

JAPAN LABOR BULLETIN

ISSUED BY THE JAPAN INSTITUTE OF LABOUR

Vol.31 - No.03

March 1992

CONTENTS

General Survey

- ▶ Gov't Sees 3.5% Growth in 1992

Labor Management Relations

- ▶ Unionization Rate Hits Record-Low

Public Policy

- ▶ Contributions for Employment Benefits to be Reduced

Special Topic

- ▶ Gastarbeiter in Japanese Small Firms

Statistical Aspects

- ▶ Recent Labor Economy Indices
- ▶ From A 1991 White Paper on Youth

General Survey

Gov't Sees 3.5% Growth in 1992

On December 19, 1991, the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) and the Ministries of Finance and International Trade and Industry agreed on a government economic forecast that the economy will grow by 3.5 percent in real terms, or 5 percent in nominal terms in fiscal 1992. On the 21st, the Cabinet formally set the official government estimate of growth at 3.5 percent. The government is aiming at sustainable growth with brisk domestic demand as the source of demand growth. It predicts that the contribution of domestic demand to growth will be 3.6 percent, while external demand will be negative by about 0.1 percent.

The government economic forecast does not simply report business trends but also acts as a target for government economic management for the coming fiscal year. Thus, it is compiled and released in coordination with the government's budget which mirrors the basic stance of policy management.

The EPA, the main government agency which works out the government's economic forecast, insisted that the growth forecast be set at the 3.3-3.4 percent level. This figure suggests they believe that domestic demand growth will be stronger than the 1991 level and that this will mean continued firm growth without fears of recession. MITI, on the other hand, favored that the pace of growth should be at the 3.6-3.9 percent level, contending that "it is unwise for Prime Minister Miyazawa, who supports high growth, to forecast the slowest pace of growth in the past 10 years". Government officials finally settled on the 3.5 percent growth level. Reasons are: first, they felt that predictions of 3.1-3.4 percent growth would likely have a negative effect on corporate confidence which has begun to turn down. Second, Japan needs to show that it is making the utmost efforts to expand domestic demand in the wake of recent reports of a slowdown in the global economy, including in the U.S. .

Meanwhile, an overwhelming majority of private research institutes have predicted that the economy will grow at around 3 percent, and many have raised doubts regarding the government's growth forecast. Fifty-three private research institutes of banks, security houses and life-insurance firms predicted an average 2.9 percent expansion. Nomura Research Institute of Technology and Economics and Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank painted pessimistic pictures of the outlook for the nation's economy, forecasting growth of 2.3 percent. The most hopeful forecast was by the National Economics Research Institute, predicting 4.0 percent growth. Nomura analyzed that substantial expansion of the treasury investment and loan budget, even if implemented at this time, will prove effective from the summer at the earliest, thus making it impossible for GNP growth to reach 3.5 percent. A report compiled by

Itochu Economic Research Institute stated, "It will be difficult to achieve the 1992 government economic forecast in terms of both the real growth rate and trade surplus. From current business trends, chances are high that there could be a drop in the nation's economic growth below 3 percent and a surge in the trade surplus to around the \$100 billion level. To attain 3.5 percent real GNP growth, a steady economic growth must be expected in the summer-fall period of 1992. This will require substantial domestic demand expansion and furthermore, will require the third Bank of Japan discount rate cut."

Labor-Management Relations

Unionization Rate Hits Record-Low

The Basic Survey on Trade Unions, conducted in June and compiled in December 1991 by the Ministry of Labour, revealed that the unionization rate for 1991 declined to 24.5 percent, down 0.7 percent points from the year before, continuing the decline for 9 consecutive years since 1982. Secretary-General Yamada of Rengo (Japanese Trade Union Confederation), the largest central labor organization, commented, "We take this seriously, finding that we have done little to deal with the question of how to expand the organization." He thus added that Rengo would endeavor to "achieve a unionization rate of 30 percent" through strengthening of industrial organizations. The Ministry has carried out the Basic Survey each year since 1947.

