated net severance payment wealth of regular workers in

manufacturing by age. As seen in Figure 2, employees with college degrees receive 10 thousand to 120 thousand yen of net severance payment wealth by postponing quitting for 2 years. The rate of increase of the net severance payment wealth by age rises when employees are relatively young and peaks during the mid-40s. And after reaching the peak in the mid-forties, the net severance payment wealth profile begins to decline.

The fact that net severance payment wealth is positive and increases in the earlier part of an employee's job career within the firm, suggests that employers have a growing motivation to keep their employees from the 20's to the mid-40's when the marginal productivity of these employees is more likely to exceed their wages in the long term labor contract. Also the fact that net severance payment wealth begins to decline after the mid-forties is consistent with the theory that the employers' motivation to keep their middle aged employees decreases when the wages of these employees are more likely to exceed their marginal productivity.

The above results may have two implications. First, it reconfirms the theory that the firm severance payment is designed to encourage employees to stay longer during, at least, the earlier part of their job career in the firm. Secondly, it also confirms that this characteristic of firm severance payment which promotes firm loyalty among employees begins to weaken after the mid-40s.

It is important for us to promote more employment of older people to cope with the growing number of elderly in the years to come. But employment practices in Japanese firms which have been designed as an efficient instrument to focus on younger workers within a pyramid shaped population. This has not utilized older workers and has not offered attractive employment conditions so far. The above results suggest that employers of Japanese firms are motivated to keep younger workers whose wages are relatively low, and to let older employees whose wages have become high relative to their productivity, leave the firm.

NOTE

- (1) For detail see Seike(1993).
- (2) Lumsdaine and Wise(1994) provide a good survey of this.
- (3) See Lazear(1982,1992).
- (4) For detail see Seike(1993).
- (5) In order to calculate vested pension wealth as per Kotlikoff and Wise(1985), we need micro data reporting the vesting policy by firm.
- (6) For detail see Seike(1993).
- (7) We use the government bond yield as the market interest rate.

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Statistical Aspects

Recent Labor Economy Indices

	October 1995	September 1995	Change from previous year
Labor force	6,710 (10thousand)	6,749 (10thousand)	31 (10thousand)
Employed	6,496	6,529	16
Employees	5,296	5,294	61
Unemployed	214	219	15
Unemployment rate	3.2%	3.2%	0.2
Active opening rate	0.61	0.60	-0.03
Total hours worked	161.4 (hours)	160.4 (hours)	0.8*
Total wages of regular employees	283.1 (¥ thousand)	282.2 (¥ thousand)	1.3*

Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Ministry of Labour.

Notes: 1.*denotes annual percent change.

2.From February 1991, data of "Total hours worked" and "Total wages of regular employees" are for firms with 5 to 30 employees.

No. of Establishments Employing Foreigners and of Foreign Workers by Industrial Classification and Size of Establishment (Total of Directly and Indirectly Employed)

		Establishments				Foreign Workers			
		No. of establishments		Composition ratio		No. of foreign workers		Composition ratio	
		1994	1995	1994	1995	1994	1995	1994	1995
	Total	14,277	14,663	100.0	100.0	130,030	139,861	100.0	100.0
By industrial classification	A Agriculture	38	35	0.3	0.2	228	164	0.2	0.1
	B Forestry	5	3	0.0	0.0	27	18	0.0	0.0
	C Fishery	10	7	0.1	0.0	28	24	0.0	0.0
	D Mining	15	15	0.1	0.1	87	53	0.1	0.0
	E Construction	728	777	5.1	5.3	3,401	2,734	2.6	2.0
	F Manufacturing	7,756	8,211	54.3	56.0	88,077	97,894	67.7	70.0
	G Utilities	22	19	0.2	0.1	68	72	0.1	0.1
	H Transportations and telecommunications	515	516	3.6	3.5	5,066	5,765	3.9	4.1
	I Wholesale and retail trade and eating and drinking establishment	1,938	1,847	13.6	12.6	8,878	7,927	6.8	5.7
	J Finance and insurance	167	159	1.2	1.1	1,633	1,555	1.3	1.1
	K Real estate	21	28	0.1	0.2	97	71	0.1	0.1
	L Services	3,036	3,023	21.3	20.6	22,210	23,449	17.1	16.8
	M Government(not elsewhere classified)	26	23	0.2	0.2	230	135	0.2	0.1
By size of establishment (person)	1 1~ 4 employees	179	128	1.3	0.9	299	214	0.2	0.2
	2 5~ 29 employees	1,638	1,591	11.5	10.9	6,053	5,377	4.7	3.8
	3 30~ 49 employees	1,438	1,492	10.1	10.2	7,408	8,032	5.7	5.7
	4 50~ 99 employees	3,573	3,755	25.0	25.6	24,217	24,614	18.6	17.6
	5 100~ 299 employees	4,580	4,748	32.1	32.4	47,124	48,062	36.2	34.4
	6 300~ 499 employees	1,070	1,124	7.5	7.7	14,505	18,588	11.2	13.3
	7 500~ 999 employees	940	982	6.6	6.7	14,622	19,005	11.2	13.6
	8 1000 employees and over	859	843	6.0	5.7	15,802	15,969	12.2	11.4

Source: Ministry of Labour, *Report on Foreign Employment(1994, 1995)*