Japan's unionization rate, after hitting 55.7 percent in 1947, dipped to the mid-30 percent range in the early 1950s. It has continued to decline from 1975 to the present after having leveled off for about 20 years. The foremost cause of the drop in the unionization rate is inability to adequately organize the rising number of employed workers, including part-timers and temporary workers, in the tertiary sector. The survey found that despite the increased number of employed workers of 1.87 million, the unionization rate, which is the ratio of union members to total employed workers, declined to 24.5 percent, far below the record low of 25.2 percent recorded in 1990.

The proportion of organized members by central group to the total number of union members was 61.4 percent (7.615 million) for Rengo, 6.6 percent (840,000) for Zenroren (National Confederation of Trade Unions) with many pro-Communist members and 2.4 percent (229,000) for Zenrokyo (National Trade Union Council) consisting chiefly of leftwingers of the Social Democratic Party of Japan. In addition, 22.2 percent (2.758 million) were not affiliated with central organizations and 9 percent (1.114 million) did not belong to any upper-echelon organizations.

The top three industrial organizations included Jichiro (All Japan Prefectural and

Municipal Workers' Union, 975,000 members), Jidoshasoren (Confederation of Japan Automobile Workers' Unions, 764,000 members) and Denkiroren (Japanese Federation of Electrical Machine Workers' Unions, 740,000 members) followed by Zensendomei (Japanese Federation of Textile, Garment, Chemical, Distributive and Allied Industry Workers' Unions, 540,000 members). The later started with labor unions in the textile industry and expanded its sphere of unionization efforts into commerce and distributing. Next is Zenkensoren (National Federation of Construction Workers' Unions, 523,000 members), which continues its efforts toward expanding unionization from areas of carpentry and plastering to other construction-related fields.

By firm size, the unionization rate was high at 58.7 percent in firms with 1,000 and more regular workers. This compares with 23.3 percent in those firms with 100-1,000 regular workers. It was, however, only 1.8 percent in firms with fewer than 100 regular workers which comprise a shade over 54 percent of total workers, indicating that workers in small firms remain virtually unorganized. By industry, the unionization rate stood at over 40 percent in government service, electricity, gas, steam supply and water, finance and insurance and 29.9 percent in manufacturing. The unionization rate was low at 14.1 percent in the services and at 8.8 percent in wholesale and retail trades and restaurants.

Public Policy

Contributions for Employment Benefits to be Reduced

On December 19, 1991, the Ministry of Labour's Central Council on Employment Security proposed that the government overhaul unemployment benefits under the existing employment insurance scheme.

The costs required for Employment Insurance Services are presently covered by contributions paid by both employers and employees as well as by a subsidy from the National Treasury. The contributions are as a rule 1.45 percent of the wage bill, of which 1.1 percent is used for the costs for unemployment benefits and are paid by both employers and employees at a rate of 0.55 percent each of the wage bill. The remaining 0.35 percent of the wage bill, paid only by the employer, is used for services for the stabilization of employment. In addition, a quarter of the costs for unemployment benefits are covered by a subsidy from the National Treasury.

The proposed plan for reviewing unemployment benefits calls for: first, reducing contributions (to be used for unemployment benefits) by 0.3 percent from the current 1.45 percent in fiscal 1993; second, cutting the subsidy from the National Treasury by around 20

percent; and third, as a temporary step for fiscal 1992, lowering contributions by 0.2 percent at a legally set rate and reducing by around 10 percent the subsidy from the National Treasury. The proposed measures to reduce contributions and the subsidy from the National Treasury, in compliance with the regulations stipulated by law, are based on an assessment of the recent revenues for employment in funds.

The reduction in the subsidy from the National Treasury faced strong objections from workers; however, the administration presented its view that it will begin studying basic issues regarding the employment insurance scheme.

Responding to the proposal made by the Council, the Ministry will submit to the next regular Diet session bills revising the Labour Insurance Levy Law and the Employment Insurance Law. The contributions and the subsidy from the National Treasury will be reduced for the first time in 17 years and 33 years, respectively. The proposed measures, when implemented, will enable both the employer and the worker to pay 0.4 percent of wages and salaries as contributions to the program. It means that the contributions will be reduced by 6,750 Yen for a worker with an annual income of 4,000,000 Yen and by 9,000 Yen for an employee with an annual wage of 6,000,000 Yen.

On the other hand, the wage bill of insurance funds amounted to around 970,000,000 Yen in 1990, a quarter of which was financed by a subsidy from the National Treasury. A 20 percent cut in the subsidy will lead to a reduction in annual expenditures of around 50,000,000 Yen.

Special Topic

Gastarbeiter in Japanese Small Firms


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Introduction

We are living in an era of great exodus and influx of immigrants and refugees across borders. Behind these movements are historical events such as the end of Cold War, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the resurgence of ethnic identities, the rise and decline of nationalism, the further widening of socio-economic differentials between South and North, and so on.

Japan, in which 'internationalization' is deemed a major political objective in the present decade, cannot be free from these probably irreversible waves, even if it might largely escape the influx of refugees due to the breakdown of communism. In fact, in the past couple of years, there has been a remarkable increase in number of the foreign workers from Asian, African and South American countries engaged in so-called the '3D'-i.e. dull, dangerous and dirty-jobs in Japanese small manufacturing, service and construction companies. Among those especially from Asian countries, many are 'illegal' temporary workers, being neither immigrants nor refugees, who sometimes get drawn into involvement with criminal elements.

Figure 1 indicates, first, that the total number of 'illegal' foreign workers increased dramatically from 1989 to 90 mainly because of legal revisions referred to below; secondly, the proportion of male workers grew remarkably in recent years - the proportion of males was 80.9% in 1990 compared with only 7.3% in 1984; thirdly, migrant (male) workers coming from Bangladesh, Korea, Malaysia and Pakistan increased rapidly in these two or three years, in sharp contrast with such countries as Philippines and Thailand.



In a sense, such an influx is very natural because employers of Japanese small firms

faced serious labor shortages in the 1980s on the one hand, and foreign workers were looking for good job opportunities in Japan which promised the chance to earn big money in a short time on the other. In other words, complementary pull and push factors resulted in the rapid inflow of 'illegal' overseas workers.

Despite the amendment of the legal framework for immigration in June 1990, however, neither the employers of small firms nor Gastarbeiter have been satisfied with the outcome. Legally, even now in principle the inflow of unskilled foreign workers into the Japanese labor market is rigidly prohibited. At the same time, it is envisaged that the labor shortage in small firms will not improve in the next decade (cf., Ministry of Labour, Department of Employment Security ed., 1991). Therefore, one of Japan's employers' associations has officially begun to talk of the necessity for cautious reassessment of the present legal regulations on immigration (Keizai Doyukai, 1991)⁽¹⁾. I will attempt to describe in brief below the outcome of the legal reforms implemented from June 1990, the actual working and living conditions of Gastarbeiter in small firms, employers' evaluation of their foreign workers and so on, based on research conducted jointly by the author in the summer of 1991⁽²⁾.

1. Effects of the Legal Amendment on Immigration

The new law on immigration was put into effect in June 1990. The main points of the reform were as follows. First the number of qualified statuses under which people can stay lawfully was enlarged from 18 to 28, which means the door particularly to foreign professionals and skilled workers was opened more widely. Secondly, people of Japanese descent (e.g. Japanese Brazilians) were permitted to stay in Japan without any limitation in terms of their activities. Thirdly, the sanctions on unlawful activities such as illegitimate staying or working, and the employment or related assistance of illegal workers, were intensified. Fourthly, the system of 'on-the-job learning' of skills and knowledge was recognized even for small and medium-sized firms under certain conditions (3). Of vital importance here is the second factor, because, despite the official hardline prohibition of workers from overseas working in unskilled jobs, this constituted *de facto* approval of the practice (4). Within the period of lawful stay, any Japanese Brazilian for example can legally perform '3D' jobs if they so choose. One may find here a 'contradiction' in the present legal regulations on immigration (5). It is beyond the scope of this article to pursue the question of whether the legal amendment on the second point was intended to breach the persistent public policy of 'no acceptance of Gastarbeiters'. The point is that some foreigners such as Japanese Brazilians no doubt are legally permitted to do unskilled jobs in Japan. Indeed, since the reform, a great many Brazilians of Japanese origin have visited Japan to work temporarily (cf., *Financial Times*, 11 October, 14 October and 16 December 1991).

As shown in Table 1, the number of Japanese Brazilians staying lawfully increased 5.5

times from 11,479 persons in 1987 to 63,462 in 1990. Among them, the overwhelming majority stayed 'for a short time' - less than one year - throughout the period, with a rapid increase of those classified as 'spouse of a Japanese' in 1990. This is the first readily observable effect of the legal amendment.

Table I. Qualified Statuses of Staying among Japanese Brazilians

	(unit: persons)					
	1985	86	87	88	89	90
Total	13,364	12,918	11,479	15,968	27,819	63,462
Short Staying	11,861	11,084	9,226	12,893	22,566	51,845
Training	466	521	576	628	851	1,027
Show Business & Entertainment	489	771	1,091	1,323	570	624
Spouse of a Japanese	78	84	88	503	1,178	7,545
Specified	102	94	128	223	2,206	5
Permanent Resident	—	—	—	—	—	1,777


Source: Ministry of Law, Annual Report of Immigration Control (yearly)

Secondly, a 'mild' dual labor market structure of foreign workers was created by the 1990 immigration law. In Japanese small firms at present, one can find two kinds of 'unskilled' foreign workers: one the legally-employed South Americans of Japanese descent, the other the Asia - African Gastarbeiter many of whom are illegal in their status of stay or work. Thus among small businesses, there appears to be a dual labour market formed along the lines of legal qualification (see Fig. 2). Some additional clarifications are necessary regarding the 'mild' dual labor market structure shown in Figure 2. First, the independent parts suppliers ('makers') or 'primary' sub-contractors with around 100 employees or more are likely to employ lawful Japanese Brazilians for example with higher wages. Medium-sized 'secondary' sub-contracting firms with more than 50 employees are able to a certain extent to employ these people, but smaller enterprises - often 'secondary' sub-contractors processing work from larger firms on a piecemeal basis - recruit 'illegal' workers coming from Asian and African countries (employers of small firms in our sample acknowledged that most of the workers from these areas are 'illegal' in terms of their staying qualifications), since they cannot employ those of Japanese descent because of their higher wages. Secondly, the wage differential between the Japanese descendants and Asians and Africans can be attributed to the fact that the former are legally employed and the latter often illegal. There was no substantial difference in terms of skill or even ability of Japanese language. Our research reveals that these abilities are closely correlated not with 'ascriptive' origin but with the length of stay or working in Japan. Thirdly, lawful recruiters or brokers have found opportunities for business mainly in the upper tier - the Japanese descendants - of the dual labour market. If we subtract the recruiters' or brokers' margin from the hourly or daily wage paid for the Japanese descendants, the wage becomes much the same as those of Asian-African workers. Accordingly, in these two senses - one that there is no difference in

terms of skill or language ability, two that the wage difference is not decisive, it is possible to call the dual structure 'mild'.

Thus, two consequences at least were brought about by the legal reforms on immigration in June 1990; one the 'breakthrough' approval of foreign workers (most Japanese descendants are 'foreigners') allowing them to engage in unskilled jobs during lawful stays; two the creation of a 'mild' dual labour market structure.

Fig.2 'Mild' Dual Labor Market for Foreigners in Small Manufacturing Companies



2. Segmented Labor Markets and High Mobility

The wage rate in the dual labour market, whether hourly or daily (the former hourly wage prevailed in the manufacturing and service industries, and the latter daily wage in the construction industry, which is the same for Japanese workers), basically reflects the balance of demand and supply of workers in small firms at the moment. The hourly wage of 1,000 yen shown in Figure 2 for Gastarbeiter is closely linked with those of Japanese part-time workers. According to our survey, the average hourly wage for male migrant workers in all industries is 1,130.6 yen - in the construction industry the figure is 1,405.2 yen - while that of Japanese part-time workers is 1,044.3 yen for males in all industries, and 1,382.2 yen in the construction industry. The fact that the wage rate in construction is much higher than in other industries reflects the greater labor shortage in the construction industry.

Figure 2 also indicates other features of foreigners' labor market segmentation along the lines of nationality, or more properly, the kinship and territorial networks, which are smaller units of segmentation. This network of relationships works in many respects from the point of departure to return to their respective home countries. In many cases the workers come to

Japan with friends or as members of a family. Otherwise, it is difficult to settle down smoothly into certain job which may or may not be introduced by a broker or recruiter. When working alone in a firm, they keep in close contact with friends or kin, through telephone calls in the weekend for example. Through these networks, they gain vital information such as new job opportunities, good shops for purchasing the ingredients for meals, access to appropriate public services, and so on. If they work together, this 'communal' network also means sharing room and board whilst working in the same firm. In some cases, kinship and national-territorial relationships extend to gathering at restaurants in or outside of the local city, and eating, drinking, singing and chattering regularly in the weekend. The third significant feature indicated by Figure 2 is the high mobility of foreign workers. According to the employers of small firms in our research, the average length of service is only 11.7 months, with no difference by nationality.

The reason why foreign workers so frequently move from firm to firm is clear. As temporary workers planning to stay two or three years on average, their concentration is focused on earning more money, whether to be sent to their home country or saved, within this short time by doing '3D' jobs. Naturally they seek jobs with higher hourly or daily wages. The result is high mobility. There is no difference in this respect between the Japanese descendants and Asians or Africans. As indicated above, mobility is positively supported by kinship- and national-territorial networks as well as by brokers. Fourthly, related to high mobility, a few remarks ought to be made on brokers. The employers in our sample seldom mentioned shady operations by brokers or 'yakuza'. They did often mention fluent Japanese-speaking foreigners calling to ask whether there was any job vacancy open to their compatriots. However, in their view such people would have difficulty in expropriating big money from their compatriots, because the latter would soon run from their control. They had heard stories of brokers' unscrupulous deeds several years ago, but the situation seemed to have changed. In sum, regarding foreigners' labour market, the level of wages is closely linked with those of Japanese part-time workers, there is a segmented labour market along the lines of supply, i. e., by nationality, or territorial or kinship networks, with high mobility from firm to firm in search of better terms and working conditions, and little role for brokers.

3. Working and Living Conditions

It has been stated that foreign workers doing unskilled jobs are not from the lower or underprivileged classes in their home countries in terms of educational attainment or father's occupational status (as for the 'middle class origin', see Tokyo Metropolitan Institute of Labour Studies, 1991). This is borne out to a considerable extent with our samples. Indeed, the workers have to be able to collect money to buy the transportation tickets to Japan, and they also are literate, both of these factors being crucial conditions for leaving their home country and finding job in Japanese firms. But this is not the whole story. It is possible, for

example, to borrow from brokers, and not a few of the foreigners in the sample were deemed to have come from lower classes, although the proportion to the total is not certain. Meanwhile, as for working conditions in Japan, to begin with, monthly income amounts to 240,000 yen for male migrant workers in all industries on average, and 264,000 yen in the construction industry including overtime payments.

Secondly, hours of overtime are not necessarily long. In most cases it averages less than two hours a day, and is no different from that of Japanese workers in the same firm. Thirdly, in general no bonuses are paid, which is probably the most fundamental difference from Japanese co-workers in terms of wage payment (Japanese regular workers have annual bonus of nearly four months on average even in small firms).

Fourthly, they are mostly engaged in lower skilled or '3D' jobs as illustrated by an employer interviewed: 'their jobs can be mastered with ease within one week. It is typically unskilled work, although not necessarily dirty or dangerous. It requires more than three month at least if they are to do all the related jobs well. There is a serious labour shortage in higher skilled jobs as well such as NC programming in my factory, but I don't intend to assign the migrant workers to such jobs at present mainly because of their short stays in Japan. They return home after two or three years at most'.

Fifthly, as for housing, among the 172 employers with foreign workers in our sample, 19.8% responded that they 'supply company accommodations without cost', 14.0% 'supply rented houses without cost', 12.8% 'supply company accommodations with some charge', 19.8% 'supply rented houses with some charge', and 9.8% 'pay a housing allowance' respectively. These figures imply that many small firm owners are concerned with housing for the migrant workers. Moreover, individual housing conditions for foreign workers are not necessarily as cramped as is generally believed. We cannot assume that most suffer from bad housing conditions and are obliged to live in overcrowded rooms.

Lastly, regarding the participation of foreigners in Japanese social security schemes, migrant workers appear to be little concerned with pension schemes, mainly because of their short stays. However, Japanese descendants mostly join the National Health Insurance Scheme and pay the premiums, and not a few foreign workers are enrolled by employers in private overseas insurance schemes for travelers. The very low rate of participation among workers from Asia and Africa, however, is due not only to the inadequacy of the schemes for aliens (e. g., the relation between pension scheme and short stays) but also to the large number of 'illegal' workers involved - as far as they stay or work unlawfully, they cannot participate in public security schemes - as well as their lack of knowledge of Japanese social security schemes.

4. Employer's View of Migrant Workers

Among the interesting results of our survey, a few remarks can be made about employers' views of Gastarbeiter. First of all, their evaluation of foreign workers is generally 'fairly good' in terms of attendance, work attitude and ability, compared with ordinary Japanese workers. For example, 80.9% of migrant workers were deemed by employers as 'better' than those of Japanese co-workers in the same firm in terms of attendance. Regarding attitude, 64.5% were considered to be 'better' than Japanese co-workers; and as for ability, 45.5% were evaluated as 'better' than Japanese co-workers.

Secondly, although employers of small firms have diverse plans regarding future employment of foreign workers, overall they consider such employment basically 'acceptable'. According to our sample of 1,754 employers, including those with no foreign workers, 12.5% of employers at small firms considered the increase of unskilled foreign workers to be 'welcome' and 34.5% 'unavoidable'. Also, 13.4% considered their becoming permanent residents as 'welcome' and 31.0% 'unavoidable'. As for increasing cost for social security and public education for foreigners, 19.7% consider it 'a matter of course' and 44.7% 'unavoidable'.

Thirdly, in particular, employers in the construction industry interviewed said unanimously that 'it is pointless to try to stop foreign unskilled workers coming to Japan to work. Unfortunately, it is not at all possible to get Japanese - especially young - workers into small construction firms. They can easily find jobs with better opportunities and they reject '3D' jobs. Moreover, we don't have the alternative of substituting mechanization or foreign direct investment to solve the labor shortage problem, unlike in manufacturing industry. In the not too distant future, for our own survival, we will have to consider seriously how to train and raise up foreigners to be craftsmen and skilled workers, and not just take on unskilled foreign workers.'

Fourthly, such a positive attitude of employers towards the inflow of foreign workers into the Japanese labor market confronts the opposing governmental stance of prohibiting it rigidly. In fact, the evaluation by employers of small firms of the present legislation on immigration, especially regarding the sanctions on employers' illegitimate behaviour, divides sharply into halves.

We may after all be nearer the crossroads in terms of appropriate solutions to the 'foreign workers problem'. As for the most crucial issue of how to deal with the inflow of unskilled (often 'unlawful') foreign workers into the Japanese labor market, one alternative may be to draw precisely the picture of an 'orderly' acceptance of temporary unskilled migrant workers (6), as well as improving the system of 'on-the-job learning' of skills and knowledge in terms of

the period of learning and number of 'trainees'.

Notes:

- (1) Its publication Japanese Course, for instance, says: 'although it is of basic importance to create employment in local areas of each country, bearing in mind the reality that a great many unlawful migrant foreigners are already working everywhere and also considering the balance of supply and demand in Japan's domestic labor market, we should take a positive decision to accept an 'orderly' inflow of unskilled foreign workers' (Keizai Doyukai, 1991: 13).
- (2) The research consisted of two kinds of surveys; one a questionnaire survey conducted in August 1991 with a useful sample of 1,754 employers of small manufacturing, service and construction industry companies located in Tokyo, Gunma, Nagano and Shizuoka prefectures. Among these, 172 or 9.8% were actually employing foreign workers. The second consisted of interview survey of employers of 30 small firms in these three industries conducted simultaneously with the questionnaire survey. The findings are published in Inagami et al. (1992).
- (3) For details of the legal amendment in 1990, see Suwa (1990).
- (4) The Japanese government gives the following reasons for prohibiting the inflow of unskilled foreign workers; it will very likely prevent the improvements of working conditions, management innovation or 'modernization' of small companies, as well as the extension of employment opportunities for elderly or part-time workers. Such reasoning, however, cannot be fully supported by the results of our survey, because the employment of foreign migrant workers is proceeding in paralleled with the mechanization or 'rationalization', improving working conditions such as wage increases and shortening of working hours, especially in small firms employing foreign workers. Moreover, we cannot assume that small firms suffering severely from labour shortages intend to employ migrant workers - whether their status of stay or working is lawful or not - mainly because of 'cheap labor' in preference to employing Japanese part-time workers or the elderly. Of course, the evidence does not demonstrate the continued parallel development of improved working conditions and management innovation. The point is not to argue in general terms, but to establish an empirical linkage between these two elements.
- (5) Otherwise, the de facto approval of Japanese descendants to do unskilled jobs implies a rise of 'nationalistic' sentiment also observed in some of western European countries at present.
- (6) One political option to prevent the 'illegal' influx of immigrants and the related spread of xenophobia is to grant temporary work permits. Very recently, for example, Germany and Russia signed an agreement to allow up to 11,000 Russian contract workers to find jobs in the German labor market every year, as well as offering training for a further 2,000 young laborers and apprentices. A similar policy has already been adopted for Poland and other eastern European countries. Behind the German policy lies fear of a new influx of unofficial migrant workers from the former 'Eastern' block. cf., Financial Times, 8 January 1992.

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Publications
of the Japan Institute of Labour

MANAGING JAPANESE WORKERS

Personnel Management - Law and Practice in Japan
by Tadashi Hanami (Professor of Sophia University)

Size A5, 106pages, 1991

Price: 2,500 Yen (postage not included)

Statistical Aspects

Recent Labor Economy Indices

Recent Labor Economy Indices

	November 1991	October 1991	Change from previous year
Labor force	6,543 (10 thousand)	6,554 (10 thousand)	119 (10 thousand)
Employed	6,412	6,422	114
Employees	5,078	5,047	142
Unemployed(S.A.)	138	133	5
Unemployment rate(S.A.)	2.1 %	2.0 %	0.0
Active opening rate(S.A.)	1.31	1.33	- 0.12
Total hours worked	173.1 (hours)	169.9 (hours)	- 0.9*
Total wages of regular employees	(¥thousand) 265.2	(¥thousand) 263.6	4.1*

Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Ministry of Labour.

- Notes:
1. S.A. denotes seasonally adjusted.
 2. * denotes annual percent change.
 3. From January 1991, data of "Total hours worked" and "Total wages of regular employees" are for firms with from 5 to 30 employees.

From A 1991 White Paper on Youth

Contents of School Work and Activities

		Primary school students(4th to 6th graders)		Junior high school students		Senior high school students		College and University students	
		Average time (Hr.)	(Min.)	Average time (Hr.)	(Min.)	Average time (Hr.)	(Min.)	Average time (Hr.)	(Min.)
Classes and school events	Weekdays	5	47	6	03	5	17	3	41
	Saturday	3	58	4	13	3	58	1	45
	Sunday		21		39		30		23
Extra curricular activities	Weekdays		19		47		25		14
	Saturday		16	1	10		33		24
	Sunday		12		48		27		07
After-school study sessions	Weekdays	1	13	2	18	2	23	1	00
	Saturday		56	2	04	1	56		52
	Sunday	1	00	2	37	2	47	1	11

Source: Public Opinion Poll Division, NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, *A National Survey on Use of Living Time (1990)*

How One Lives

	High school students		College & University students		Working youth	
	1970	1990	1970	1990	1970	1990
Become rich	5.1	13.3	3.7	6.2	7.7	16.1
Become famous	3.0	4.5	4.5	7.6	1.8	1.6
Live to suit one's liking	54.9	56.4	55.8	68.3	53.5	58.6
Live in ease and comfort	14.7	17.0	16.2	11.7	19.7	17.7
Live honestly	17.6	6.8	13.0	4.1	13.1	4.0
Sacrifice one's life for one's nation and society	4.3	1.5	5.1	2.1	3.5	1.2
Don't know	0.3	0.5	1.7	-	0.7	0.8

Source: Headquarters for Measures to Deal with Youths' Problems, Management and Coordination Agency, *A Survey on Youth Attitudes*